An Analysis of a Virtually Synchronous Protocol by Arnon, Dan & Sharma, Navindra
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
02
24
1v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  8
 M
ar 
20
15
An Analysis of a Virtually Synchronous Protocol
Dan Arnon and Navindra Sharma
EMC Corporation
September 9, 2018
Abstract
Enterprise-scale systems such as those used for cloud computing require a scalable and
highly available infrastructure. One crucial ingredient of such an infrastructure is the ability
to replicate data coherently among a group of cooperating processes in the presence of process
failures and group membership changes. The last few decades have seen prolific research into
efficient protocols for such data replication. One family of such protocols are the virtually
synchronous protocols. Virtually synchronous protocols achieve their efficiency by limiting
their synchronicity guarantee to messages that bear a causal relationship to each other. Such
protocols have found wide-ranging commercial uses over the years. One protocol in particular,
the CBCAST protocol developed by Birman, Schiper and Stephenson in 1991 and used in their
ISIS platform was particularly promising due to its unique no-wait properties, but has suffered
from seemingly intractable race conditions. In this paper we describe a corrected version of
this protocol and prove its formal properties.
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1 Introduction
Many modern computational tasks are performed by groups of processes that are physically dis-
tributed and are prone to failure. Such computations require efficient ways to reliably multicast
messages within the group in the presence of group membership changes. These requirements are
becoming increasingly common in data center systems such as storage systems and server clusters.
Meeting these requirements while maintaining good performance is challenging. There is a need to
keep all the members of the group in a synchronized state, whatever that may mean, and there is a
need to avoid split brains and subtle race conditions that can occur when the group is reconfigured.
These requirements generally fall into three categories:
Message synchrony For the group to work coherently, at least some messages must be delivered
at different group members in the same order.
Reconfiguration atomicity When the group membership changes, there must be some guarantee
against split brains and all the members of the new group must reach some kind of agreement
on a common initial state.
Progress guarantee There must be some guarantee that messages get delivered to the whole
group.
Meeting such requirements can be costly. To reduce these costs different authors have proposed
weaker requirements within these three categories that allow for more performant systems. The
original papers describing the process group model [8, 4] envisioned incremental group reconfigu-
rations, possibly limited to one member addition or removal at a time. This makes reconfiguration
more expensive. More recent treatments of the subject assume general reconfigurations that oc-
cur in bulk. In [3] bulk reconfiguration is joined with a flexible framework of delivery guarantees
that allows for the tailoring of these guarantees to the needs of specific applications. However this
framework requires all message delivery to stop while the system is being reconfigured. The Rambo
system [13] is designed more specifically for a distributed atomic memory, but it allows messages
to flow while bulk reconfiguration is taking place. It also enjoys weaker synchrony guarantees that
are tailored to the specific requirements of atomic memory.
One multicast paradigm that proved especially useful is Virtually Synchrony (see [4]). Virtual
Synchrony achieves high efficiency albeit with some reduced availability (see [7]) by serializing
messages only when they may be causally linked. Messages that are not causally linked may
be delivered in different orders to different members of the process group. Virtually synchronous
multicast protocols have been used for a long time in many commercial and non-commercial systems,
for example Horus (see [5]) and Transis (see [1]). For a comprehensive specification of group
multicast protocols and their properties, see [9].
One truly exceptional proposal for a virtually synchronous protocol was described in [6]. The
CBCAST protocol that the authors describe in that paper not only promises virtual synchrony and
reconfiguration atomicity without stopping message delivery, but also promises to work without
any delivery guarantee - all message broadcasts are ship-and-pray. While this last promise is not
explicitly elaborated on in the paper, it is what makes the CBCAST protocol exceptionally powerful.
Unfortunately, CBCAST did not deliver on its promise. Its very complexity meant that race conditions
could never be completely wrung out of it. The goal of this paper is to fix that protocol and provide
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a rigorous proof of its properties.
Following [6], we describe the CBCAST algorithm within a formal model that contains processes,
channels, packets, and an opaque group membership service. Channels connect pairs of processes,
enabling them to send point-to-point packets (we reserve the term ”messages” to the entities that are
multicast by CBCAST). The group membership service (GMS) is assumed to be a primary-component
GMS (as opposed to a partitionable one, see [9].) GMS provides ordered notifications of group mem-
bership changes. Each component of the model can fail independently. As a result, failure scenarios
can get very complex.
We provide a rigorous proof of two essential properties of the CBCAST protocol, the Causal Order
Property and the Progress Property. The Causal Order Property says that messages are delivered
at each process in an order that respects the causality relationships between messages. The Progress
Property says that if two processes in the group never halt, then any message broadcast by one is
delivered at the other, provided that only a finite number of processes join the process group. Both
of these properties are proved to hold under any pattern of component failure in the cluster.
The proof is divided into a number of parts, each of which is a separate investigation. The outline
of the proof plan is as follows:
• The first part deals with the formal model only and is independent of CBCAST. We analyze
the failure scenarios in the model (stop failures only) using an axiomatic approach, and show
that under reasonable assumptions on the behavior of the GMS all partial failure cases are
equivalent to either the failure-free case or to a simultaneous failure of all the components. In
essence the group behaves like a single fault domain. This frees us to carry out the rest of the
proof under the assumption that no failures ever occur. A critical ingredient in the analysis
is the fact that the formal act of removing a process from the group by the GMS can mask the
stop-failure of a process.
• In the second part we give a detailed description of the CBCAST protocol. The version described
here is not the most general and certainly not the most efficient. Our goal here is to achieve
maximum simplicity in order to facilitate a clear analysis. Some parts of the protocol that
deal with the admission of processes into the group are new. Specifically the steps of state
donation and co-donation.
• The third part deals with processes that are admitted to the group by GMS (as opposed to
processes that are in the group from the start). We prove the rather surprising fact that a
process admission event can be reduced to a process removal event. To do that we construct
an explicit mapping from a history that contains an admission of a process G to a history
that contains a removal of an ”opposite” process -G. We show that the two histories carry the
same computation and share the same progress and causality order properties. As a result
we can get rid of any finite number of GMS admission events.
• The fourth part is the proof of the Causal Order Property and the Progress Property in the
special case where no new processes are ever admitted to the group beyond the original mem-
bers. A central idea in the proof is the concept of effective routes. The CBCAST protocol allows
a message to be transmitted from source to target multiple times and through multiple routes.
However only one of the routes is effective and all the other are redundant. Concentrating on
the effective routes simplifies the analysis a great deal.
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Our model makes a number of assumptions on the behavior of the group membership service. There
are many different implementations of such a service in the literature. Such a service is sometimes
referred to as a reconfiguration service. See for example [3, 13]. Virtually all such services are based
on the Paxos protocol (see [11, 12]). Elsewhere we describe a detailed implementation and analysis
of a compliant (primary-component) group membership service (see [2]).
2 The Underlying Computational Model
2.1 Introduction
In this section we create a detailed, axiomatic computational model in which the CBCAST protocol
executes. The purpose of this model is to create a context that is rich and precise enough for
us to carry two of the core arguments in this paper. First, that the failure model of a group
computation with a group membership service and stop faults is equivalent to the failure model
of a single process, where the only failure is an instantaneous failure of the whole system; Second,
that any group computation that is based on CBCAST where a process G joins in the middle of the
computation is identical to a computation carried by a similar group that includes the process G
from the start. The first argument allows us to carry out our analysis of the properties of CBCAST
without taking failures into consideration. The second allows us to carry the analysis under the
assumption that processes never join the group during the computation.
The first argument is carried out in the current part. We use the interface points between different
components in the model as a place to ”shift the blame” from channel and GMS failures to process
failures. Then we hide the process failures by subsuming them into the group membership service
itself. To put this last shift in other words, if a process is officially removed by the group membership
service and halts at the same time, then we can analyze the event as a pure group membership
service event rather than as two separate events (a group membership service event and a component
failure). To make this intuitive, process removal and process halting have to occur simultaneously.
The notion of simultaneity requires some work since our model does not include a notion of time.
We perform a careful analysis of the partial order that exists between events in the model to show
that they can be laid along a timeline in such a way that desired events (such as process removal
and process halting) occur at the same time.
To make blame shifting possible, we model the channels as including a queuing stage at the sending
and receiving ends of the channel - in other words we add a send queue and a receive queue to each
channel. A channel that fails to ship a packet to its destination can shift the blame to the sending
process by claiming that the faulty packet never left the send queue. We add a similar queue for
GMS notifications. This queuing construct is not as artificial as it may sound. Queuing is inherent
to communications networks. The sender/channel and channel/receiver boundaries are inherently
blurry.
The main technical difficulty in the analysis is keeping infinities from creeping in. If we try to shift
the blame for an infinite number of failures to a single component of the model, we end up with
the absurd conclusion that an infinite number of events happen in a finite period of time. It is for
this reason that the analysis proceeds by dealing with each class of failures in one fell swoop rather
than dealing with failures one at a time.
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2.2 Model Overview
We assume a group of processes - the group having a set of initial members to which at various
times new processes can be added, while processes that are already in the group can be removed.
We do not care how the decision to add or remove processes is made. We assume that there is an
opaque group membership service (GMS for short) that notifies all the current member processes of
any addition or removal of a process. The notifications for each process are appended by GMS to a
GMS receive queue. Eventually the process dequeues each notification in order and processes it. We
do not assume that the membership service is reliable - notifications can stop arriving at an eligible
process.
We assume that the processes can communicate with each other by exchanging packets on point-to-
point, unidirectional channels. We assume that the packets in each channel arrive in the order they
were sent, i.e. the channel between the source and target is FIFO. The channels are not assumed
to be reliable. When a process P wants to send a packet to a process Q, it appends the packet to
the send queue of the outbound channel between P and Q. Eventually an opaque driver dequeues
the packet and sends it through the channel. When Q receives a packet from P , the packet is
appended to the receive queue of the inbound channel by an opaque driver. Eventually the process
dequeues each packet and processes it. To make the model more symmetrical we assume that there
is a channel, called the self-channel, between each process and itself.
We assume that each process executes some code. This code is made up of a protocol PROTOCOL and
an application APP. The application is an arbitrary execution thread that makes message multicast
requests to communicate with other processes. Each message multicast request is appended to the
APP receive queue of the process. Eventually the process dequeues each message and multicasts it.
APP does not directly specify the set of recipient processes of each multicast. Doing so is impossible
since the roster of processes changes over time and messages are multicast asynchronously rather
than immediately. Instead, APP must specifiy a functional set of recipients, and leaves it to PROTOCOL
to decide who are the members of the functional set at the moment that it performs the multicast.
In general many functional sets can be specified for a multicast. For example if a natural order
relation exists between all possible processes (e.g. an order on their identifiers) then the smallest
member process, largest member process, or two smallest processes can be specified as functional
sets. If the processes have distinguishing characteristics (e.g. colors) then the blue processes or
ultraviolet processes can be specified.
In our analysis we do not assume any order or distinguishing characteristics. This leaves us with
only one interesting functional set, namely the universal set of all member processes. A multicast
to the universal set is called a broadcast. This is not really a limitation because functional sets can
be specified by APP in the body of each message. Once the message is received by a process, the
receiving process can decide on its own whether it belongs to the specified set. If it does not it can
simply ignore the message.
PROTOCOL is a set of non-blocking callbacks that the process uses to process the packets, notifications
and message broadcast requests that it dequeues from its various receive queues. We assume that
the processing of each received item - packet, notification or message broadcast request - completes
without any context switching, meaning that the items are processed one at a time; that items that
arrive at the same queue are processed in the order at which they were queued; and that APP does
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not progress while an item is processed.
We assume that each process has a state. The state can be thought of as the totality of values of
all the variables that are managed by PROTOCOL. We assume that APP can read some of this state,
but cannot change any of it directly. This does not mean that APP has no private state of its own,
however we do not model it. We will see that at least in the case of CBCAST, and plausibly in
the general case, APP is started from scratch at each new process and therefore we can treat it as
stateless for the purpose of our analysis.
Since the state is only changed by PROTOCOL, the state of a process when it dequeues the next packet,
notification or message broadcast request is identical to the state it had after it finished processing
the previous packet, notification or message broadcast request. The initial group of processes all
start their life with an identical initial state. Any process that is subsequently admitted into the
group by GMS starts life with a state that is identical to the state of a parent which must be an
existing group member. The parent is selected by GMS. To be more accurate, the new process starts
life by dequeuing the GMS notification of its own joining. At that moment is has the same state that
its parent has when it dequeues the same notification from GMS. This makes the act of dequeuing
the notification similar to the execution of a fork() system call in UNIX.
There are a few types of events in our model. Each event occurs at a specific process and can be
either a queuing event, also called a side effect event, or a dequeuing event, also called a trigger
event.
A trigger event occurs when any item is dequeued from some receive queue. This includes packet,
notification and message broadcast request dequeuing events. Such an event triggers processing,
using the appropriate callback supplied by PROTOCOL.
A side effect event occurs when the process multicasts information by appending one or more
identical packets to the send queues of outbound channels, destined to different processes. Such an
event always occurs as a result of the execution of a callback, and is therefore a side effect of that
execution. In other words, the side effects of a trigger are determined by the current state of the
process and by the implementation of PROTOCOL. APP cannot initiate a queuing event directly, but
only through the issue of an message broadcast request.
The various send queues of outbound channels; the receive queues of inbound channels; and the
receive queues of notifications and message broadcast requests form an integral part of a process in
our model. The inclusion of queuing as part of the model is in recognition of the fact that queuing
is a fundamental property of any communication mechanism and is not an artifact of any particular
implementation. The presence of queuing blurs the boundary between a processes and channels
and between processes and GMS. This insight is crucial in reasoning about failures.
Some events have an actual or potential causal relations between them. This is captured by a partial
order on events. The queuing event of a packet always precedes its dequeuing event. In addition,
the events at a specific process are linearly ordered, capturing the assumption of a single threaded
processing of trigger events. In fact, at every process the sequence of events can be broken into
intervals composed of a single trigger followed by a finite sequence of the zero or more side effects
that are caused by the processing of the trigger. We refer to such a sequence as a transaction.
The structure of the transactions that compose the event set of each process is determined by
PROTOCOL. Each trigger event causes a PROTOCOL-specific callback to be executed. The callback can
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generate an arbitrary number of queuing events.
While the number of events may be infinite over the life of a process, there is only a finite number
of events preceding each particular event.
2.3 The Formal Model
2.3.1 Ingredients of the model
P
The set of all processes.
Ph
The set of all halting processes. Ph ⊂ P.
V
The number of views. 0 < V ≤ ∞
Si where i < V
The set of members of the ith view. Si is a finite set of processes. We will freely refer to both
Si and its index i as a ”view”.
K
The set of all packets. A packet k has a content which in denoted by cont(k) and is protocol
and application specific. A packet is sent from a source process and received by a target
process. Due to faults, a packet may fail to be sent or received. So in general a packet is
either sent and received, or sent and not received, or not sent. In the second case, where the
packet is sent but not received, we say that the packet is dropped.
By abuse of notation we will say k = c when we mean cont(k) = c.
F
The set of all GMS notifications. For each view i and each process P there is at most one
notification for view change i that is supposed to be received at P . We denote this notification
by vi(P ). A notification has a content which is made up of the view change type (join or
removal), the identity of the process that is joining or is being removed, and possibly the
identity of the parent process (in case of a join). We denote the content of the notification by
cont(vi(P )). The possible contents for a notification are:
nREM〈pid〉
Process pid is removed.
nJOIN〈pid,p pid〉
Process pid is joining, and its parent is the existing member p pid.
nSTART〈pid〉
You (the recipient of the notification) are the new member of the group, and your
identifier is pid.
nSTOP
You (the recipient of the notification) are no longer a member of the group.
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Due to faults, a notification may fail to be received by its target process. In such a case we
say that the notification is dropped.
By abuse of notation we will say vi(P ) = c when we mean cont(vi(P )) = c.
A
The set of all message broadcast requests from APP. An message broadcast request r has
a content which is denoted by cont(r) and is application specific. Since these requests are
generated locally we assume that they are never dropped.
−−→
PQ
The unidirectional channel from a source process P to a target process Q. A channel is a set
of packets.
−−→
PQ ⊂ K.
E,≺
The set of all events, partially ordered by the ≺ order relation. If e ≺ f we say that event e
precedes event f , or that e is earlier than f and f is later than e.
The ≺ relationship is a weak partial order, meaning that in some cases both e  f and f  e
can hold at the same time for e 6= f . We will in indicate such cases by e ≍ f and say that e
and f are contemporaneous.
EP
The set of all events that occur at process P . If this set is empty we say that P is uninitialized.
AP
The set of all requests that APP issues at process P .
GMS
A Group Membership Service that delivers view change notifications to the processes.
PROTOCOL
A protocol that determines how triggers are processed and what side effects they create.
APP
A user application that generates message broadcast requests at various processes.
Events in the model
kQU
The packet k ∈
−−→
PQ is appended to the send queue of the channel. This event occurs at P .
kPR
The packet k ∈
−−→
PQ is removed from the receive queue of the channel and processed. This
event occurs at Q.
vi(P )
PR
The notification vi(P ) is removed from the receive queue at process P and processed. This
event occurs at P .
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rPR
The message broadcast request r ∈ AP is removed from the APP receive queue and processed.
This event occurs at P .
The set EP includes all the packets queued by P , all the packets dequeued by P , all the view
notifications dequeued by P , and all the message broadcast requests dequeued at at P :
EP =
{
kQU ∈ E |∃Q(k ∈
−−→
PQ)
} ⋃ {
kPR ∈ E |∃Q(k ∈
−−→
QP )
}
⋃
{vi(P )
PR ∈ E}
⋃
{rPR ∈ E |r ∈ AP }
2.3.2 The PROTOCOL interface
We mentioned in the introduction that each notification; dequeued packet; and message broadcast
request has to be processed somehow. The processing is mostly controlled by PROTOCOL which
consists of a small number of non-blocking calls that we will describe below.
When APP wishes to broadcast a message m it invokes the PROTOCOL call protBroadcast(m).
When a brand new process group Grp is initialized, the PROTOCOL call protStart(Grp, P ) must be
invoked manually at each member process P ∈ Grp.
When a notification n is dequeued at a process P from the notification queue, some pre-processing
has to occur before PROTOCOL can take over. First of all removal notifications have to be separated
from join notifications.
If the notification is the removal notification of a process R then the PROTOCOL call protRemove(R)
is invoked.
If the notification is a join notification of a process J with parent E, the process P has to determine
whether it is the designated parent of the joining process. If P is not the designated parent (P 6= E)
then it invokes the PROTOCOL call protJoin(J , E). If P is the parent then it must first fork the
new process and call protRun(J) in the child process to initialize J . This is summarized in the
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pseudo-code below.
Procedure doNotification(n)
Input: n is the notification being processed
if n = nREM〈R〉 then
protRemove(R);
end
else if n = nJOIN〈J,E〉 and E 6= self then
protJoin(J,E);
end
else
// the local process is the parent
switch fork() do
case parent:
// this block is executed when fork() returns in the parent
protJoin(J,E);
endsw
case child:
// this block is executed when fork() returns in the child
protRun(J);
endsw
endsw
end
When a received packet k is dequeued at a target process T from the receive queue of an incoming
channel
−→
ST , the process invokes the PROTOCOL call protPacket(k, S).
All in all the following six non-blocking calls must be implemented by PROTOCOL:
protBroadcast(m)
This call is issued by APP when it wishes to broadcast a message m.
protStart(roster, P)
This call is issued manually at each initial member process when the group is initialized at
the start of view zero. roster is the set of initial members and P ∈ roster is the identifier of the
process at which the call is issued. While GMS does not issue join notifications to the initial
members at view zero, this call appears as if it were issued in response to such a notification.
protRun(P)
This call is issued at a new process right after it is forked from its parent. P is the identifier
of the new process. At the moment of forking the new process is identical to its parent and
this call is the means by which the new process acquires an independent identity. While GMS
does not issue a join notification to the joining member, this call appears as if it were issued
in response to such a notification.
protRemove(P)
This call is issued in response to a removal notification from GMS. P is the identifier of the
removed process.
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protJoin(P, E)
This call is issued in response to a join notification from GMS. P is the identifier of the joining
process and E is the identifier of its parent.
protPacket(k, S)
This call is issued when a packet is dequeued from a receive queue. k is the received packet
and S is the process identifier of the sender of the packet.
2.3.3 The APP interface
The user application APP runs in its own thread at each process. Its only means for communicating
with other processes is the protBroadcast call. With the help of PROTOCOL, APP can have view
change notifications and messages from other processes delivered to it. In order to facilitate these
deliveries, APP must implement a small number of non-blocking callbacks that are executed by
PROTOCOL within the context of PROTOCOL calls. As a result these callback execute outside the
context of the main APP-thread.
We assume that these callbacks are used by APP to manage an opaque (APP-dependent) data struc-
ture ReplicatedData. This data structure can be manipulated by the callbacks, but the main APP
thread can only read that structure and not change it. In order to allow ReplicatedData to be
initialized APP must provide an initialization callback.
The callbacks are not able to invoke the protBroadcast call. Only the main thread can do that.
Specifically, APP must obey the following rules:
1. APP must implement the following callback functions:
• GroundState(): This call creates the initial value of ReplicatedData. It is called when
a member of view zero is initialized, thus guaranteeing that the replicated data will
start with coherent values at all the initial processes (the meaning of ”coherent” here is
APP-specific. It can simply mean ”identical”, but it can also indicate a more complex
relationship.)
• ApplyMessage(msg, originator): This call applies a message msg from process originator
to ReplicatedData. One possible way to apply the message is to append it to a delivery
log (see [4]).
• ApplyJoin(pid): This call applies the notification that a process with identity pid has
joined the group. In [4] such notifications are appended to the delivery log.
• ApplyRemoval(pid): This call applies the notification that the process with identity pid
has been removed from the group. In [4] such notifications are appended to the delivery
log.
2. APP must implement a Main(pid) function. This is the main application thread. Its only
parameter is the local process identity. This implies that when APP is started at a new
process, it has no context except for the local process identity and the information that is
available to it through ReplicatedData.
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3. The Main() function of APP may invoke the protBroadcast procedure but the callbacks may
not.
4. The Main() function has read-only access to ReplicatedData. It may manage additional data
outside of ReplicatedData without any restrictions.
5. The callbacks listed above have read and write access to ReplicatedData. They have access to
no other information. In particular they do not know the identity of the local process.
6. The Main() function runs in its own thread. The callbacks are called in the context of a
critical section, and therefore must not block.
2.3.4 Model axioms and histories
View Interval Axiom
A process P is a member of at least one view, and the set of views of which it is a member is an
unbroken interval, called the view interval, which is either finite or infinite. Formally
{i|P ∈ Si} = {i|j(P ) ≤ i < r(P )}
If j(P ) > 0 then we say that j(P ) is the join view of P . If j(P ) = 0 then we say that P is original.
If r(P ) < V then we say that r(P ) is the removal view of P . If r(P ) = V then we say that P is
not removed.
View Change Axiom
View zero, which contains the initial group members, is finite. Every subsequent view differs from
its predecessor by the addition or removal of a single process. As a result, each view other than
view zero is the join view or the removal view of exactly one process.
Channel Axiom
Every packet belongs to exactly one channel. If k ∈
−−→
PQ we say that P is the source of k and Q is
the target of k.
Packet Event Axiom
Every packet k ∈
−−→
PQ has a single queuing event kQU ∈ EP and at most one dequeuing event
kPR ∈ EQ. If the packet has a dequeuing event then
kQU ≺ kPR
in other words k is queued (at the sending process) before it is dequeued (at the receiving process).
If k1 6= k2 then k1
PR 6= k2
PR and k1
PR 6= k2
QU, wherever these events exist.
If e = kQU then the set of packets Me = {k′ | k′
QU
= e} is finite. Me is called the multicast set of e.
All the packets in Me have identical contents and share the same source P , but they must all have
different targets. In other words, no two of them belong to the same channel. The set of target
processes Te = {Q ‖∃k′ ∈Me(k′ ∈
−−→
PQ)} is called the target set of e.
14
Packet Order Axiom
Channels are FIFO. Precisely, if
• packets k and k′ belong to the same channel
• kQU ≺ k′QU
• k′PR exists
then kPR exists and kPR ≺ k′PR.
GMS Axiom
The following GMS notifications exist in the model
• For each process P and each j(P ) < i < r(P ) there is exactly one notification vi(P ).
– If i is the join view of process J (with parent E) then vi(P ) = nJOIN〈J,E〉
– If i is the removal view of process R then vi(P ) = nREM〈R〉.
• For each process P with j(P ) > 0 there is exactly one notification vj(P )(P ) = nSTART〈P 〉
• For each process P with r(P ) < V there is exactly one notification vr(P )(P ) = nSTOP
We also add the following artificial notifications that do not relate to actual GMS notifications:
• For each original process P we add a notification v0(P ) = nSTART〈P 〉
• For each process that halts and is not removed we add a notification vV (P ) = nSTOP
Notification Event Axiom
If vi(P ) exists, there is at most one vi(P )
PR event. If i = 0 and P is original then vi(P )
PR exists.
If vj(P )(P )
PR exists, we will use the shorthand Prun ≡ vj(P )(P )
PR
If vr(P )(P )
PR exists, we will use the shorthand Phlt ≡ vr(P )(P )
PR
Notification Order Axiom
View notifications are dequeued in order. Precisely, if j(P ) ≤ i < i′ ≤ r(P ) and vi′(P )PR exists
then
1. vi(P )
PR exists.
2. vi(P )
PR ≺ vi′ (P )PR
Parent Axiom
If J joins in view j(J) > 0 and E is its parent and Jrun exists then vj(J)(E)
PR also exists and
vj(J)(E)
PR ≍ Jrun. In other words a new process would not instantiate unless its parent has
processed the notification that announces its joining but we model the two events as being contem-
poraneous.
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Process Order Axiom
The precedence order ≺ is a linear order at each process P . In other words any two events in EP
are ≺-comparable.
Process Liveness Axiom
A process P does not queue a packet to send to another process Q unless Q appears live to P . In
other words, if k ∈
−−→
PQ then the following two conditions must be met:
1. Q ∈ Sj(P ) or, vj(Q)(P )
PR ∈ EP and vj(Q)(P )
PR ≺ kQU
2. If vr(Q)(P )
PR ∈ EP then kQU ≺ vr(Q)(P )
PR
Take note that this axiom is a statement about the behavior of PROTOCOL, since its callbacks are
the only elements of the model that generate queuing events.
Piggyback Axiom
Packets are processed in the same or higher view than the one at which they are queued1. In other
words, if k ∈
−−→
PQ and kPR exists, then for any i, if i ≤ j(P ) or vi(P )PR ≺ kQU then i ≤ j(Q) or
vi(Q)
PR exists and vi(Q)
PR ≺ kPR.
Self Channel Axiom
Packets on self channels are processed early. If P is a process, k ∈
−−→
PP is a packet and i is a view
such that vi(P )
PR exists and kQU ≺ vi(P )PR then kPR exists and kPR ≺ vi(P )PR.
Request Event Axiom
If request r ∈ AP exists, there is at most one rPR event.
Order Foundation Axiom
The ≺ order in EP is very well founded, meaning that every event is preceded by only a finite
number of earlier events. Formally, for any event e ∈ EP :
|{f ∈ EP |f ≺ e}| <∞
If EP 6= ∅ then Prun exists and is the first element of EP .
If Phlt exists then is the last element of EP .
Minimal Order Axiom
The order ≺ is the minimal order generated by the order relations at each process and by the orders
stipulated by the Packet Event Axiom and the Parent Axiom.
1For this axiom to hold the implementer has to ”piggyback” the latest view change information on every packet
that is sent, in case this information is missing at the receiving side
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First Halting Axiom
A halting process P has a finite event set. In other words, if P ∈ Ph then |EP | <∞.
Second Halting Axiom
Let P be a process and let i be a finite integer in the interval j(P ) ≤ i ≤ r(P ). Then
• If vi(P ) is dropped then vi(P )PR does not exist.
• If P does not halt and vj(P ) is not dropped for any j ≤ i then vi(P )PR exists. In other words
if P does not halt then it dequeues all the notifications that it is legally allowed to process.
Third Halting Axiom
Let P and Q be processes and let k ∈
−−→
PQ be a packet. Then
• If P does not halt then k is sent. In other words, a non-halting process eventually sends all
the packets that it queues to its send queues.
• If k is not received then kPR does not exist.
• If
– P and Q do not halt
– Every packet k′ ∈
−−→
PQ where k′QU  kQU is received
then kPR exists. In other words in the absence of a gap or stoppage, a packet in a channel is
eventually dequeued and processed.
Fourth Halting Axiom
Let P be a process and let r ∈ AP be an message broadcast request. If P does not halt then rPR
exists. In other words a non-halting process eventually dequeues and processes all of its message
broadcast requests.
Definition 1. A particular vector of values (P,Ph,K,F,A,E,≺) that satisfies the model axioms is
called a history.
2.4 Event Order and Time
The group computation model that we presented in the previous section does not include a notion
of time. But it does include a notion of causality that is embodied by the partial order on events.
Furthermore, any instance of group computation, embodied by the notion of a history, does unfold
in physical time. How is physical time related to event order? intuitively, effects always follow
causes in time. Also, within any finite interval of time only a finite number of events can occur.
Beyond that we can say nothing. In other words, given any physical group computation in our
model there should be a timestamp mapping
time : EH → R
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Where H is the history of the computation, R is physical time as represented by the real numbers,
and time(e) is the physical time at which the event e occurs. The mapping time(·) must have the
following properties:
1. e ≍ f =⇒ time(e) = time(f)
2. e ≺ f =⇒ time(e) < time(f)
3.
∣∣∣ {e ∈ EH | time(e) < r} ∣∣∣ <∞ for all r ∈ R
Conversely, any arbitrary timestamp mapping time(·) that meets the above criterion should be
realizable by a physical computation that yields the history H . One simply has to assume that the
the computation unfolds at each process at the speed that is dictated by time(·).
With that in mind, we want to show that every history can be realized by a physical computation
that unfolds in physical time in a particularly convenient fashion. Namely we want to show that
for every history there is a timestamp function that enjoys the additional property
4. time(vi(P )
PR) = i whenever vi(P )
PR exists
In other words, all the notification events for view i occur at exactly the same time. By constructing
such a realization we will demonstrate that race conditions where different processes have different
ideas about group membership can be ignored and the local view change notification events at the
various processes can be collapsed into a single event. This is exactly what we intend to do in
section 5.
For this kind of timing to be possible we must show that the partial order ≺ is stratified by view.
In other words we must show that every event e can be assigned a value view(e) such that
• e  f only if view(e) ≤ view(f).
• view(vi(P )PR) = i.
It turns out that this can be done for any history H .
2.4.1 Ko¨nig’s Lemma
A key tool in this and subsequent investigations of the event order relation in H is Ko¨nig’s Lemma,
a well known property of some partially ordered sets. We use the following formulation of the
lemma:
Lemma (Ko¨nig’s Lemma). Let A be an infinite partially ordered set with a first element a0 where
the following properties hold for any element a ∈ A:
• a has a finite number of immediate successors.
• If b > a then there is an immediate successor b0 of a such that b ≥ b0.
Then A contains an infinite ascending branch.
Proof. Call an element a ∈ A heavy if it has an infinite number of successors. Then obviously a0 is
a heavy element. We will show that every heavy element has a heavy successor. Once we do that
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we can choose a heavy successor a1 to a0, a heavy successor a2 to a1, etc. until we get an infinite
ascending branch a0 < a1 < a2 < . . . .
Let a be a heavy element. By assumption, each successor b > a is mediated by an immediate
successor of a. Since there are an infinite number of the former and only a finite number of the
latter, there must be some immediate successor c of a that has an infinite number of its own
successors. In other words, c is a heavy successor of a.
2.4.2 Stratifying events by view
We start our investigation by showing that the set of notification events of each view form a maximal
semi-antichain in the partial order ≺, and that these semi-antichains partition the packet events by
the view at which they occur, a notion that we will make precise.
For each finite view i in the view interval 0 ≤ i ≤ V define
Gi = {vi(X)
PR|vi(X)
PR exists}
The sets Gi form a partition of all the notification events in H .
We now extend the partition to all the events. For all finite 0 ≤ i ≤ V Define
Kˆi = {e ∈ E |g  e for some g ∈ Gi}
Ki = Kˆi \
⋃
i<j≤V
Kˆj for finite 0 ≤ i ≤ V
We will now investigate the order relations between events in the different Gi sets. We will show that
each Gi is a semi-antichain, meaning that there are no strict ≺-inequalities between its elements,
and that elements in a high Gi never precede elements in a low Gi.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there are processes P and Q and views i, j such that
vi(P )
PR ≺ vj(Q)
PR
Then i < j.
Proof. The Minimal Order Axiom implies that the relation vi(P )
PR ≺ vj(Q)PR is derived from a
sequence of parent/child relations (vj(J)(E)
PR ≍ Jrun) and queuing/dequeuing relations (kQU ≺
kPR). We will prove the claim by induction on the number of intermediate steps in the shortest
derivation.
If the derivation is immediate then the two events must occur at the same process, namely P = Q.
In this case the Notification Event Axiom and the Notification Order Axiom imply that i < j and
we are done.
If the derivation is longer, look at the first step. This step can be of packet type or parent/child
type.
If the first step is of packet type then there is a process R and a packet k ∈
−→
PR such that kPR
exists, kQU ∈ EP and
vi(P )
PR ≺ kQU ≺ kPR ≺ vj(Q)
PR
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By the Piggyback Axiom this implies that i ≤ j(R) or vi(R)PR ≺ kPR. If vi(R)PR ≺ kPR then we
can create a shorter derivation leading from vi(R)
PR to vj(Q)
PR and conclude by induction that
i < j.
If i ≤ j(R) then we can create a shorter derivation leading from Rrun = vj(R)(R)
PR to vj(Q)
PR and
conclude by induction that j(R) < j and therefore i < j.
If the first step is of parent/child type then there is an initialized process J that is a child of P and
vi(P )
PR  vj(J)(P )
PR ≍ Jrun  vj(Q)
PR
and either the rightmost or leftmost inequalities is strict.
The left inequality implies, by the Notification Event Axiom and the Notification Order Axiom,
that i ≤ j(J). If the inequality is strict then i < j(J).
The right inequality implies by induction that j(J) ≤ j. If the inequality is strict then j(J) < j.
Together these facts imply that i < j and we are done.
Corollary 1. Gi ⊂ Ki
Corollary 2. Every event e ∈ E is a member of exactly one Ki.
Proof. It follows directly from the definition that e cannot belong to more than oneKi. The difficult
part is showing that e belongs to some Ki. The event e occurs at some process Q and therefore
Qrun  e. Therefore e ∈ Kˆj(Q). If V <∞ then there is a largest j such that e ∈ Kˆj and therefore
e ∈ Kj and we are done. To finish the proof we have to show that even when V =∞ there is such
a largest j.
By the Order Foundation Axiom, there is a largest j such that vj(Q)
PR  e. We will show that
j is the maximal value we are looking for. Suppose there is a process P and a view i such that
vi(P )
PR  e. If the derivation of this relation is immediate then P = Q and by definition i ≤ j.
For a non-immediate relation we proceed by induction on the length of the shortest derivation.
If the derivation starts with a packet type step then there is a process R and a packet k ∈
−→
PR such
that
vi(P )
PR ≺ kQU ≺ kPR  e
By the Piggyback Axiom the leftmost inequality implies that i ≤ j(R) or vi(R)PR ≺ kPR. If
vi(R)
PR ≺ kPR then we can create a shorter sequence leading from vi(R)PR to e and conclude by
induction that i ≤ j.
If i ≤ j(R) then we can create a shorter sequence leading from Rrun = vj(R)(R)
PR to e and conclude
by induction that j(R) ≤ j and therefore i ≤ j.
If the derivation starts with a parent/child type step then there is a child J of P such that
vi(P )
PR  vj(J)(P )
PR ≍ Jrun  e
The lefthand inequality occurs within EP and therefore we know that i ≤ j(J). Also, since Jrun =
vj(J)(J)
PR we can conclude by induction that the righthand inequality implies that j(J) ≤ j.
Therefore i ≤ j and we are done.
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Definition 2. If an event e ∈ E belongs to Ki, we say that the view of e is i and denote it by
view(e) = i. It follows from the proof of Corollary 2 that all the events in EP immediately following
a notification event vi(P )
PR share the same view i.
Next we investigate the order between the Ki sets.
Lemma 2. Let e and f be events such that e  f . Then view(e) ≤ view(f).
Proof. By definition there is an event g ∈ Gview(e) such that g  e. Therefore g  f and therefore
f ∈ Kˆview(e). It is easy to see from the definition of K∗ that this implies view(e) ≤ view(f).
Corollary 3. The partial event order ≺ is very well founded in E, meaning that for each event e,
the set {f ∈ E |f ≺ e} is finite.
Proof. Let e be an event and let i be the view of e. Then for every preceding event f ≺ e with view
j we have j ≤ i by Lemma 2. Therefore if a process P joins at a view that is higher than i then
EP does not contain any predecessor of e because for any f ∈ EP we have Prun ≺ f and therefore
view(f) > i. So all the events that precede e come from early joining processes, and it follows from
the View Change Axiom that there is only a finite number of such processes.
Suppose that the partially ordered set of predecessors of e (including e itself) is infinite. The
Minimal Order Axiom implies that each event in the set has at most two immediate predecessors
(one at the process and one at the channel. A join event of a child has one strict immediate
predecessor at the parent process.) The same axiom, together with the Process Order Axiom and
Order Foundation Axiom imply that every predecessor is mediated by an immediate predecessor.
By inverting the direction of the order Ko¨nig’s Lemma implies that there is an infinite decreasing
sequence
e = e0 ≻ e1 ≻ e2 ≻ · · ·
All the predecessors of e reside on a finite number of early joining processes, and therefore there is
one process X that contains an infinite number of the events in the regression chain ej1 ≻ ej2 ≻ · · · .
But this means that ej1 is an event in EX that has an infinite number of predecessors at the same
process X . This contradicts the Order Foundation Axiom.
2.4.3 Creating an event timeline
We want to show that the properties of the event order in H are sufficient for the creation of a
timeline that meets the basic timeline criteria (1)-(3) as well as the additional criterion (4).
The na¨ıve plan is to start by assigning time(g) = v for each event g ∈ Gv. This should work thanks
to Lemma 1 and because the sets Gv are finite. Then it would be tempting to squeeze all the events
in Kv \Gv into the open time interval (v, v + 1) ∈ R.
This would have worked if we could guarantee the finiteness of Kv. But we cannot do that because
of a number of permissible pathological situations. For example, a process can be removed and yet
not halt. Such a process could generate an infinite number of events with a fixed view. Another
example is a process that is not removed, but stops receiving GMS notifications at some point. As
a result all the events at the process have a fixed view beyond a certain point. A reasonable group
communication protocol would eliminate such pathologies (e.g. through various timeout clocks that
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would force a process to halt when a pathology is suspected.) In Section 2.5.1 we explore a set of
such ”reasonableness” assumptions. For now we explore the more general situation that requires
more finesse in constructing the timeline.
The idea is to force the events in Gv to occur contemporaneously while allowing some events in Kv
to occur indefinitely late, bounding their timing by a measure of their pathology. We measure the
pathology of an event e using the notion of a view bound:
Definition 3. Let K =
⋃
0≤i<V(Ki \Gi). Let e ∈ K be an event. The view bound of e is
vb(e) =
{
min {w|∃g(e ≺ g ∈ Gw)} if such views exist
V otherwise
Definition 4. Kb denotes the set of events in K of bound b < V. KV denotes the unbounded
events in K.
It follows from the definition of view() and from Lemma 1 that vb(e) > view(e).
It follows from Corollary 3 and from the fact that the sets Gi are finite that the set K
b is finite for
each b < V. The set KV may be infinite.
We can now amend our timing plan by placing the events in the finite set Kb on the time interval
(b − 1, b) and by carefully distributing the events in KV between different time intervals. To do
this we need the following set-theoretic lemma:
Lemma 3. Let (A,≺) be a countable, very well founded, partially ordered set. Then the elements
of A can be listed in a sequence that respects the partial order ≺. In other words, the partial order
≺ can be extended to a total order of order type ω, the order type of the natural numbers.
We will prove the lemma below. We use Lemma 3 to order the elements of KV into a sequence
KV = {e1, e2, e3, . . . }
that respects the ≺-order.
Now we can place all the events of E on a timeline.
Obviously, every event in g ∈ Gv occurs at time v. As we mentioned before, the events of Kb occur
in the time interval (b − 1, b). Lemma 3 guarantees that the events in Kb can be arranged along
that interval in a way that respects the ≺-order. In order to reserve some free time to schedule KV
events in the interval, we restrict the events in Kb to the smaller interval (b − 1, b− 1/2).
Now we can place the events of KV along the timeline. To make matters simpler, we will place
all of the events in this set at times of the form time(ei) = ni + 3/4 where ni ∈ N. We do that
inductively by defining:
time(ei) = max
{
⌊time(f)⌋|f ≺ ei
}
+ 7/4 (⌊x⌋ stands for the integer part of x)
This inductive formula is well defined because each ei has a finite number of predecessors (Corollary
3) and because every predecessor of ei inKV must come earlier in the sequence than ei and therefore
has its time already defined.
Our construction of a timeline for E clearly satisfies conditions (1), (3) and (4). We have to
demonstrate that condition (2), which stipulates that the timeline respects the ≺-order, is also
satisfied. Take any two events e1, e2 such that e1 ≺ e2.
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If e2 ∈ KV then by construction time(e1) < time(e2). Henceforth we will assume that if e2 ∈ K
then vb(e2) < V.
If e1 ∈ Gi and e2 ∈ Gj then Lemma 1 implies that time(e1) = i < j = time(e2).
If e1 ∈ Gi and e2 ∈ K then Lemma 2 implies that view(e2) ≥ i and therefore vb(e2) > i. Since we
can also assume vb(e2) < V it follows that vb(e2)− 1 < time(e2) < vb(e2). Therefore
time(e1) = i ≤ vb(e2)− 1 < time(e2)
If e1 ∈ K and e2 ∈ Gj then by definition vb(e1) ≤ j < V and therefore
time(e1) < vb(e1) ≤ j = time(e2)
We are left with the case where e1, e2 ∈ K. The order e1 ≺ e2 implies vb(e1) ≤ vb(e2) and we are
assuming that vb(e2) < V. If there is a strict inequality vb(e1) < vb(e2) then
time(e1) < vb(e1) ≤ vb(e2)− 1 < time(e2)
If there is equality then both e1 and e2 belong to the same set K
vb(e1) = Kvb(e2) and their timing
matches their order by construction.
Proof of Lemma 3. The set A is countable. Let the bijection h : N → A be an arbitrary ordering
of A into a ”bad” sequence (one that does not necessarily extend the ≺-order.)
Let c∗ = c1, c2, c3, . . . be an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers where each number appears an
infinite number of times (for example one could use the sequence 1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 1, 4, 3, 2, 1, . . .)
To create the sequential extension of the ≺-order, Start with an empty ”good” sequence. We will
append the elements of A to the good sequence one at a time using the following infinite process.
At the nth step, look at the cthn element of the bad sequence, namely the element h(cn). Now do
the following:
1. If h(cn) has already been appended to the good sequence, do nothing.
2. If some predecessor a ≺ h(cn) has not yet been appended to the good sequence, do nothing.
3. If h(cn) has not yet been appended to the good sequence, but all of its predecessors in the
≺-order had been appended, append h(cn) to the good sequence now.
The good sequence that this procedure generates has some obvious good properties. It includes at
most one copy of each element of A, and the sequence order respects the ≺-order. We just have to
show that every element of A is eventually appended to the good sequence.
Assume instead that some element of A is never appended to the good sequence. Look at the subset
A0 ⊂ A of elements that are never appended. This subset is not empty by assumption. Since the
≺-order on A is very well founded, there must be a ≺-minimal element in A0. Suppose that this
minimal element is a0 = h(j). Since the ≺-order is very well founded, the element a0 has a finite
number of ≺-predecessors a′1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
k.
By assumption all of these predecessors are appended to the good sequence, and this must happen
by some finite step n0. By our assumption on the sequence c∗ there is some high number n > n0
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such that cn = j. At step n the element a0 = h(j) = h(cn) will be inspected and it will be found
that all of its predecessors have already been appended to the good sequence. As a result a0 will
be appended at this point, contrary to our assumption.
2.5 Understanding Faults
A history represents a possible computation by a group of processes in our model. Such a com-
putation can be plagued by different types of stop faults - halting processes, dropped packets and
dropped GMS notifications. Our goal is to demonstrate that by adding a small number of reasonable
restrictions to the model, we will be able to analyze all histories in our model under the assumption
that all faults are eliminated except for one simple fault - the simultaneous halt of all the processes
in the group. This is a very desirable property, because it means that the whole group behaves the
same way a single process would - albeit at a much higher performance and availability level.
The fault simplifications techniques that we propose all involve the use of timers, timeouts and
voluntary process halts when timeouts occur. But we are going to keep our computational model
asynchronous and avoid introducing the notion of time explicitly. We achieve this by introducing
axiomatic correlations between certain faults. These correlations can be forced to occur through
the use of timers and timeouts, but these implementation details are not part of the model itself.
Let us start by looking at notifications. Suppose that P fails to dequeue a notification that P is
entitled to. How can that happen? According to the Second Halting Axiom either some vj(P ) is
dropped or P halts. So the blame can be assigned to P or to GMS. If we want to simplify the fault
model and eliminate GMS faults, we must shift the blame to P . But this is not possible unless P
halts. A reasonable implementation will not allow a process P to continue running indefinitely when
GMS becomes unresponsive. At some point P will timeout and halt voluntarily. If that happens
then we have a hope of shifting the blame to P and away from GMS.
A similar observation can be made about packets. Suppose there is a packet k ∈
−−→
PQ that is queued
by P but not dequeued by Q. How does that happen? According to the Third Halting Axiom either
P halts (which opens the possibility that k is never sent), or Q halts (which opens the possibility
that k is never dequeued even if it is received) or else k - or some packet ahead of k - is dropped. So
the blame can be assigned to P , to Q or to the channel
−−→
PQ. If we want to simplify the fault model
and eliminate
−−→
PQ faults, we must shift the blame either to P or to Q. But this is not possible
unless one of them halts. A reasonable implementation will not allow P and Q to continue running
indefinitely when the channel between them becomes unresponsive. At some point one of them
must be successfully evicted, and failing that, both of them will timeout at some point and halt
voluntarily. If that happens then we have some hope of shifting the blame to P or Q and away
from the channel between them.
This built-in ambiguity of the boundary between a process and its channels and membership service
allows us to reinterpret the root cause of visible faults. If a packet is not dequeued, we can shift
the blame from the channel to the process and vice versa. If a notification is not dequeued we can
shift the blame from the membership service to the process and vice versa. But there are limits
to this blame shifting game. If a process halts, we cannot keep on blaming it forever. If other
processes keep sending it packets indefinitely, then at some point the channels leading to the halted
process must start dropping packets since there is no process on the target side to receive them. If
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the membership service keeps attempting to inform the halted process of view changes, and never
succeeds in evicting it, then its notifications will have to start dropping at some point.
Well implemented processes will not, however, keep attempting to send packets to a process that
has already halted a long time ago. A well implemented membership service will not keep a halted
process as a member in view after view indefinitely. A well implemented process will monitor its
channels and GMS and attempt to detect problems and remove them, and at some point it will have
to give up and halt.
If everyone behaves well enough then perhaps the blame for all the faults in the system can be
shifted to the processes.
The process faults themselves cannot be eliminated entirely, but they can be greatly simplified.
When a process halts, there can be an arbitrary, finite number of unsent packets in its send queues,
and an arbitrary finite number of packets, notifications and message broadcast requests in its receive
queues. The halt can occur in the middle of the processing of a trigger event, when some of the
side effect events have already occurred while others have not. This is very different than what one
would expect to happen when a process is removed in an orderly fashion. In an orderly removal you
would expect a notification to go to all the processes, including the removed process itself, and you
would expect the group to enter a quiescent period during which all on going tasks are completed
and all packets in flight are received and processed while the application execution is put on hold
so it does not create any new work. Only once the group is fully quiescent will the removed process
halt, the group reconfigure itself, and finally resume its normal work under the new configuration.
We will demonstrate that under reasonable assumptions, a general process halt can be simplified to
look like an orderly removal - with the aforementioned exception of a simultaneous halt of the whole
group. This means that with this one exception, we can view any process halt as the consequence of
a planned process removal, rather than as a failure that was the cause of a removal. In other words,
we can make process failures go away entirely, with the one notable exception of a simultaneous
system-wide failure.
First of all we can assume that a halting process completes the execution of its final transaction
before halting (see Section 2.2 for a definition of transactions). This can affect its send queues and
its internal state, but it does not affect any or the remaining processes as long as the packets that
the transaction generates remain stuck in a send queue. Also as long as the newly generated packets
are not sent out they do not adversely effect the perceived reliability of the outbound channels of
the process.
A further simplification can be achieved by emptying out the receive queues of the process. This is
more tricky. The basic idea is pretty simple - just assume that the process dequeues and processes
all the items in its receive queues before it halts. This can generate a lot of side effects, but as long
as the side effects are stuck in their respective send queues, the surviving members of the group
will not be affected.
A final simplification can be achieved by emptying out some of the send queues. This is the most
tricky part since it allows a process that is presumably already halted to affect other processes
by sending them additional packets. In a sense the halted process can alter the information held
by other processes and change history ”from the grave”. This can be made acceptable if we limit
ourselves to only sending packets bound to processes that appear to have halted even earlier. This
should confine any new information to the world of the dead and prevent it from altering history.
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There are three additional complications.
The first and easiest complication is that the order of processing must comply with the Piggyback
Axiom.
The second and more pernicious complication is that the processing must comply with the Self
Channel Axiom. The issue is that while most side effects can be left stuck in a send queue or sent
”downstream” to an already halted process, the latter axiom sometimes forces packets on the self
channel to be sent, received and processed, thus generating more side effects, which themselves
could result in more packets on the self channel, ad infinitum. We cannot allow that to happen
because this violates the First Halting Axiom. This problem does not go away by itself. But it
does not arise if PROTOCOL is implemented in a reasonable fashion and does not generate infinite
loops for itself in the absence of external stimuli. If the protocol meets this vacuum convergence
condition, then we can assume that a halting process leaves no unprocessed or partially processed
items.
The third and perhaps subtlest complication is that processes can give birth to child processes
before they halt, so even if a packet is bound to a target that halts earlier than its source did, the
information that is conveyed by that packet may live on inside a child of the target process - and
the child could live indefinitely. This complication is bound together with a more general issue of
race conditions that can arise when a process births a child. As with the previous complication,
these race condition issues cannot be wished away. Instead we must require that PROTOCOL behave
in a way that prevents race conditions from occurring. An additional but less critical simplifying
requirement is that processes that fail to initialize must not be chosen by GMS to be the parents of
child processes.
These observations lead us to consider a sub-class of histories that arise from conforming models,
which are models that assume well behaving processes; a well behaving membership service; and a
well behaving PROTOCOL layer. We will see that for such histories it is possible to drastically simplify
the faults that need to be considered.
2.5.1 Conforming models and conforming histories
We claimed that under some assumptions of ”reasonableness” of the way the drivers and PROTOCOL
are implemented in a model we have a hope of simplifying the behavior of faults. We are going
to make this notion exact by introducing a number of new axioms that are less general than the
axioms of 2.3.4 but represent behaviors that would be expected from a reasonable implementation.
As we mentioned before, implementing these reasonable behaviors requires timers, but the new
axioms preserve asynchrony by describing the model simplifications as mere correlations between
faults
We start with a few definitions.
Definition 5. A stunted history is a history where the number of processes is finite and all of
them halt.
Definition 6. A finite channel is a channel where only a finite number of packets are dequeued.
In other words a channel
−−→
PQ is finite if
∣∣∣{k ∈ −−→PQ|kPR ∈ E}∣∣∣ <∞.
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Conforming Channel Axiom
If
−−→
PQ is finite, then either P is removed or Q halts.
Conforming Packet Axiom
A process P does not dequeue packets from process Q after a removal notification for Q is dequeued
by P .
Conforming Notification Axiom
If any notification vi(P ) is dropped then P halts.
Conforming GMS Axiom
f a process halts then it has a finite view interval.
Conforming Parent Axiom
If a process is uninitialized then it has no child processes.
Conforming Halt Axiom
If a process is removed then it halts.
Definition 7. A conforming history is a history that satisfies all the conforming axioms.
2.5.2 Fault equivalence
Definition 8.
A downstream channel is a channel
−−→
PQ where r(P ) > r(Q) or P = Q. In other words it is
either a self channel or else it is a channel whose target is removed from the group before its source
is removed. A upstream channel is a channel
−−→
PQ where r(P ) ≤ r(Q) and P 6= Q. A upstream
packet or downstream packet is a packet that belongs to an upstream or downstream channel,
respectively.
Definition 9.
A vacuum event is an event e at a halting process that has no lasting effect on the history. To
be precise, e is a vacuum event if its successor events
{f |f  e}
form a finite set, and all them occur at halting processes.
A vacuum packet is a packet k with a vacuum queuing event kQU.
Obviously, all the successors of a vacuum event are vacuum events as well.
Definition 10. Two histories are said to be fault equivalent if they are identical with the following
exceptions:
• packets that are sent in one need not be sent in the other. Packets that are received in one
need not be received in the other.
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• notifications that are dropped in one need not be dropped in the other.
• the two histories have the same non-vacuum events.
• the two histories have the same non-vacuum packets.
Definition 11. A history H is called lossless if
• H has no dropped packets
• H has no dropped notifications
• All upstream channels clear their receive queues. In other words all received upstream packets
are dequeued.
• All downstream channels clear their send queues. In other words all queued downstream
packets are sent.
2.5.3 The Vacuum Loop and vacuum closure
Definition 12. Let H be a lossless history and let P be any halting process in H. If j(P ) > 0 let
E be the parent of P and assume that vj(P )(E)
PR exists. Look at P at the moment that it halts.
Let v be the highest view processed by P , namely the value of the highest notification vv(P ) that
was processed by P before it halted. By the Order Foundation Axiom such a maximal view always
exists unless EP = ∅. In the latter case set v = j(P )− 1.
Look at the following loop, called the vacuum loop:
1. If the event Phlt exists at the end of EP
• remove it
• return the notification vr(P )(P ) to the GMS receive queue
• set v = r(P )− 1
2. Finish processing the current item. If any new packet multicasts are generated, append the
respective packet queuing events at the end of EP . Queue any new upstream packets to
their respective send queues and declare them to be unsent and unreceived. Queue any new
downstream packets to their respective receive queues and declare them to be sent and received.
3. If v ≥ j(P ) and there are any requests in the APP receive queue, dequeue and process them
one by one. For each request, append the generated request dequeuing event at the end of
EP . If the processing of a request creates any side effects, append the resulting packet queuing
events at the end of EP . Queue any new upstream packets to their respective send queues
and declare them to be unsent and unreceived. Queue any new downstream packets to their
respective receive queues and declare them to be sent and received.
4. If v = r(P )− 1, dequeue and process all the packets in all the receive queues of channels
−−→
QP
where Q 6= P . For each packet, append the corresponding dequeuing event to EP ; and process
the packet. If the processing of a packet creates any side effects, append the resulting packet
queuing events at the end of EP . Queue any new upstream packets to their respective send
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queues and declare them to be unsent and unreceived. Queue any new downstream packets to
their respective receive queues and declare them to be sent and received.
5. If the receive queue of the self channel
−−→
PP is empty, proceed to step (6). Otherwise, dequeue
all the packets there. For each packet, append the corresponding dequeuing event to EP ;
and process the packet. If the processing creates any side effects, append the resulting packet
queuing events at the end of EP . Queue any new upstream packets to their respective send
queues and declare them to be unsent and unreceived. Queue any new downstream packets to
their respective receive queues and declare them to be sent and received. Repeat step (5) until
the receive queue of the self channel is empty.
6. Increment v
• if v = r(P ), append a Phlt event to EP and exit.
• dequeue the vv(P ) notification and process it. Append the vv(P )PR event to EP . If
v = j(P ) > 0, add the order relation vv(E)
PR ≍ vv(P )PR. Notice that in this case
vv(P )
PR = Prun.
• If the processing of the notification creates any side effects, append the resulting packet
queuing events at the end of EP . Queue any new upstream packets to their respective
send queues and declare them to be unsent and unreceived. Queue any new downstream
packets to their respective receive queues and declare them to be sent and received.
• go back to step (3).
Lemma 4. Let H be a lossless history and let P be a halting process in H. Assume that P is
either a member of view zero, or else the parent of P processes the notification of the joining of P
(vj(P )(E)
PR exists, where E is the parent of P ).
Suppose that the vacuum loop is run against the halting state of P for a finite number of steps.
Then the resulting structure is a lossless history that is fault equivalent to H. Moreover, if the
original history H is conforming then the extended history is conforming as well.
Proof. We start by showing that the extended structure is a lossless history. Then we show that it
is fault equivalent to the original history H .
The proof that the extension of H satisfies the history axioms is by induction. Suppose that all the
history axioms remain true, and the history remains lossless after going through a certain number
of steps. We will show that the same remains true after running through one more step. For most
axioms we do not actually need the inductive hypothesis - they are either trivially true or can be
demonstrated directly. But there are a few exceptions.
The Packet Event Axiom remains true because every new packet that we create comes with a
queuing event per multicast. We only add a dequeuing event to packets that are already queued
(steps (4) and (5)).
The Packet Order Axiom is violated if there are packets k, k′ ∈
−−→
QY such that kQU ≺ k′QU and k′PR
exists and yet kPR does not exist or does not precede k′
PR
.
Suppose that k′PR already existed prior to the current step. By induction the extension of H was
a history at the conclusion of the last step and therefore k′
QU
already existed and as a result the
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preceding kQU event had existed as well. Therefore by induction kPR had also existed and preceded
k′
PR
and we are done.
Assume therefore that k′
PR
is generated in the current step. This implies Y = P . Moreover, the
only steps that create packet dequeuing events are steps (4) and (5).
If k′
PR
is generated in the current step then the packet k′ is already received after the previous
step. The induction hypothesis implies that k′ is a downstream packet in this case, or else it would
have been dequeued already due to losslessness (if we are at step (5) then k′ is downstream by
definition). Therefore, again by induction, losslessness implies that the packet k must have been
sent (and therefore received) before the current step. Since k was queued before k′, it must have
been dequeued before k′ is dequeued. Therefore kPR exists and precedes k′
PR
.
The Notification Order Axiom remains true because step (6) dequeues notifications in order and
without gaps.
The Parent Axiom remains true thanks to the conditions we imposed on P .
The Process Liveness Axiom is a statement about the behavior of PROTOCOL callbacks, which are
the only part of the model that generates queuing events. Since the vacuum loop processes triggers
using the appropriate PROTOCOL callbacks, the axiom remains valid.
Suppose that the Piggyback Axiom is violated. Then there is a packet k ∈
−−→
QP that we dequeue in
step (4) or (5) of the vacuum loop even though there is an i such that i < j(Q) or vi(Q)
PR ≺ kQU
and yet i > j(P ) and either vi(P )
PR does not exist or it exists and kPR ≺ vi(P )PR.
In the case of the self-channel (step (5)) this can be easily seen to be absurd by substituting Q = P .
In the case of step (4) we have by definition kPR ≻ vv(P )PR and so it must be that i > v. Since
v = r(P )−1 in this case, we have i ≥ r(P ). So we either have r(P ) < j(Q) or we have vr(P )(Q)
PR 
vi(Q)
PR ≺ kQU. Either of these cases violate the Process Liveness Axiom which holds by induction
prior to the current step.
To see that the Self Channel Axiom remains true notice that the vacuum loop dequeues a notification
(in step (6)) only after it verifies that all the packets on the self channel are processed (in step (5)).
The Order Foundation Axiom is mostly trivial except for the Prun and Phlt part.
If Prun does not already exist then v = j(P )− 1 and there was no current item to finish processing
when the vacuum loop started. By induction, EP = ∅. All the steps except step (6) become no-ops
and no new events are added to EP . To see that step (5) is a no-op, notice that a packet can reside
in the receive queue of the self-channel only if it was previously queued to the send queue. This
would show up as a queuing event which is not possible in our case.
Step (6) increments v to equal j(P ) and adds a vv(P )
PR = vj(P )(P )
PR = Prun event as the first
element of EP . This proves this case.
Step (1) of the vacuum loop removes Phlt from EP and returns it to the GMS receive queue, if
necessary. Step (6) can create or restore the Phlt event. If that happens then the loop exits, leaving
Phlt as the last event in EP .
All the other axioms are trivial to verify. For the Second Halting Axiom one just needs to remember
that we are dealing here exclusively with lossless histories, so there are no dropped notifications.
30
We still have to show that executing each step of the vacuum loop preserves losslessness (see
Definition 11). Since we start with a lossless history we have no dropped notifications. Every
packet that is created by the vacuum loop is either unsent and unreceived (if it is an upstream
packet) or sent and received (if it is a downstream packet), so the loop never creates a dropped
packet and guarantees the losslessness conditions with regard to upstream and downstream channels
We have to show that the extended history is fault equivalent to the original history H . This is
more or less trivial by construction. All we did was add a finite number of new packets and events.
All of the new events occur at the ”end of history” in the sense that they do net precede any
pre-existing events. All of the new events are added at P which is a halting process. Therefore by
definition we only added vacuum events and vacuum packets. Any pre-existing event acquires at
most a finite number of new successors and all of them occur at a halting process. Therefore all
pre-existing vacuum events remain so in the extended history.
Finally, assume that H is conforming. We must check that the extended history is still conforming.
The vacuum loop does not change the set of removed processes. It does not change the set of
halting processes. It does not change the view interval of any process. It adds only a finite number
of dequeuing events to EP , and it does not add any dequeuing events to any other process. Therefore
the extended history satisfies the Conforming Channel Axiom, the Conforming GMS Axiom and the
Conforming Halt Axiom. The Conforming Notification Axiom is vacuously true because a lossless
history has no dropped notifications.
The Conforming Parent Axiom holds because any uninitialized process in the extended history is
uninitialized in the original history and the vacuum loop does not create any new parent/child
relationships.
The Conforming Packet Axiom holds for every process other than P because H is conforming.
Suppose that P processes a removal notification of a processX 6= P . This implies that r(X) < r(P )
and therefore the channel
−−→
XP is upstream. By losslessness this implies that the receive queue of
the channel is empty throughout the execution of the vacuum loop, and therefore the loop does not
add any new dequeuing events for packets on that channel.
If the processing of the removal notification of X occurs during the vacuum loop, then we have
already shown that all the packets from X are already processed at this point. Since the vacuum
loop does not add any new packets to the X-receive queue, the axiom holds in this case as well.
If X = P the axiom holds because Phlt is the last event in EP , according to the Order Foundation
Axiom.
Definition 13. A history extension of the type that is described in Lemma 4 is called a vacuum
continuation of H at P . If the vacuum loop at P terminates then there is a maximal vacuum
continuation of H at P , called the vacuum closure of H at P . If the vacuum closure of H at P is
equal to H (meaning that the vacuum loop did not generate any new events or packets) then we say
that H is vacuum closed at P . It is trivial to check that the vacuum closure of H at P is vacuum
closed at P .
Corollary 4. Let H be a lossless history and let P be a halting process in H. If H is vacuum closed
at P , then P processes all the packets that it receives and all the notifications that it is entitled to,
from Prun to Phlt.
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Proof. It is easy to see that the vacuum loop does not terminate as long as there is an unprocessed
GMS notification that P is entitled to. This means that if P is vacuum closed then it must have
processed Phlt.
In order to reach the processing of Phlt, the vacuum loop must pass through steps (4) and (5) while
v = r(P ) − 1. This clears all the receive queues as required.
2.5.4 Transactional histories and the Fault Theorem
Definition 14. A transactional history is a conforming, lossless history that meets the following
additional restrictions:
1. All notifications are processed to completion.
2. All message broadcast requests are processed to completion.
3. All received packets are processed to completion.
Definition 15. A protocol PROTOCOL is vacuum convergent if for any conforming model in
which it participates and for any halting process in any lossless history of that model the vacuum
loop terminates.
We are now ready to state the principal finding of this part of the paper - the Fault Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Fault Theorem). Let H be a conforming history, and assume that PROTOCOL is vacuum
convergent. Then H can be extended to a fault equivalent transactional history tr(H). tr(H) is called
the transactional closure of H.
We start by showing that drops can be eliminated, and then we move on to simplifying process
faults.
Lemma 5. If a packet k ∈
−−→
PQ is dropped in a conforming history, then either P halts or Q halts.
Proof. By the Third Halting Axiom, kPR does not exist. By the Packet Order Axiom, for any
k′ ∈
−−→
PQ with k′
QU ≻ kQU, k′PR does not exist either. Therefore, considering that EP and EQ are
linearly ordered, the only k′ ∈
−−→
PQ packets for which k′
PR
exists are the ones for which k′
QU ≺ kQU,
and since (by the Order Foundation Axiom) the ≺ relation is very well founded at P , there are
only a finite number of such packets. Therefore the channel is finite. By the Conforming Channel
Axiom, either P is removed or Q halts. In the former case, the Conforming Halt Axiom guarantees
that P halts, and we are done.
Lemma 6. In a non-stunted conforming history, a process halts if and only if it is removed.
Proof. By the Conforming Halt Axiom we know that every removed process halts. To show the
converse, suppose a process P halts but is not removed. By the Conforming GMS Axiom process P
must have a finite view interval. Since P is not removed, r(P ) = V and so V is finite. This implies
that the number of processes is finite. Let Q be any process. Since P halts, the First Halting Axiom
guarantees that the channel
−−→
PQ is finite. By the Conforming Channel Axiom, P is removed or Q
halts. Since P is not removed, Q must halt. We conclude that there is a finite number of processes
and all of them halt. In other words the history is stunted.
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Lemma 7. In a conforming history, a halting process P only queues a finite number of packets
and only misses a finite number of packets and notifications:∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
Q∈P
−−→
PQ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
Q∈P
{
k ∈
−−→
QP |kPR /∈ EP
}∣∣∣∣∣∣ <∞
|{i|j(P ) ≤ i ≤ r(P ) and vi(P )
PR /∈ EP }| <∞
Proof. Let P be a halting process in a conforming history. By the First Halting Axiom, P has a
finite event set. Therefore only a finite number of packets are queued by P . This proves the first
claim.
By the Conforming GMS Axiom, a halting process in a conforming history has a finite view interval.
Therefore P is eligible only for a finite number of view notifications. This proves the third claim.
The main difficulty is with the second claim.
Let Q be a process. First we want to show that P misses a finite number of packets from Q.
If Q halts, then Q has a finite event set, therefore Q queues a finite number of packets to
−−→
QP ,
therefore P misses finite number of packets from Q and we are done. So assume that Q does not
halt. This implies, incidentally, that the history is not stunted.
Since the history is conforming and not stunted, Lemma 6 implies that P is removed.
If r(P ) < j(Q) then the Process Liveness Axiom guarantees that
−−→
QP is empty and we are done.
So we can assume that
j(Q) < r(P ) < V = r(Q)
And therefore by the GMS Axiom the notification vr(P )(Q) exists. Since the history is conforming
and Q does not halt, there are no dropped notifications at Q (due to the Conforming Notification
Axiom) and therefore Q must process the removal notification of P .
By the Process Liveness Axiom, for every k ∈
−−→
QP we have kQU ≺ vr(P )(Q)
PR. By the Order
Foundation Axiom, there is only a finite number of events in EQ that precede vr(P )(Q)
PR and
therefore
−−→
QP is a finite channel. Therefore, P can only miss a finite number of packets from Q.
We have established that P misses a finite number of packets from each source process. As long as
only a finite number of processes queue packets targeted at P , we are done. Since P has a finite
view interval, there is only a finite number of processes Q with j(Q) < r(P ). For any Q with
j(Q) > r(P ) we have already established that the channel
−−→
QP is empty.
Theorem 2 (Lossless History Theorem). Every conforming history is fault equivalent to a lossless
conforming history that contains the same packets and events.
Proof. Let H be a conforming history. We are going to change H into a fault equivalent lossless
history by changing the faulting characteristics of notifications and packets, without adding or
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subtracting any vacuum events and packets. The conforming axioms (see 2.5.1) are not affected
by such changes except for the Conforming Notification Axiom. However a lossless history has no
dropped notifications, so this and all other conforming axioms are going to remain valid.
We start with notifications by simply declaring that none of the notifications are dropped. There are
two catches. First, we may have just added an infinite number of notifications into the notification
queues of some processes. But it follows from the Conforming Notification Axiom that dropped
notifications only exist at halting processes, and it follows from Lemma 7 that halting processes
only have a finite number of dropped notifications, so this problem does not occur. The other catch
is that we have to prove that H is still a history. There are several assertions in the Second Halting
Axiom that are related to dropped notifications which we now have to verify. Suppose that some
notification vi(P ) is dropped in H .
• The Second Halting Axiom claims that if vi(P ) is a dropped notification then vi(P )
PR does
not exist. This assertion is not violated when we declare that vi(P ) is not dropped, so we are
done in this case.
• The same axiom claims that if P does not halt and vi(P ) is not dropped then vi(P )PR does
exist. However history H is conforming, and so by the Conforming Notification Axiom P
must halt. Therefore this assertion is not violated either.
We now move to packets. We make the following changes in the faulting characteristics of packets
in the channel
−−→
PQ:
• We declare all the unprocessed upstream packets to be unsent and unreceived.
• We declare all the unprocessed downstream packets to be sent and received.
The same two catches apply here as well. By preventing packets from being sent we may saddle
some processes with an infinite number of unsent packets. By forcing packets to be received without
being processed we may be saddling some processes with an infinite number of received packets
that linger in the process’ receive queues indefinitely. In addition, we have to verify all the relevant
axioms.
To see that we do not create an infinite number of packets that remain stuck in the send or receive
queues of a process P , notice that if P halts then Lemma 7 guarantees that only a finite number of
unprocessed packets exist in P ’s incoming and outgoing channels and so we cannot create infinities
at P . If P does not halt then the situation is a little bit more complex and we have to look at the
send queues and receive queues of P separately.
It follows from the Conforming Halt Axiom that P is not removed and therefore r(P ) = V. As
a result most of the outgoing channels of P are downstream. Since we force all the unprocessed
downstream packets to be sent we do not create any unsent packets on these outgoing channels.
The exceptions the are channels
−−→
PQ that lead to some other process Q that is not removed. Lemma
6 implies that Q does not halt. The Conforming Channel Axiom implies that
−−→
PQ is not finite and
therefore the Packet Order Axiom implies that all the packets on the channel are processed and as
a result we do not change the faulting characteristics of any of packets on these channels.
On the other hand the incoming channels of P are all upstream, with the exception of the self
channel
−−→
PP . Since we force all the unprocessed upstream packets to be unsent, we do not create
any received-and-unprocessed packets on these channels. We have already seen that when both
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ends of a channel do not halt, all the packets on the channel are processed. Therefore P processes
all of the packets on its self channel and as a result we do not change the faulting characteristics of
any self channel packets.
As far as axioms go, the only axiom that is related to the fault properties of packets is the Third
Halting Axiom. The first part of this axiom claims that a non-halting process sends all of its queued
packets. This part is not violated by our changes because we only declare a packet to be unsent if
it emanates from a removed process P . By the Conforming Halt Axiom the process P halts.
The second part of the axiom claims that a packet is not processed unless it is received. We only
declare a packet to be unreceived if it is not processed. Therefore this part of the axiom is not
violated.
The third and last part of the axiom claims that packets keep getting processed as long as there is
no impediment such as a halting source or target, or a previous unreceived packet. Suppose P and
Q do not halt. The the Third Halting Axiom implies that all the packets in
−−→
PQ are sent. Lemma
5 implies that all the packets are received and as a result the Third Halting Axiom implies that all
the packets in the channel are processed. Therefore we do not touch any of these packets and the
third part of the axiom remains valid.
We have to show that the revised history is lossless (see Definition 11). This follows directly from
our construction. We obviously do not have any dropped packets or notifications anymore. As
for channels, since we declared all the unprocessed packets in upstream channels to be unsent and
unreceived we have cleared all the receive queues of these channels. Similarly, since we declared all
the unprocessed packets in downstream channels to be sent and received, and since all the processed
packets must have been sent to begin with, we have cleared all the send queues of these channels,
as required.
Our last task is to show that the new history is fault equivalent to the original history. But this is
trivial since we did not add or subtract any events.
Proof of the Fault Theorem. Theorem 2 established that the conforming history H is fault equiv-
alent to a lossless conforming history H1. In a two step process, we will improve H1 to a fault
equivalent transactional history H3. The intermediate histories will have the following properties:
• H1 is conforming and lossless.
• H2 is conforming and lossless. In addition, all processes in H2 are initialized and process all
of their notifications.
• H3 is transactional.
The intermediate history H2 is constructed by running the vacuum loop to completion at each
halting process. As one might expect, there are some complications.
The first complication is that for Lemma 4 to apply at a process P , we must make sure that its
donor E, if it exists, had dequeued the join notification of P . This can be guaranteed by traversing
the processes of H by increasing join view. Since j(P ) > j(E), this order guarantees that we run the
vacuum loop at E before we run it at P . The vacuum convergence property of PROTOCOL together
with Corollary 4 guarantee that E will process the join notification of P before we run the vacuum
loop at P .
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The second complication is that we may be running the vacuum loop an infinite number of times.
This only happens if H1 is not stunted, in which case Lemma 6 implies that every halting process
is removed. At each finite step Lemma 4 guarantees that the resulting structure is a conforming,
lossless history that is fault equivalent to the original history H . But we have to show that all of
these properties are preserved at the limit. This is mostly but not entirely trivial.
The limiting structure H2 is a conforming history because almost all the history axioms and con-
forming history axioms either deal with views and view intervals, or with the events at a single
process, or with events at a pair of processes, or with packets in a single channel. Any such axiom is
either not affected by the vacuum loop at all, or is affected only by a finite number of applications
of the vacuum loop in our infinite sequence. Therefore all of these axioms follow immediately from
Lemma 4. The only exception is the Minimal Order Axiom, but this axiom is ”continuous” in the
sense that it naturally commutes with limits. This is because each order relationship that exists at
the limit already exists after a finite number of applications of the vacuum loop.
H2 is lossless for the same reason: the requirement that there be no dropped packets or notifications
is continuous - it is fulfilled at the limit if it is fulfilled at each step. The requirements on upstream
and downstream channels affect one channel at a time and each channel is affected only by the
execution of the vacuum loop at the source and target of the channel.
The non-trivial part is in showing that H2 is fault equivalent to H1. The argument in Lemma 4
was that the vacuum loop does not create any new non-vacuum events because it only introduces a
finite number of events, all of which are vacuum events themselves. Obviously a finiteness argument
of this sort cannot simply be carried over to the limit. Instead the fault equivalence of H1 and H2
arises from deeper roots.
Let e be any event in H2 that has an infinite number of successor events in H2. The fault equivalence
claim will follow if we can show that e already has an infinite number of successors in H1. From
Ko¨nig’s Lemma it follows that there is an infinite increasing sequence
B = b1  b2  b3  . . .
of successors of e in H2, and we can assume that B contains no gaps, meaning that any two
consecutive pair of events in bi  bi+1 in B is a primitive relation, meaning that either
• bi and bi+1 are adjacent events in a process P .
• There is a packet k such that bi = kQU and bi+1 = kPR.
• There is a parent/child pair of processes E/J such that bi = vj(J)(E)
PR and bi+1 = Jrun
All we need to show is that B cannot be made up exclusively of events that are outside of H1,
namely events that are added by the extension process. We demonstrate that through a sequence
of claims. We assume that B is made up by events that are added by the vacuum loops and use
the notation P (b) to indicate the process that event b occurs at. We reach contradiction through a
sequence of claims.
Claim: The sequence P (b1), P (b2), . . . contains an infinite number of different processes.
If only a finite number of processes appear in the sequence then there is some process P∞ that
appears an infinite number of times in the sequence. But that means that the sequence B contains
an infinite number of events at P∞ all of which are added, by our assumption, by the vacuum loop
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at P∞. This contradicts our assumption that the vacuum loop completes in a finite number of steps
at P∞.
Claim: The sequence B must contain an infinite number of parent/child type pairs vj(J)(E)
PR 
Jrun.
If not, then we can remove an initial segment of B so that it does not contain any such pair. This
would leave us only with consecutive pairs that occur at the same process or pairs of the type
kQU ≺ kPR. It follows from Lemma 4 that the vacuum loop only creates kPR events for downstream
packets. It follows that for all i, r(P (bi+1)) ≤ r(P (bi)). As a result the sequence B can only involve
a finite number of processes, contradicting the first claim.
Claim: If B contains a pair kQU ≺ kPR, then k is a packet on a self-channel.
Suppose that B contains an event bi = k
PR where k is not on a self-channel. If follows from the
previous claim that there is a parent/child pair later on in the sequence. Therefore there is a
parent/child pair E/J and a segment in B of the form
kPR ≺ f1 ≺ f2 ≺ · · · ≺ fN ≺ vj(J)(E)
PR
where N ≥ 0; all the events occur at E; and k is not on the self-channel
−−→
EE. Because k is not
on the self-channel, the event kPR must be generated by step (4) of the vacuum loop, which means
that it is generated while v = r(E)− 1. This means that the next (and last) notification event that
the vacuum loop creates at E is Ehlt and not vj(J)(E)
PR.
Now we are ready to draw a contradiction. The sequence B contains an infinite number of par-
ent/child pairs and all other pairs in B are local to a process. Therefore there is a segment in B of
the form
vj(J)(E)
PR  Jrun ≺ f1 ≺ f2 ≺ · · · ≺ fN ≺ vj(K)(J)
PR  Krun
where N ≥ 0; E/J and J/K are parent/child pairs; and all the events f1, f2, . . . , fN occur at
J . It follows that the process J is uninitialized in H1, since the Jrun event is generated by the
vacuum loop at J . By the Conforming Parent Axiom the process J cannot have a child process K.
Contradiction.
We are not done yet. We have constructed a conforming, lossless history H2 that is fault equivalent
to H1 and which has very good properties. H2 has no uninitialized processes and according to
Corollary 4 all the notifications and APP message broadcast requests in H2 are processed to comple-
tion. But H2 is not transactional. The reason is that the vacuum loop at each process may create
unprocessed packets in the receive queues of non-self downstream channels. Since we generate H2
from H1 using a single pass over all the halting processes, these packets may never be revisited.
To make sure that we deal with these packets, we perform a second pass, the same way we performed
the first pass. As we have already shown, this procedure creates a conforming, lossless history H3
that is fault equivalent to H2. However unlike the previous pass, all the processes in H2 have
already processed all of their notifications. Therefore for every downstream non-self channel
−−→
PQ
the process P already knows that Q is removed. It now follows from the Process Liveness Axiom
that P does not queue any new packets to the channel during the vacuum loop. As a result H3 is
transactional.
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3 The CBCAST Algorithm
3.1 Introduction
The algorithm we present here is based on the outline in [6]. Our description is more detailed than
the authors’, but the algorithm itself is a bare bones version of the original. Our prime motivation
here is to create a description that is easy to check for correctness. Therefore there is no attempt
to accommodate frills like allowing multiple clusters, or optimizing time, space or communication
complexity. For such considerations refer back to [6].
From this point on we consider our model to be conforming and so all the histories that we analyze
are assumed to be conforming. The properties of CBCAST as presented here do not necessarily hold
for non-conforming models.
3.2 Terminology
3.2.1 Messages and delivery
As mentioned in the introduction, we use the term messages to refer to the objects being broadcast
between processes with the expectation of virtually synchronous delivery. The CBCAST algorithm
implements these broadcasts using the underlying multicast of point-to-point packets. When a
packet is dequeued at a process and found to contain a message, the message is not immediately
delivered in order to preserve causality constraints. Following [6], we say that the message is received
once the process dequeues its packet up from the receive queue of the channel, but the message
within it is delivered only at the moment when doing so is consistent with causality constraints. The
act of delivery is implemented by invoking the ApplyMessage callback, which applies the message to
the user’s replicated data (see 2.3.3 below). Every message carries with it three pieces of metadata,
denoted ORIG(msg), VIEW(msg) and VT(msg) and describing the originator, view and vector time
of the message respectively. These notions are explained below.
3.2.2 Views, installations and view gaps
The membership service sends a coherent stream of membership change notifications to member
processes, as described in the previous section. This creates a natural sequence of membership
views, starting at view(0) and progressing through view(1), view(2), etc. Each view is a finite
set of processes, and view(n) is computed from view(n − 1) by taking the nth notification of the
membership service and applying it to the earlier view, either by adding or removing a process.
Each process keeps track of the view notifications as they arrive from the membership service, and
then attempts to install them. Installation involves waiting a while for packets in flight to arrive at
their destinations. This flushing procedure is at the heart of the algorithm and is necessary in order
to guarantee virtually synchronous delivery across views. As a result of this wait, a process may
be several views behind as old installations are delayed and new view notifications keep arriving.
This gap is referred to as the view gap. If a process has received a notification of a new view, we
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say that the process is aware of the view, regardless of whether the process has already installed
the view.
It should be noted that a process that leaves the group never re-joins. Even if a user re-starts a
process, from the point of view of the membership service the re-started process is brand new.
3.2.3 Instability and forwarding
A major difficulty in designing a coherent broadcast protocol is that it must make broadcasts look
like atomic operations, where in reality message packets are sent to each target process individually
and are received (or fail to be received) individually. Creating the perception of atomicity requires
careful bookkeeping of the progress of each message by the sender and by each target.
In order to broadcast a message to a set of members of the currently installed view, a sender process
creates, for each target, a packet containing the message and then sends the packet through the
appropriate channel. The sender process tries to keep track of the arrival of the packets. To do
that it creates a set, called the instability set, that initially contains the identities of all the target
processes. When the sender receives an acknowledgment of receipt from a target2, it removes that
target from the instability set of the message. Likewise, if the group membership service notifies the
sender that a target has been removed from the group, that target is removed from the instability
set. A message with a non-empty instability set is called unstable. The sender keeps copies of all
the unstable messages in a wait set. If the instability set becomes empty, the message is said to
have become stable and is removed from the wait set.
When a process receives a packet containing a message, it keeps a copy of the message in a receive
set where it waits to be delivered. In addition the receiver has a responsibility to help the sender
propagate the message to its intended target set. For that purpose the receiver keeps a copy of the
received message in a forwarding queue. If the receiver learns of the removal of the sender it takes
over its duties by re-broadcasting all the messages in the forwarding queue that were received from
that sender.
In a practical implementation the receiver tries to keep track of the stabilization of each received
message, just like the sender does. Once a message stabilizes there is no more need to help propagate
it, even if its sender is removed. Good bookkeeping is essential for keeping forwarding sets small and
communication costs low. In our simplified implementation we do not keep track of stabilization
on the receiver side, except for the very rudimentary measure of removing obsolete messages from
the forwarding queues.
Due to this forwarding mechanism we must differentiate between the originator of a message, which
is the process that originally broadcast a message, and the packet sender which is the process that
happened to send the packet containing the message. Usually these two are the same, but in the
presence of process removals, a message may be carried from originator to target through a series of
forwarded packets. The forwarding procedure naturally leads to duplicated deliveries. The receiving
process removes the duplicates using the vector time (see below). There are simple ways to reduce
2In our implementation, acknowledgments are received directly from the target - one acknowledgment per packet.
In more practical implementations with lower communication costs, fewer acknowledgments are used and the sender
may have other, more indirect methods of deducing that a packet has been received.
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the number of duplicates and thus reduce the communication cost that is involved in forwarding.
We do not include these here for the sake of simplicity.
3.2.4 Vector time
Each process keeps track of causality relations between messages using a vector of natural numbers,
indexed by member processes, called the vector time. At each coordinate, the vector time contains
the serial number of the latest delivered message that originated at the process that corresponds
to that coordinate. The vector time is reset to zero every time a new view is installed. When a
message is originally broadcast by a process the vector time is incremented (at the originator’s own
coordinate) and the metadata of the message - namely ORIG(msg), VIEW(msg) and VT(msg) - are
then set to the id of the process, the currently installed view and current vector time of the process,
respectively. These values remain fixed for the lifetime of the message. For a detailed discussion,
including proofs, of how the vector time is used to guarantee causality order preservation within
each view, see [6].
3.2.5 Cluster Initialization and original processes
Birman et al ([6]) assume that the cluster starts at view 1 with a single member. We have to relax
this assumption because a central tool in our analysis of CBCAST is the History Reduction Mapping
(see Section 5) that moves process joins back to the initial view. Therefore we allow an arbitrary
finite number of processes to belong to that view (view zero in our exposition). We call these the
original processes. These processes get started through an invocation of the protStart procedure.
We assume that the procedure gets called at each original process at exactly the same time and
with the same roster of members that includes exactly the set of original processes. While the
assumption of simultaneity is not realistic, we only need to use it with theoretical ”reduced” cases
and not with actual clusters which can still be assumed to start with a single member.
3.3 Outline of the Algorithm
Each process, from the moment it joins the group to the moment it leaves, keeps track of the
views as notifications are received from the membership service. For each view from the currently
installed view to the most recently announced view, the process keeps a list of the members of that
view.
Usually, when the process needs to broadcast a message to the group, it fixes the metadata of the
message with the current view and vector time, and then sends a packet containing the message
to each member of the current view. The process also places the message in a wait set, where it
tracks its stabilization as the recipient processes acknowledge the message. However, when there is
a view gap (i.e. there are announced views that have not been installed yet) the process refrains
from broadcasting messages or fixing their metadata, and it queues them instead. The messages
are broadcast whenever the view gap closes.
When a process receives a packet containing a message, it acknowledges its receipt to the sender
(the sender, remember, may be different from the originator). If the message is not a duplicate it
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is placed in the receive set until it becomes deliverable and a copy of it is created and appended to
the tail of the forwarding queue of the sender of the message. When a message becomes deliverable
it is removed from the receive set and applied to the user’s replicated data. At the time of delivery
the process updates its own vector time by incrementing the coordinate that corresponds to the
originator of the message.
When a process is notified that another member process has been removed, it takes each message
in the forwarding queue of that process and forwards it to all the live processes. These messages
are forwarded with their original metadata (originator, view and vector time) unchanged. A copy
of each message is placed in the wait set, to await stabilization.
Whenever a view gap exists, such as after a new view notification is received, the process must
wait for its wait set to empty out before it can install the next view. Once the wait set becomes
empty, the process sends a flush packet to all the live processes. This packet contains the value of
the latest view known to the process (i.e. the current view plus the view gap). The process then
waits to receive similar flush packets from all the live processes. Once that happens, the process
installs the next view. It applies a view installation notification to the user’s replicated data and
removes any obsolete messages from the receive set and the forwarding queue.
Our implementation contains, in addition to flush packets, a related type of packet called a ghost
packet. These packets are not necessary in a practical implementation. We use them to facilitate
our reasoning about joining processes. A ghost packet is the ”ghost” of a flush packet that would
have been sent by a child of an existing process, had that child already been born.
When a new process joins the group, it must somehow synchronize its state with the state of the
existing processes. This is done in two stages. Initially the new process starts life as a perfect
replica of an existing process, the parent. We do not describe how this is done, and subsume it into
the opaque membership service. In addition the new process must compensate for the natural race
conditions that occur as a result of the fact that packets have been in flight between its parent and
the other members of the group at the moment that it is born. This compensation is performed using
the donation protocol, whereby each existing process other than the parent exchanges instability
information with the new process.
3.4 Variable and Function Definitions
3.4.1 Global variables - the state of a process
cur view The number of the current view.
v gap The number of yet-uninstalled views of which we have been notified by the membership
service.
self Local process identifier.
MSet The set of identifiers of the member processes of the current view.
PendViewQueue A queue of pending view changes. Each view change is either a joining of a new
process or the removal of an existing process.
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LiveSet The set of identifiers of all the live processes. This includes every process that is a member
of the current view or a known future view, excluding all known removed processes.
ContactSet A subset of LiveSet that excludes all the processes that joined before the local process
but from which a donation has not yet been received.
vt[] A vector of natural numbers, indexed by the process identifiers of the members of the current
view. This is the vector time of the local process.
ReceiveSet The set of non-duplicate messages that were received and not yet discarded or delivered.
FwdQueue[] A vector of message queues, indexed by process identifiers. For each process identifier,
the queue contains copies of all the messages that were sent from and acknowledged to that
process - excluding duplicates - in the order they were received. The queue includes messages
that were merely forwarded by the sending process and did not originate from it. Each queue
includes both delivered and undelivered messages.
WaitSet The set of all the messages that the process broadcast or forwarded during the current
view (note that forwarded messages may have a VIEW(msg) of a higher view even if they are
forwarded during the current view). Each message in the wait set is paired with an index and
an instability set. The index indicates how many messages were broadcast or forwarded out
of the process prior to the current message. The instability set contains, for every process
that has not yet acknowledged the message, an index that indicates how many broadcast and
forwarded messages were received from that process prior to the broadcasting or forwarding
of the current message. WaitSet is organized as the union of two data structures:
1. BcastWaitSet contains only the messages that were broadcast by the current process.
2. FwdWaitSet contains only the messages that were forwarded by the current process.
LaunchQueue A queue of all the unsent messages that need to be broadcast once the view gap
closes.
ReplicatedData An opaque object containing the replicated user data. This data is managed by
the user application in an application-specific way, subject to the rules listed in subsection
2.3.3.
ghost height A number indicating the highest ghost value sent by the process so far. Ghost values
are sent out in a strictly increasing sequence.
flush height A number indicating the highest flush value sent by the process so far. Flush values
are sent out in a strictly increasing sequence.
ghost[] A vector of view numbers, indexed by process identifiers. It keeps, for each process, the
highest ghost value that was received from that process.
flush[] A vector of view numbers, indexed by process identifiers. It keeps, for each process, the
highest flush value that was received from that process.
mpkt out A counter of outbound messages, made up of two fields:
• mpkt out.b is the number of original messages broadcast by the process up to this point.
• mpkt out.f is the number of messages forwarded by the process up to this point.
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mpkt in[] A vector of number pairs, indexed by process identifiers, that counts how many messages
have been received from each process so far. The two fields are:
• mpkt in[P ].b is the number of original P -messages received from P .
• mpkt in[P ].f is the number of forwarded messages received from P
3.4.2 Packet and notification types
nJOIN〈pid,p pid〉 Notification that a new process with identifier pid joined the group as a clone of
the parent process with identifier p pid.
nREM〈pid〉 Notification that current member process with identifier pid was removed from the group.
pMSG〈msg〉 A message packet carrying a message msg.
pACK〈msg〉 An acknowledgement packet carrying an acknowledgment of receipt of message msg.
pGHOST〈v〉 A ghost packet indicating ghost value v.
pFLUSH〈v〉 A flush packet indicating flush up to view v.
p
GHOST
〈≥ v〉 or p
FLUSH
〈≥ v〉 Stand for any packet p
GHOST
〈v’〉 or p
FLUSH
〈v’〉 where v’ ≥ v.
pDONATE〈donation〉 A donation packet containing a donation of instability information from an
existing process to a newly joined process.
pCO-DONATE〈co-donation〉 A co-donation packet containing a donation of instability information
from a newly joined process to an existing process.
3.4.3 Message metadata
Each message is fixed with three pieces of metadata
ORIG(msg) Originator, namely the process that broadcast the message originally.
VIEW(msg) View, which is the view of the originator when the message is broadcast.
VT(msg) Vector Time, which is (roughly) the vector time of the originator when the message is
broadcast.
The pair 〈VIEW(msg),VT(msg)〉 uniquely identifies the message msg.
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3.5 Detailed CBCAST Algorithm Pseudo Code
Our pseudo code implements the various PROTOCOL interfaces (see 2.3.2)
protBroadcast(m) at page 44
protStart(roster, P) at page 45
protRun(P) at page 46
protRemove(P) at page 47
protJoin(P, E) at page 48
protPacket(k, S) at page 49
The protPacket(k, S) interface implementation uses the following procedures to process the various
types of packets that are defined in the CBCAST protocol:
ReceiveMessage(msg, sender) at page 50
ReceiveAck(msg, sender) at page 50
ReceiveGhost(view, sender) at page 51
ReceivefFlush(view, sender) at page 51
ReceiveDonation(donation, sender) at page 52
ReceiveCoDonation(co donation, sender) at page 53
In addition there are three service routines that are called from several places that deal with view
installation and message delivery:
CheckFlush() at page 54
TryToInstall() at page 55
Scan() at page 56
Interface protBroadcast(msg)
Input: msg is the message that is being broadcast
if v gap > 0 then
1 append msg to the tail of LaunchQueue;
end
else
increment mpkt out.b;
// calculate the message vector time
let vt′ = vt;
let vt′[self] = vt[self] +mpkt out.b−mpkt in[self].b;
// fix message metadata before broadcasting
ORIG(msg)⇐ self;
VIEW(msg)⇐ cur view;
VT(msg)⇐ vt′;
2 queue p
MSG
〈msg〉 to ContactSet; // multicast the message packets
let index = mpkt out; // locates msg in the outgoing message sequence
let iset[] = mpkt in[]; // the initial instability set for msg
add 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 to BcastWaitSet;
end
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Interface protStart(roster, pid)
Input: roster is the set of original members of the group (view zero members). pid is the
process identifier of the local process
GroundState(); // create the initial value of ReplicatedData
let cur view = 0;
let v gap = 0;
let self = pid;
let MSet = roster;
let PendViewQueue = ∅;
let LiveSet = ContactSet = roster;
let vt = ∅;
let ReceiveSet = ∅;
let FwdQueue = ∅;
let WaitSet = ∅;
let LaunchQueue = ∅;
let ghost height = flush height = 0;
let ghost[] = flush[] = ∅;
let mpkt out = {f = 0; b = 0};
let mpkt in[] = ∅;
foreach id ∈ roster do
create vt[id] = 0;
create FwdQueue[id] = ∅;
create mpkt in[id] = {f = 0; b = 0};
create ghost[id] = flush[id] = 0;
ApplyJoin(id);
end
// We launch the main APP thread asynchronously
// It will start executing at some indeterminate point in the future
execute Main(self );
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Interface protRun(pid)
Input: pid is the process identifier of the new process
increment v gap;
append 〈JOIN, pid〉 to the tail of PendViewQueue;
add pid to LiveSet;
let ContactSet = {pid};
create FwdQueue[pid] = ∅;
let BcastWaitSet = ∅;
foreach 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ FwdWaitSet do
let index.b = 0;
end
let LaunchQueue = ∅;
let flush height = ghost height;
create ghost[pid] = ghost height;
create flush[pid] = ghost height;
let mpkt out.b = 0;
create mpkt in[pid] = mpkt out;
let self = pid;
CheckFlush();
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Interface protRemove(rem proc)
Input: rem proc is the identifier of the removed process
1 increment v gap;
2 append 〈REMOVE, rem proc〉 to the tail of PendViewQueue;
remove rem proc from LiveSet;
remove rem proc from ContactSet;
foreach 〈msg, index, iset〉 ∈ WaitSet do
discard iset[rem proc];
if iset = ∅ then
remove 〈msg, index, iset〉 from WaitSet; // message is stable
end
end
discard mpkt in[rem proc];
3 while FwdQueue[rem proc] 6= ∅ do
pop msg from the head of FwdQueue[rem proc];
// create an instability set that contains
// all the live processes
increment mpkt out.f ;
4 let index = mpkt out;
let iset[] = mpkt in[];
5 queue pMSG〈msg〉 to ContactSet; // multicast the message packets
6 add 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 to FwdWaitSet;
end
discard FwdQueue[rem proc];
discard ghost[rem proc];
discard flush[rem proc];
CheckFlush();
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Interface protJoin(jn proc, p proc)
Input: jn proc is the identifier of the joining process. p proc is the identifier of the parent
process.
increment v gap;
append 〈JOIN, jn proc〉 to the tail of PendViewQueue;
add jn proc to LiveSet;
add jn proc to ContactSet;
create FwdQueue[jn proc] = ∅;
foreach 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈WaitSet do
if iset[p proc] exists then
1 create iset[jn proc] = {f = iset[p proc].f ; b = 0};
end
end
create ghost[jn proc] = ghost[p proc];
create flush[jn proc] = ghost[p proc]; // The received flush value of the new process
is inherited from the received ghost height of the parent
create mpkt in[jn proc] = {f = mpkt in[p proc].f ; b = 0};
let donation = 〈WaitSet,mpkt in[], ghost height, flush height〉;
queue p
DONATE
〈donation〉 to jn proc;
CheckFlush();
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Interface protPacket(k, sender)
Input: k is the packet being received. sender is the process identifier of the sender of the
packet
switch cont(k) do
case p
MSG
〈msg〉:
ReceiveMessage(msg, sender);
endsw
case pACK〈msg〉:
ReceiveAck(msg, sender);
endsw
case pGHOST〈view〉:
ReceiveGhost(view, sender);
endsw
case pFLUSH〈view〉:
ReceiveFlush(view, sender);
endsw
case pDONATE〈donation〉:
ReceiveDonation(donation, sender);
endsw
case pCO-DONATE〈co donation〉:
ReceiveCoDonation(co donation, sender);
endsw
endsw
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Procedure ReceiveMessage(msg, sender)
Input: msg is the message being received. sender is the process identifier of the sender of the
message packet
queue pACK〈msg〉 to sender; // acknowledge receipt of the message
if ORIG(msg) = sender then
increment mpkt in[sender].b;
end
else
increment mpkt in[sender].f ;
end
1 // Check for duplicates:
if VIEW(msg) < cur view then
2 discard p
MSG
〈msg〉; // obsolete messages are duplicates (Lemma 34)
end
else if VIEW(msg) = cur view and vt[ORIG(msg)] ≥ VT(msg)[ORIG(msg)] then
discard pMSG〈msg〉; // duplicate - message already delivered
end
else if msg ∈ ReceiveSet then
discard p
MSG
〈msg〉; // duplicate - message already received
end
else
3 add msg to ReceiveSet;
4 append msg to the tail of FwdQueue[sender];
5 Scan(); // scan ReceiveSet and deliver all the deliverable messages
end
Procedure ReceiveAck(msg, sender)
Input: msg is the message being acknowledged. sender is the process identifier of the sender
of the acknowledgement packet
// the following if statement will always succeed
if 〈msg, index, iset〉 ∈WaitSet exists then
discard iset[sender];
if iset = ∅ then
remove 〈msg, index, iset〉 from WaitSet; // message is stable
CheckFlush();
end
end
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Procedure ReceiveGhost(view, sender)
Input: view is the ghost height of the sender. sender is the process identifier of the sender of
the packet
let ghost[sender] = view; // ghost[sender] always increases
Procedure ReceiveFlush(view, sender)
Input: view is the flush height of the sender. sender is the process identifier of the sender of
the packet
let flush[sender] = view; // flush[sender] always increases
TryToInstall();
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Procedure ReceiveDonation(donation, sender)
Input: donation is the donation being received. sender is the process identifier of the sender
of the donation packet
add sender to ContactSet;
let co donation = 〈WaitSet,mpkt in[], ghost height, flush height〉;
queue pCO-DONATE〈co donation〉 to sender; // Co-donate local state to the sender
// Process, in order, all the untimely packets
let UNTg = {〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈WaitSet | iset[sender] exists};
Define height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg) = index.b+ index.f ;
Define height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg) = 0;
let UNTp = {〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ donation.WaitSet | iset[self] exists};
Define height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp) = iset[self].b+ iset[self].f ;
Define height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp) = index.b+ index.f ;
let UNT = UNTg
⋃
UNTp;
sort UNT using the lexicographical order (height1, height2);
// we process the elements of UNT in order
foreach 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNT do
if 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp then
if index.b+ index.f > mpkt in[sender].b+mpkt in[sender].f then
// we found an untimely message packet from the sender to the parent,
and we process its clone now
1 ReceiveMessage(msg, sender);
end
end
if 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg then
if index.b+ index.f ≤ donation.mpkt in[self].b+ donation.mpkt in[self].f then
// we found a message packet from the parent whose acknowledgement
packet was untimely, so we process its clone now
2 ReceiveAck(msg, sender);
end
end
end
let ghost[sender] = donation.ghost height;
let flush[sender] = donation.flush height;
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Procedure ReceiveCoDonation(co donation, sender)
Input: co donation is the co-donation being received. sender is the process identifier of the
sender of the co-donation packet
// Process, in order, all the untimely and post-critical packets
let UNTg = {〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ co donation.WaitSet | iset[self] exists};
Define height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg) = iset[self].b+ iset[self].f ;
Define height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg) = index.b+ index.f ;
let UNTp = {〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈WaitSet | iset[sender] exists};
Define height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp) = index.b+ index.f ;
Define height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp) = 0;
let UNT = UNTg
⋃
UNTp;
sort UNT using the lexicographical order (height1, height2);
// we process the elements of UNT in order
foreach 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNT do
if 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTg then
if index.b+ index.f > mpkt in[sender].b+mpkt in[sender].f then
// we found one of two things here:
// either an untimely forwarded message packet from the parent that
we process now as a message from the sender
// or a post-critical, pre-donation forwarded message packet from the
sender that we process now
1 ReceiveMessage(msg, sender);
end
end
if 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 ∈ UNTp then
if index.b+ index.f ≤ co donation.mpkt in[self].b+ co donation.mpkt in[self].f then
// we found a timely message packet from us to the parent whose
acknowledgement was untimely, so we process its clone now
2 ReceiveAck(msg, sender);
end
end
end
let ghost[sender] = co donation.ghost height;
let flush[sender] = co donation.flush height;
3 TryToInstall();
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Procedure CheckFlush
if FwdWaitSet 6= ∅ then
return; // there are unstable forwarded messages, do not send any ghosts or
flushes
end
if ghost height < cur view+ v gap then
let ghost height = cur view+ v gap;
1 queue pGHOST〈ghost height〉 to ContactSet; // multicast the ghost packets
end
if BcastWaitSet 6= ∅ then
return ; // there are unstable original messages, do not send any flushes
end
if flush height < cur view+ v gap then
let flush height = cur view+ v gap;
2 queue p
FLUSH
〈flush height〉 to ContactSet; // multicast the flush packets
end
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Procedure TryToInstall
// check whether all the members are fully flushed
1 foreach pid ∈ LiveSet do
if flush[pid] < cur view+ v gap then
return ; // some members are not flushed - wait
end
end
while v gap > 0 do // this loop installs all the pending views
2 // remove obsolete messages from ReceiveSet
foreach msg ∈ ReceiveSet do
if VIEW(msg) = cur view then
remove msg from ReceiveSet;
end
end
3 // remove obsolete messages from FwdQueue
foreach pid ∈ LiveSet do
foreach msg ∈ FwdQueue[pid] do
if VIEW(msg) = cur view then
remove msg from FwdQueue[pid];
end
end
end
increment cur view ;
decrement v gap;
pop notification from the head of PendViewQueue;
if notification = 〈JOIN, pid〉 then
add pid to MSet;
ApplyJoin(pid); // deliver notification to APP
if pid = self then
execute Main(self ); // launch the main APP thread asynchronously
end
end
else if notification = 〈REMOVE, pid〉 then
remove pid from MSet;
ApplyRemoval(pid); // deliver notification to APP
end
4 reset vt; // New view now installed. vt coordinates reflect new membership
Scan(); // high view messages may now become deliverable
end
// v gap = 0 - time to broadcast all pending messages
while LaunchQueue 6= [] do
pop msg from the head of LaunchQueue;
5 protBroadcast(msg);
end
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Procedure Scan
// look for deliverable messages. A message is deliverable if all the
following are true:
// 1. It is a current-view message
// 2. It is the next expected message from its originator
// 3. All the messages on which it depends have been delivered already
let deliverable messages found = false;
foreach msg ∈ ReceiveSet do
if VIEW(msg) = cur view then
// msg is a current-view message
if VT(msg)[ORIG(msg)] = vt[ORIG(msg)] + 1 then
// msg is the next expected message from its originator
let all dependents delivered = true;
foreach pid ∈ MSet and pid 6= ORIG(msg) do
if VT(msg)[pid] > vt[pid] then
let all dependents delivered = false;
end
end
if all dependents delivered = true then
// msg is deliverable
let deliverable messages found = true;
increment vt[ORIG(msg)];
remove msg from ReceiveSet;
let originator = ORIG(msg);
strip out metadata stamps VIEW(msg), VT(msg) and ORIG(msg);
1 ApplyMessage(msg, originator); // deliver message to APP
end
end
end
end
if deliverable messages found = true then
Scan(); // try to see if more messages can now be delivered
end
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4 Basic Properties Of The CBCAST Algorithm
In subsequent sections we will analyze the CBCAST protocol in depth. Right now we want to highlight
some of its important basic properties.
4.1 Some CBCAST invariants
Definition 16.
• Let T be a transaction. The trigger of T is denoted trig(T )
• Let e ∈ EP . Then e belongs to a unique transaction T . We denote T = trans(e) and use
trig(e) as shorthand for trig(trans(e)).
• Let T be a transaction. The view of T is view(trig(T )) and denoted by view(T ). Since the
side effects of T cannot contain notification events, all the events in T share the same view
view(T ).
Definition 17. Let P be any process in a group that executes the CBCAST protocol. Let var be any
state variable (see 3.4.1) and let e ∈ EP be any event other than the join event of P , in other words
e 6= vj(P )(P )
PR.
If e is a trigger event we use the notation varP@e to denote the value of the variable var at process
P at the onset of the transaction trans(e). We use the notation varP@e to denote the value of the
variable var at process P at the conclusion of the transaction trans(e).
If e is a queuing event we use the notation varP@e to denote the value of the variable var at process P
at the moment when the queuing event occurs. Since queuing events do not change state variables,
there is no distinction here between the pre and post values.
When e = vj(P )(P )
PR, the processing of e causes the execution of the protStart procedure or the
protRun procedure, according as P is an original process (a member of view zero) or a late joining
process. We use the same definition of varP@e that we use for any other trigger. However for an
original process we define
varP@e = var
P@e
and for a late joining process we define varP@e to be the value of var right before the invocation of
the CheckFlush procedure at the end of the protRun procedure.
This last part of the definition is admittedly not elegant. However it does have some intuitive
justification in the sense that the endpoint of protStart and the pre-CheckFlush point in the protRun
procedure are the first points in the life of a process where it is fully initialized as a CBCAST process.
Definition 18. Let P be a process and let e ∈ EP be any trigger event. Let Ue be the set of
processes that had not yet contacted P at the time that e occurred. These are processes that joined
the group before P did, but for which P has not yet processed a donation packet. Formally
Ue = {Q ∈ P ‖ j(Q) < j(P ) and if d = pDONATE〈〉 ∈
−−→
QP then either dPR ≻ e or dPR does not exist}
In particular if P is a member of view zero then Ue = ∅.
The set Ue is called the uncontacted set of e.
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Lemma 8 (CBCAST Omnibus Lemma).
Let P be any process and let e be any trigger event in P . Then the following relations hold at P :
1. (cur view+ v gap)
P@e
= view(e)
2.
LiveSetP@e = {Q ∈ P ‖ j(Q) ≤ (cur view+ v gap)P@e < r(Q)}
ContactSetP@e = LiveSetP@e \ Ue
3. The entries in the vectors FwdQueue[]P@e, mpkt in[]P@e, ghost[]P@e and flush[]P@e correspond
exactly to the members of LiveSetP@e.
4. The entries in the vector vt[]P@e correspond exactly to the members of MSetP@e.
5. For any X ∈ LiveSetP@e
flush[X ]P@e ≤ ghost[X ]P@e ≤ (cur view+ v gap)P@e
If X /∈ ContactSetP@e then the right inequality is strict. If v gapP@e = 0 then the inequalities
are actually equalities.
6. For any X ∈ LiveSetP@e
⋂
LiveSetP@e
ghost[X ]P@e ≤ ghost[X ]
P@e
flush[X ]P@e ≤ flush[X ]
P@e
in other words the values of ghost[X ] and flush[X ] are non-decreasing.
7. If e = vi(P )
PR and X ∈ LiveSetP@e then
ghost[X ]
P@vi(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightX@vi(X)PR
flush[X ]P@vi(P )
PR
≤ flush heightX@vi(X)PR
8. flush[P ]P@e ≤ flush heightP@e ≤ ghost heightP@e ≤ (cur view+ v gap)P@e
9. If v gapP@e > 0 then
ghost heightP@e = (cur view+ v gap)P@e if and only if FwdWaitSetP@e = ∅
flush heightP@e = (cur view+ v gap)
P@e
if and only if WaitSetP@e = ∅
10. If v gapP@e = 0 then LaunchQueueP@e = ∅.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on e, where we assume by induction that the lemma holds
for f if either f ≺ e or if view(f) < view(e). This is possible thanks to Corollary 3 and Lemma 2.
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We have three types of triggers to consider: message broadcast request events, notification events
and packet dequeuing events. In the latter case we will use the following notation throughout. k is
the packet that is being dequeued (so e = kPR) and X is the process that queued the packet k.
We start by picking off the easy cases. We show that if e is a packet dequeuing event or a message
broadcast request event then claims (1), (2) and (3) all hold. claim (7) holds vacuously for e because
it only pertains to notification events.
For the remaining cases, since every trigger event causes some CBCAST procedure to be executed,
we simply go over each procedure and show that if the inductive hypothesis is assumed then the
lemma holds at the end of the execution of the procedure.
To prove claim (1) when e is a packet dequeuing event we need two facts. First, the proof of
Corollary 2 demonstrates that view(e) = view(e′), where e′ ≺ e is the immediate predecessor of
e in EP . Second, a lengthy but routine inspection of the pseudo-code shows that the protPacket
procedure does not change the sum cur view+ v gap (the TryToInstall utility procedure increments
cur view and decrements v gap zero or more times, but does not change their sum). These facts
taken together with the inductive hypothesis give
view(e) = view(e′) = (cur view+ v gap)
P@e′
= (cur view+ v gap)P@e = (cur view+ v gap)
P@e
The exact same argument holds when e is a message broadcast request event (with protBroadcast
replacing protPacket).
To prove the first part of claim (2) when e is a packet dequeuing event or a message broadcast
request event, notice that neither protPacket nor protBroadcast change the value of LiveSet, and
as we already saw these procedures do not change the value of cur view+ v gap either. As a result
this part of the claim follows by induction.
An immediate corollary is that if e is a packet dequeuing event then X ∈ LiveSetP@e. This is because
the definition of view(e) and the Conforming Packet Axiom imply that j(X) ≤ view(e) < r(X). It
follows from claim (1) and the first part of claim (2) that X ∈ LiveSetP@e.
The second part of the claim is a bit more complicated. As long as e is not a donation packet it is
easy to check that ContactSet does not change and Ue = Ue′ , where e
′ is the immediate predecessor
of e in EP and so this part of the claim follows by induction.
If e is the donation packet fromX then it is easy to see that X /∈ Ue and that Ue = Ue′ \{X}. We al-
ready demonstrated that X ∈ LiveSetP@e. The protPacket procedure executes the ReceiveDonation
procedure which in turn adds X to ContactSet and so by induction
ContactSetP@e = ContactSetP@e ∪ {X} = ContactSet
P@e′ ∪ {X} =
= (LiveSetP@e
′
\Ue′ ) ∪ {X} = (LiveSet
P@e \ Ue′) ∪ {X} =
= (LiveSetP@e ∪ {X}) \ (Ue′ \{X}) = LiveSet
P@e \ Ue
Proving claim (3) when e is a packet dequeuing event or a message broadcast request event amounts
to a routine check that only notification related procedures, namely protStart, protRun, protJoin
and protRemove actually add or remove entries from the mentioned vectors or change LiveSet.
59
We prove the remaining claims for non-notification events by examining the protBroadcast proce-
dure and each of the service procedures that are invoked by the protPacket procedure. A claim has
to be tested against a procedure only if the procedure changes one or more of the variables that are
mentioned in the claim.
protBroadcast
This procedure only affects claims (9) and (10). If v gap = 0 it adds a record to WaitSet, but
in that case claim (9) is vacuously true. If v gap > 0 it adds a message to LaunchQueue, but
in this case claim (10) is vacuously true.
ReceiveMessage
This procedure does not affect any of the claims because it does not change any of the relevant
variables (this includes the invocation of the Scan procedure which also does not change any
of the relevant variables).
ReceiveAck
This procedure affects claims (8) and (9) by making changes to WaitSet, ghost height and
flush height but no other variable.
Claim (8) is true by induction before CheckFlush is called. The claim remains true if
CheckFlush sets ghost height = cur view + v gap. There are two possible impediments to
this action. If FwdWaitSet 6= ∅ then CheckFlush does nothing and the claim remains true by
induction. If ghost height is already high before CheckFlush is called the claim remains true
regardless of whether CheckFlush raises flush height or not. So (8) remains true in all cases.
Claim (9) is vacuously true if v gap = 0 so assume that v gap > 0. The procedure may
shrink, but does not enlarge, either FwdWaitSet or BcastWaitSet and if it removes any record,
it invokes the CheckFlush procedure. If WaitSet does not lose a record then CheckFlush is
not called and nothing changes. If WaitSet loses a record, we have to look at the following
cases:
FwdWaitSet remains non-empty after the record loss
In this case CheckFlush does nothing and the claim remains true by induction.
FwdWaitSet becomes empty while BcastWaitSet remains non-empty
In this case it follows from the inductive hypothesis that
ghost heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
flush heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
and therefore CheckFlush sets ghost heightP@e = cur view + v gap and does not touch
flush height. These changes preserve the claims of (9).
FwdWaitSet becomes empty while BcastWaitSet remains empty
In this case it follows from the inductive hypothesis that
ghost heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
flush heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
and therefore CheckFlush sets
ghost heightP@e = flush heightP@e = cur view+ v gap
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These changes preserve the claims of (9).
FwdWaitSet remains empty while BcastWaitSet remains non-empty
In this case it follows from the inductive hypothesis that
ghost heightP@e = cur view+ v gap
flush heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
and therefore CheckFlush does nothing and the claim remains true by induction.
FwdWaitSet remains empty while BcastWaitSet becomes empty
In this case it follows from the inductive hypothesis that
ghost heightP@e = cur view+ v gap
flush heightP@e < cur view+ v gap
and therefore CheckFlush sets flush heightP@e = cur view + v gap and does not touch
ghost height. These changes preserve the claims of (9).
ReceiveGhost
This procedure affects claims (5) and (6), but only with respect to the sender process X . We
know that LiveSetP@e = LiveSet
P@e and that X ∈ LiveSetP@e so both claims must be verified
for X .
Also note that it follows from claim (3) that for every process in LiveSetP@e all the fields in
claims (5) and (6) are well defined.
Let k = p
GHOST
〈v〉.
To prove claim (6) we first have to note that the value of ghost height (and flush height)
is non-decreasing, as is easy to verify by looking at the pseudo-code and specifically at the
CheckFlush procedure.
Assume first that k is not the first packet from X that carries ghost information (in addition
to ghost packets, donation packets and co-donation packets also carry ghost information).
It follows from the Packet Order Axiom and from the monotonicity of ghost height that
v ≥ ghost[X ]P@e and we are done.
If k is the first such packet then ghost[X ]P@e is the initial value assigned by the protStart,
protRun or the protJoin procedure, where each of the cases occurs when j(X) = j(P ) = 0;
j(X) ≤ j(P ) 6= 0; and j(X) > j(P ), respectively.
In case j(P ) = 0 we have ghost[X ]P@e = 0 ≤ v and we are done.
In case j(X) = j(P ) 6= 0 we have X = P and one can verify by looking at the protRun
procedure that
ghost[X ]P@e = ghost[P ]P@e = ghost[P ]
P@vj(P )(P )
PR
=
= ghost heightP@vj(P )(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightP@kQU = v
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of ghost height.
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Look at the case j(X) < j(P ). By induction (on claim (7))
ghost[X ]P@e = ghost[X ]
P@vj(P )(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightX@vj(P )(X)PR
and by the monotonicity of ghost height
ghost heightX@vj(P )(X)PR ≤ ghost heightX@kQU = v
and we are done.
Now look at the case j(X) > j(P ). In this case X is a late joining process. Let E be the
parent of X . Then
ghost[X ]P@e = ghost[E]
P@vj(X)(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightE@vj(X)(E)PR
and since X inherits its values of ghost height from the value of ghost height in E we have
ghost heightE@vj(X)(E)PR = ghost heightX@vj(X)(X)PR
And by monotonicity we have
ghost heightX@vj(X)(X)PR ≤ ghost heightX@kQU = v
and we are done in this case as well.
To prove claim (5) let e′ be the trigger of the X-transaction that queued the packet k. Then
e′ ≺ kQU ≺ kPR = e. It follows from Lemma 2 that view(e′) ≤ view(e).
By claim (6) that we just proved and by induction we know that
flush[X ]
P@e
= flush[X ]P@e ≤ ghost[X ]P@e ≤ ghost[X ]
P@e
= v ≤ ghost heightX@e
′
≤
≤ (cur view+ v gap)X@e
′
= view(e′) ≤ view(e) = (cur view+ v gap)P@e
We have to prove the additional assertions in claim (5) in the cases where v gapP@e = 0 and
X /∈ ContactSetP@e.
In the case v gapP@e = 0 we have by induction
flush[X ]
P@e
= flush[X ]P@e = (cur view+ v gap)P@e = (cur view+ v gap)
P@e
The case X /∈ ContactSetP@e cannot occur here. To show that, we only have to prove that
X /∈ Ue. The rest follows from the fact that X ∈ LiveSet
P@e and from claim (2).
If j(X) ≥ j(P ) then X /∈ Ue by definition. If j(X) < j(P ) then the first packet that X sends
to P is a donation packet which must precede k. Therefore by definition X /∈ Ue and so it
must be in ContactSet at this point. This takes care of claim (5).
ReceiveFlush
This procedure updates flush[X ] and then calls the TryToInstall service procedure. We will
start by ignoring TryToInstall and show that the inductive hypothesis still holds before
TryToInstall is invoked. Later we show that TryToInstall preserves all the claims.
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This procedure affects claims (5), (6) and (8), but for the first two claims only with respect
to the sender process X . We know that LiveSetP@e = LiveSet
P@e and that X ∈ LiveSetP@e
so both claims must be verified for X .
Also note that it follows from claim (3) that for every process in LiveSetP@e all the fields in
claims (5) and (6) are well defined.
Let k = pFLUSH〈v〉.
We start with claim (5). To prove it, we first show that flush[X ]P@e ≤ ghost[X ]P@e. This
requires a bit of digging. The packet k is queued byX through the execution of the CheckFlush
procedure. This procedure may or may not queue a ghost packet of the same height, to the
same target set, immediately prior to queuing the flush packet. If a ghost packet is queued
then it follows from the Packet Order Axiom that P processes the ghost packet immediately
prior to the current flush packet, resulting in an equality flush[X ]
P@e
= ghost[X ]
P@e
. The
only difficulty arises if a ghost packet is not queued.
The CheckFlush procedure is invoked by X as part of the execution of a notification transac-
tion or an acknowledgement packet processing transaction. An inspection of the pseudo-code
easily shows that in the notification case a queuing of a flush packet is always preceded by the
queuing of a ghost packet because all three procedures - protRemove, protJoin and protRun
- increment v gap which results, according to claim (8), in ghost height being low.
Let e′ be the trigger of the X-transaction that queued the packet k. We can assume that e′ is
an acknowledgement packet processing event. Since e′ results in the queuing of a flush packet
of height v destined to P without the queuing of a ghost packet of the same height we know
by pseudo-code inspection that
flush heightX@e′ < (cur view+ v gap)X@e′ = v and therefore v > 0
ghost heightX@e′ = (cur view+ v gap)X@e′ = v
P ∈ ContactSetX@e′
We know from claim (1) that
view(e′) = (cur view+ v gap)
X@e′
= (cur view+ v gap)X@e′ = v
Let f = vv(X)
PR be the most recent view change notification preceding e′. If the notification
vv(X) is a removal or joining of some process Q 6= X then f is not the first event in EX and
we know by induction from claim (8) that
ghost heightX@f ≤ (cur view+ v gap)X@f = v − 1 < view(e
′)
If f = Xrun then j(X) = v > 0 and X has a parent E. The protRun procedure does not
change the value of ghost height until CheckFlush is called and therefore by induction
ghost heightX@f = ghost heightE@vv(E)PR ≤ (cur view+ v gap)E@vv(E)PR = v − 1 < view(e
′)
Taking care to interpret varX@e′ correctly for protRun (see Definition 17).
63
Therefore there is some trigger event f  f ′ ≺ e′ at X such that
ghost heightX@f ′ < ghost height
X@f ′ = v
Code inspection shows that the transaction trans(f ′) must invoke the CheckFlush procedure
and must result in the queuing of a ghost packet of height v. If P is in the target set of
this multicast then we are done. If it is not, then P must join ContactSet sometime between
trans(f ′) and trans(e′). Code inspection shows that P can join ContactSet either after a join
notification or as a result of sending a donation to X .
By the definition of f there cannot be any notification events between f ′ and e′ and therefore
process X must receive a donation packet d from P at some point between these two trans-
actions. This in turn causes X to queue a co-donation packet to P that includes its current
ghost height value.
Since f ′ ≺ dPR ≺ e′ and since we know by direct code inspection that ghost height is non-
decreasing, it follows that the ghost height that X co-donates is equal to v. From the Packet
Order Axiom it follows that the co-donation packet is processed by P before k is processed.
As a result
ghost[X ]P@e = v
And we are done showing that flush[X ]
P@e ≤ ghost[X ]P@e. By induction we can conclude
(using claim (5)) that
ghost[X ]
P@e
= ghost[X ]P@e ≤ (cur view+ v gap)P@e = (cur view+ v gap)
P@e
Which concludes the proof of the first part of claim (5).
We have to prove the additional assertions in claim (5) in the cases where v gapP@e = 0 and
X /∈ ContactSetP@e. The case X /∈ ContactSetP@e cannot occur here for the same reason as
in the case of ReceiveGhost.
If v gap = 0 then we can assume by induction that
flush[X ]P@e = (cur view+ v gap)P@e
We now use claim (6) (which we will prove shortly) to conclude that
(cur view+ v gap)
P@e
= (cur view+ v gap)P@e = flush[X ]P@e ≤
≤ flush[X ]P@e ≤ (cur view+ v gap)P@e
And we are done.
The proof that the ReceiveFlush procedure preserves (6) is almost identical to the same proof
for the ReceiveGhost procedure. The only difference is that in the case where k is the first
packet that carries flush information and where j(X) > j(P ), the process X inherits its value
of flush height from the value of ghost height at the parent E, and not the value of flush height
of the parent. Similarly process P initializes flush[X ] from ghost[E] and not from flush[E].
Therefore we get
flush[X ]P@e = ghost[E]
P@vj(X)(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightE@vj(X)(E)PR
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and since X inherits its values of flush height from the value of ghost height in E we have
ghost heightE@vj(X)(E)PR = flush heightX@vj(X)(X)PR
And by monotonicity we have
flush heightX@vj(X)(X)PR ≤ flush heightX@kQU = v
and we are done.
Proof that the procedure preserves (8) is only required when X = P, i.e. when k is a self
packet. In that case we can use the monotonicity of flush height to conclude
flush[P ]
P@e
= v = flush heightP@kQU ≤ flush height
P@kPR = flush heightP@e
Finally the procedure invokes the TryToInstall procedure which preserves all the claims as we
show further on.
protStart
It is trivial to check that the procedure initializes P to a state that conforms to the require-
ments of the lemma.
protRemove
Let R be the process that is being removed. Then by definition r(R) = view(e).
To see that this procedure preserves (1) notice that its event e is a notification event, meaning
that if e′ is the preceding event in EP then view(e) = view(e
′) + 1 while the procedure
increments v gap, maintaining the equality.
It preserves the first part of claim (2) because it removes R from LiveSet. R is the only
process in LiveSet that no longer meets the condition j(Q) ≤ cur view + v gap < r(Q) as
v gap is incremented. No other process is affected because no other process satisfies either
r(Q) = r(R) or j(Q) = r(R).
It preserves the second part of claim (2) because it removes R from LiveSet and ContactSet,
while not affecting Ue since e is not a donation packet dequeuing event.
It preserves (3) because it removes the R coordinate from all the required vectors. It does
not affect (4).
It preserves (5) because it shrinks LiveSet, makes v gap > 0 and increments the right hand
side of the inequality while not affecting the left hand side.
To see why it preserves claims (8) and (9), notice that by incrementing v gap it forces
ghost height and flush height to be low without touching them. As a result the call to
CheckFlush at the end has the following effects:
• ghost height becomes high if and only if FwdWaitSet = ∅.
• flush height becomes high if and only if WaitSet = ∅.
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Therefore flush height becomes high only if ghost height becomes high, and therefore by in-
duction flush height ≤ ghost height in all cases.
The procedure increments v gap, making (10) vacuously true.
It preserves (6) because it does not change the values of ghost[X ] and flush[X ] for X 6= R.
Finally we have to show that the procedure preserves claim (7). Let i = view(e) and let
X 6= R be any process that remains live after the view change. If P does not dequeue any
ghost (flush), donation or co-donation packet from X between vi−1(P )
PR and e = vi(P )
PR
then we get by induction, for either ghost or flush
ghost[X ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= ghost[X ]
P@vi−1(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightX@vi−1(X)PR ≤ ghost heightX@vi(X)PR
flush[X ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= flush[X ]
P@vi−1(P )
PR
≤ flush heightX@vi−1(X)PR ≤ flush heightX@vi(X)PR
and we are done. Otherwise, let e′ = kPR be the last dequeuing event of a ghost (flush),
donation or co-donation packet from X at P with view(e′) = i− 1. Let v be the ghost (flush)
height carried by the packet. Then we have in each case respectively
ghost[X ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= ghost[X ]
P@e′
= v = ghost heightX@kQU
flush[X ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= flush[X ]
P@e′
= v = flush heightX@kQU
and from the Piggyback Axiom it follows that kQU ≺ vi(X)PR and so in each case respectively
ghost heightX@kQU ≤ ghost heightX@vi(X)PR
flush heightX@kQU ≤ flush heightX@vi(X)PR
and we are done.
protJoin
Let J be the joining process and let E be its parent. Then by definition j(J) = view(e).
This procedure preserves (1), (8), (9) and (10) for the exact same reasons as protRemove.
it satisfies the first part of claim (2) because it adds J to LiveSet. J is the only process that
newly meets the condition j(Q) ≤ cur view+ v gap < r(Q) as v gap is incremented. No other
process is affected, because no other process satisfies either j(Q) = j(J) or r(Q) = j(J).
It preserves the second part of claim (2) because it adds J to LiveSet and ContactSet, while
not affecting Ue since e is not a donation packet dequeuing event.
It preserves (3) because it adds a J coordinate to all the required vectors. It does not affect
(4).
It preserves (5) because it makes v gap > 0 and increments the right hand side of each existing
inequality while not affecting the left hand side. The new inequalities for the J coordinate
are inherited from the original ghost inequality for its parent E.
It preserves (6) because it does not change the values of ghost[X ] and flush[X ] for X 6= J .
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Finally we have to show that the procedure preserves claim (7). Let i = view(e) and let X be
any process that is live after the view change. If X 6= J then the claim holds following the
exact same argument that we used in the protRemove case. In the case X = J we have
flush[J ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= ghost[J ]
P@vi(P )
PR
= ghost[E]
P@vi(P )
PR
and since we have already proven the case X 6= J we know that
ghost[E]
P@vi(P )
PR
≤ ghost heightE@vi(E)PR
Since J inherits its values ghost height and flush height from its parent value of ghost height
we have
ghost heightE@vi(E)PR = ghost heightJ@vi(J)PR = flush heightJ@vi(J)PR
and we are done.
Notice that in the last equation by definition the value flush heightJ@vi(J)PR reflects the fact
that the protRun procedure copies the initial value of ghost height into flush height (see Def-
inition 17).
protRun
Let J be the new process and let E be its parent. Then by definition j(J) = view(e). Let
eE = vj(J)(E)
PR and let e′ ≺ eE be the event immediately preceding eE in E. It follows from
the Parent Axiom that eE exists and therefore e
′ exists as well since eE is not the first event
in EE .
Process J starts life with the exact same state that its parent had when it dequeued the
nJOIN〈J,E〉 notification, which is the same state it had at the conclusion of the trans(e′). By
induction, E satisfied all the claims at that point. For most claims this means that they
are automatically satisfied at that point in J as well, as long as we interpret the expressions
varJ@e
′
to simply mean the initial value of var, ignoring the fact that the value of e′ there is
undefined in J . However there are a number of exceptions.
claim (1) becomes ill-defined because e′ is not defined in J . The second part of claim (2)
is not satisfied because it depends on the value of Ue′ which is ill-defined at J , and any
rate is not inherited from E. Claim (6) becomes ill-defined because LiveSetJ@e′ has no clear
interpretation in J . Similarly, claim (7) depends on the meaning of e′ and so is hard to
interpret in J . Claim (8) references the self value flush[P ] where P is the local process.
Whenever we need rely on any of these ill-defined inductive claims as we go, we will present
an explicit calculation that relies directly on the well-defined E version of these claims.
The protRun procedure preserves (1) because
view(e) = j(J) = view(e′) + 1 = (cur view+ v gap)
E@e′
+ 1 =
= (cur view+ v gap)
J@e′
+ 1 = (cur view+ v gap)
J@e
Where the last equality follows because the protRun procedure increments v gap.
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claims (9), (10) and most of (8) are preserved by protRun for the exact same reasons as in
the protRemove case. The only missing piece is that the inequality
flush[J ]J@e ≤ flush heightJ@e
follows because the self flush height flush[J ] is initialized to be equal to ghost heightJ@e
′
. The
same value is used to initialize flush height, and thereafter flush height can only increase.
protRun satisfies the first part of claim (2) for the same reason that protJoin does.
protRun satisfies the second part of claim (2) because at the outset Ue contains every process
X whose join view is lower than j(J). This includes every member of LiveSet except J itself.
Since the protRun procedure adds J to LiveSet while setting ContactSet = {J}, this makes
the equations true.
It preserves (3) because it adds a J coordinate to all the required vectors. It does not affect
(4)
It preserves (5) because it makes v gap > 0 and increments the right hand side of each existing
inequality while not affecting the left hand side. The new inequalities for the J coordinate
hold because the values of flush[J ] and ghost[J ] are both initialized to ghost heightJ@e
′
≤
ghost heightJ@e and because we have shown that claim (8) is preserved.
It preserves (6) because the protRun procedure does not change the initial values of the ghost[]
and flush[] vectors.
Finally we have to show that the procedure preserves claim (7). Let i = view(e) and let X
be any process that is live after the view change. If X 6= J then the value of ghost[X ] and
flush[X ] is inherited from E without change
ghost[X ]
J@vi(J)
PR
= ghost[X ]E@vi(E)PR
flush[X ]
J@vi(J)
PR
= flush[X ]E@vi(E)PR
and since we have already proved all the claims for E (the protJoin case) we know that
ghost[X ]E@vi(E)PR ≤ ghost[X ]
E@vi(E)
PR
≤ ghost heightX@vi(X)PR
flush[X ]E@vi(E)PR ≤ flush[X ]
E@vi(E)
PR
≤ flush heightX@vi(X)
PR
and we are done. The case X = J follows because the protRun procedure sets
ghost[J ]
J@vi(J)
PR
= flush[J ]
J@vi(J)
PR
= ghost heightJ@vi(J)PR = flush heightJ@vi(J)PR
ReceiveDonation
Let S be the sender of the donation packet. Since e is a donation packet dequeuing event in
this case, S falls out of Ue. This is compensated for by adding S to ContactSet. This preserves
claim (2). Then the procedure makes a sequence of invocations of the ReceiveMessage and
ReceiveAck procedures which preserve all the claims as we have already shown.
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Finally the procedure updates ghost[S] and flush[S] from the donated values of ghost height
and flush height respectively. Remember that the donation packet is sent by the protJoin
procedure as part of the j(P ) view change notification processing. Therefore
ghost[S]
P@e
= ghost heightS@vj(P )(S)PR
flush[S]
P@e
= flush heightS@vj(P )(S)PR
It follows from claim 8 of the inductive hypothesis that
flush heightS@vj(P )(S)PR ≤ ghost heightS@vj(P )(S)PR ≤ (cur view+ v gap)S@vj(P )(S)PR =
= j(P )− 1 < view(e) = (cur view+ v gap)P@e
This proves most of claim 5. Since the inequalities are strict we have to show that v gap > 0. It
follows from claim (6) which we will prove shorty that flush[S] is non-decreasing, and therefore
the inequality was strict at the start of the transaction. Therefore by induction v gap > 0.
Claim (6) follows by the exact same reasoning that we used for the ReceiveGhost and
ReceiveFlush procedures, while claim (7) is not relevant at a non-notification transaction.
ReceiveCoDonation
Let S be the sender of the co-donation packet, and let e′ be the trigger of the donation
transaction at which S queues the co-donation packet.
The ReceiveCoDonation procedure makes a sequence of calls that preserve all the claims and
then updates ghost[S] and flush[S] from the co-donated values. Then
ghost[S]P@e = ghost heightS@e′
flush[S]
P@e
= flush heightS@e′
From claim 8 of the inductive hypothesis and the Piggyback Axiom we know that
flush heightS@e′ ≤ ghost heightS@e′ ≤ (cur view+ v gap)S@e′ ≤
≤ view(e′) ≤ view(e) = (cur view+ v gap)P@e
which proves most of claim (5). Process S must be contacted at this point, so we do not have
to show that the inequalities are strict. But if one of the inequalities happens to be strict,
then we have to show that v gap > 0. This follows from the same argument as in the case of
ReceiveDonation.
Claim (6) follows by the exact same reasoning that we used for the ReceiveGhost and
ReceiveFlush procedures, while claim (7) is not relevant at a non-notification transaction.
Finally the procedure calls TryToInstall which also preserves all the claims as we will see.
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TryToInstall
This is a service procedure that is called by other procedures. However it preserves (1) and
(5) because it always increments cur view and decrements v gap together. Also, the procedure
makes no changes to v gap unless all the flush[] values are high. It preserves (4) because it
resets vt whenever it changes MSet.
It preserves (8) because it does not touch either ghost height, flush height or the self flush
height flush[P ] while keeping cur view+ v gap fixed (this includes possible invocations of the
protBroadcast and Scan procedures).
It preserves (9) because it either results in v gap = 0 which makes (9) vacuously true, or else
it fails to install views in which case it does not change any variables and therefore preserves
(9) by induction.
It preserves (10) because it either results in v gap > 0 which makes (10) vacuously true, or
else it starts out with v gap = 0 in which case (10) is true by induction, or else it starts out
with v gap > 0 and ends with v gap = 0 in which case it empties out LaunchQueue, making
(10) true.
TryToInstall does not affect claims (2) and (3).
Scan
This is a service procedure that is called by other procedures. It does not affect any of the
relevant variables so it has no effect on any of the claims.
Corollary 5. Let P be a process and let e ∈ EP be any trigger event. Suppose that
LiveSetP@e 6= ContactSetP@e
Then there is a process X ∈ LiveSet such that flush[X ] < j(P ).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 8(2) that there is a live process X ∈ LiveSet ∩ Ue, and it follows
from the definition of Ue that j(X) < j(P ). Therefore P is not an original process and it has a
parent E. P starts life with a state identical to the state of E at vj(P )(E)
PR.
Process X can only be in LiveSet if it is there originally or if P receives a join notification for X .
Since the latter does not happen in this case we must have X ∈ LiveSetE@vj(P )(E)PR and by Lemma
8(3) flush[X ]E@vj(P )(E)PR exists. By Lemma 8(6, 7, 8 and 1)
flush[X ]E@vj(P )(E)PR ≤ flush[X ]
E@vj(P )(E)
PR
≤
≤ flush heightX@vj(P )(X)PR ≤ (cur view+ v gap)X@vj(P )(X)PR < j(P )
Therefore the initial value of flush[X ] at P is smaller than j(P ).
Scanning the pseudo-code reveals that this initial value of flush[X ] does not change in P unless P
receives a notification of the removal of X (which does not happen in this case) or if P processes
a co-donation packet from X (which also does not happen, because co-donations are always sent
from a late joining process to an existing group member), or if P processes a flush or a donation
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packet from X . The donation packet to P is the first packet that X queues to
−−→
XP and therefore
the first packet from X that P processes. Since e occurs before the donation packet is processed,
the initial value of flush[X ] is still extant and we are done.
Lemma 9. Let P and Q be two original processes. Suppose that P sends a message packet
pMSG〈msg〉 to Q. When P queues the packet, it increments its mpkt out and places msg in its
WaitSet together with an index value equal to its updated value of mpkt out (see the protBroadcast
procedure for original message broadcasts and the protRemove procedure for forwarded broadcasts).
If Q processes the message it increments the value of mpkt in[P ]. Then:
1. Before Q processes the message, its value of mpkt in[P ] is lower than index.
2. After Q processes the message, its value of mpkt in[P ] becomes equal to index.
Moreover, if P = Q then the conclusion holds without the requirement that P be original.
Proof. Both P and Q are original. Therefore Q is a member of ContactSet(P ) from the start (see
the protStart procedure). Therefore every message that was queued by P prior to msg had Q in
its recipient list and since channels are FIFO, all of these messages are processed by Q before msg
is processed. The mpkt out variable in P is incremented every time a message packet is multicast
by P (at the .b or .f component, according as the message is original or forwarded), and similarly
mpkt in[P ] is incremented by Q every time a message from P is processed (at the .b or .f component,
according as the message is original or forwarded). Initially both variables are equal to zero (at both
components) at both P and Q (see the protStart procedure). Therefore they remain at lockstep as
claimed.
Almost the same argument works when P = Q and P is not an original process. We just have to
verify two things. One, that P ∈ ContactSet(P ) from the start, as one can verify by looking at the
protRun procedure. Two, that initially both mpkt out and mpkt in[P ] are equal at P . This can
also be verified by looking at the protRun procedure.
Lemma 10. Let P and Q be two original processes. Suppose that P sends a flush packet k =
p
FLUSH
〈v〉 to Q. When P queues the packet, it increments its flush height (see the CheckFlush
procedure). If Q processes the flush it increments the value of flush[P ]. Then:
flush[P ]Q@kPR < flush heightP@kQU = flush[P ]
Q@kPR = v
Moreover, if P = Q then the conclusion holds without the requirement that P be original.
The exact same claim is true if flush is replaced by ghost throughout.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the flush case. The ghost case is identical using the appropriate
substitutions. Both P and Q are original. Therefore Q is a member of ContactSet(P ) from the
start (see the protStart procedure). Therefore every flush that is queued by P prior to pFLUSH〈v〉
had Q in its recipient list and since channels are FIFO, all of these flushes are processed by Q
before p
FLUSH
〈v〉 is processed. The flush height variable in P is increased to be equal to w every
time a flush of height w is broadcast by P (see the CheckFlush procedure), and therefore flush[P ]
is increased by Q every time a flush from P is processed (see the ReceiveFlush procedure). Initially
both variables are equal to zero at both P and Q (see the protStart procedure). Therefore they
remain at lockstep as claimed.
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Almost the same argument works when P = Q and P is not an original process. We just have to
verify two things. One, that P ∈ ContactSet(P ) from the start, as one can verify by looking at the
protRun procedure. Two, that initially both flush height and flush[P ] are equal at P . This can also
be verified by looking at the protRun procedure.
4.2 Side Effects of CBCAST Triggers
As we have seen, each trigger event - a notification event, a packet processing event, or a message
broadcast request event - causes a CBCAST callback to be invoked. Each invocation can cause zero
or more packets to be queued on various channels - in other words the invocation causes side effects
(see 2.2). We are now going to characterize the side effects of each type of trigger in detail.
4.2.1 Side effects of message broadcast request events
Message broadcast requests are processed through the protBroadcast procedure. The following
lemma details the possible side effects of this procedure call.
Lemma 11. An invocation of the protBroadcast procedure results in exactly one of the following
outcomes:
• No additional packet queuing, if v gap > 0.
• A message packet multicast if v gap = 0.
Proof. Obvious from the code of protBroadcast.
4.2.2 Side effects of view change notifications
A view change notification from GMS is processed either through the protJoin or the protRemove
procedures, depending on the type of view change. In addition, a joining process starts out life
with an exact replica of the state of its parent, and immediately invokes the protRun procedure.
The following lemma details the possible effects of these calls.
Lemma 12. 1. An invocation of the protJoin procedure results in the queuing of a donation
packet, followed by exactly one of the following outcomes:
• No additional packet queuing, if FwdWaitSet is not empty.
• A ghost packet multicast if FwdWaitSet is empty and BcastWaitSet is not empty.
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast, if both BcastWaitSet and
FwdWaitSet are empty.
2. An invocation of the protRemove procedure when process P is removed, results in exactly one
of the following outcomes:
• A sequence of message broadcasts, one per message in FwdQueue[P ], if FwdQueue[P ] is
not empty.
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• No additional packet queuing if FwdQueue[P ] is empty, and FwdWaitSet is non-empty
when CheckFlush is called.
• A ghost packet multicast if FwdWaitSet is empty and BcastWaitSet is not empty when
CheckFlush is called.
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast if both BcastWaitSet and
FwdWaitSet are empty when CheckFlush is called.
3. An invocation of the protRun procedure results in exactly one of the following outcomes:
• No additional packet queuing if FwdWaitSet is non-empty.
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast if FwdWaitSet is empty.
Proof. All these outcomes are easy to verify by tracing the code path in the respective calls. In the
case of protRemove it is important to notice that if FwdQueue[P ] is not empty, then the forwarded
messages are placed in FwdWaitSet, which as a result is not empty when CheckFlush is called.
4.2.3 Side effects of message and acknowledgement packet receipts
A message receipt always results in the sending of an acknowledgement packet in response. An
acknowledgement packet receipt causes a stabilization of a message with respect to the process that
sent the packet. If this stabilization causes either FwdWaitSet or BcastWaitSet to empty out, it can
cause the multicasting of ghost and flush packets.
Lemma 13. 1. An invocation of the ReceiveMessage procedure results in the queuing of an ac-
knowledgement packet targeted at the sender of the message.
2. An invocation of the ReceiveAck procedure results in exactly one of the following outcomes:
• No additional packet queuing if v gap = 0.
• No additional packet queuing if the acknowledgement does not cause either FwdWaitSet
or BcastWaitSet to empty out, even if one or both were already empty.
• No additional packet queuing if the acknowledgement causes BcastWaitSet to empty out
and FwdWaitSet is non-empty.
• A ghost packet multicast if v gap > 0 and the acknowledgement causes FwdWaitSet to
empty out and BcastWaitSet is non-empty.
• A flush packet multicast if v gap > 0 and the acknowledgement causes BcastWaitSet to
empty out and FwdWaitSet is empty.
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast, if v gap > 0 and the
acknowledgement causes FwdWaitSet to empty out and BcastWaitSet is empty.
Proof. This follows directly from direct observation and from Lemma 8(5 and 9).
73
4.2.4 Side effects of ghost and flush packet receipts
A ghost packet receipt does not cause any other packets to be sent. A flush packet, however, may
cause one or more views to be installed. If that happens then one or more original messages from
LaunchQueue may be broadcast.
Lemma 14. 1. An invocation of the ReceiveGhost procedure does not result in additional packet
queuing.
2. An invocation of the ReceiveFlush procedure results in exactly one of the following outcomes:
• No additional packet queuing if no views are installed or if LaunchQueue is empty.
• One or more message packet multicasts if one or more pending views are installed and
LaunchQueue is not empty.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 8(10) and from direct inspection of the code of the relevant pro-
cedures.
4.2.5 Side effects of donation and co-donation packet receipts
The side effects of invoking the ReceiveDonation procedure are pretty straightforward - first a co-
donation packet is sent and then a sequence of ReceiveMessage and ReceiveAck invocations are
performed, each with its side effects that have already been characterized. The side effects of
invoking the ReceiveCoDonation procedure are a bit more subtle, because this procedure has an
additional call to TryToInstall at the end and there is an interplay between its side effects and the
side effects of the rest of the procedure.
Lemma 15. 1. An invocation of the ReceiveDonation procedure results in the queuing of a co-
donation packet back to the sender of the donation packet, followed by a sequence of side
effects for each of the ReceiveMessage and ReceiveAck invocations.
2. An invocation of the ReceiveCoDonation procedure results in exactly one of the following
outcomes:
• Zero or more invocations of ReceiveMessage or ReceiveAck occur with their side effects,
and TryToInstall fails to install a new view and has no side effects.
• No invocations of either ReceiveMessage or ReceiveAck occur, and TryToInstall succeeds
in installing all the views. As a result zero or more original messages from LaunchQueue
are broadcast.
Proof. The donation case is self evident. In the co-donation case, if v gap = 0 (we will see later
that this case does not actually happen) then TryToInstall does not install any views and it follows
from Lemma 8(10) that LaunchQueue is empty and so TryToInstall has no side effects.
Therefore the only non-trivial case has to do with a co-donation that starts with v gap > 0 and
results in a successful new view installation. Suppose that the sender of the co-donation is G and
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the receiver is P . Then a successful installation requires, at P :
flush[G] = cur view+ v gap
flush[P ] = cur view+ v gap
From Lemma 8(8) we know that at P
flush[P ] ≤ flush height ≤ cur view+ v gap
Therefore flush[P ] = flush height = cur view + v gap and since v gap > 0 it follows from the same
lemma (part 9) that WaitSet is empty and as a result UNTp is empty.
Looking at the ReceiveCoDonation procedure one sees that P updates its value of flush[G] just before
invoking TryToInstall, setting it to be equal to the co-donated value of flush height in G. Therefore,
at the moment that G sends the co-donation, it has flush height(G) = cur view(P ) + v gap(P ). In
other words, if we denote by d the donation packet that P sends to G and by c the co-donation
packet that G sends to P then
flush heightG@dPR = (cur view+ v gap)P@cPR
The Piggyback Axiom and Lemma 8(1) imply that the co-donation packet cannot be processed
when P has an overall view height that is lower than that of G and therefore
(cur view+ v gap)P@cPR ≥ (cur view+ v gap)G@dPR
therefore
flush heightG@dPR ≥ (cur view+ v gap)G@dPR
From Lemma 8(8) it follows that
flush heightG@dPR ≤ (cur view+ v gap)G@dPR
and so we can conclude that
flush heightG@dPR = (cur view+ v gap)G@dPR
From Lemma 8(2 and 1) it follows that P /∈ ContactSetG@dPR . From Corollary 5 it follows that
flush[P ]G@dPR < (cur view+ v gap)G@dPR . From Lemma 8(5) it follows that v gapG@dPR > 0.
Now we can use Lemma 8(9) to conclude that WaitSetG@dPR is empty. Therefore P receives an
empty WaitSet from G as part of its co-donation, and therefore UNTg is empty and we are done.
4.3 CBCAST is Vacuum Convergent
In our analysis of CBCAST we want to take advantage of the main finding of Section 2, namely the
Fault Theorem (Theorem 1), and limit our attention to transactional histories. In order to do that
we have to prove that CBCAST is vacuum convergent (see Definitions 15).
Theorem 3. The CBCAST protocol is vacuum convergent.
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Proof. Let P be a halting process in a CBCAST based conforming history. Look at step (6) of the
vacuum loop (see Definition 12). By the Conforming GMS Axiom process P has a finite view interval
and therefore this step can only increment v a finite number of times. Afterwards either the loop
exits or step (6) is not executed again. Assume that the loop never exits. Once v stabilizes, steps
(3) and (4) are executed once and are not executed again. Therefore after a finite number of
steps the vacuum loop degenerates to repeated executions of step (5) which consist of: processing
packets on the self channel; queuing side-effect packets to their respective channels, including the
self-channel; sending and receiving the queued packets on downstream channels, including the
self-channel; processing the newly received packets on the self-channel; etc. Since donation and co-
donation packets are never queued to the self channel, at this point such packets are not processed
by the vacuum loop anymore.
From Lemma 8 we know that the values of ghost height and flush height in P cannot rise above v.
Since the CheckFlush procedure only generates ghost and flush packets when the ghost and flush
height rise, the vacuum loop can only generate a finite number of such packets. Therefore after
a finite number of steps no such packets are generated anymore. Therefore after some more time
passes the vacuum loop processes the last of these packets and does not process any ghost or flush
packets afterwards.
Message packets are generated as a result of the processing of
• a message broadcast request (when v gap = 0)
• a flush packet (when the flush causes view installations and LaunchQueue is not empty)
• a co-donation packet (ditto)
• a removal notification (when FwdQueue is not empty)
Since at this point the vacuum loop does not process any additional items of these types, it only
accumulates a finite number of message packets and as a result after some point it processes the
last message packet and does not process any more such packets afterwards.
Acknowledgement packets are generated as a result of the processing of message packets, donation
packets and co-donation packets. Therefore the vacuum loop processes a finite number of those
packets as well.
So at some point the vacuum loop runs out of packets to process and is forced to fall through to
step (6), contrary to our assumption.
5 The History Reduction Mapping
5.1 Introduction
In this section we demonstrate the rather surprising fact that any transactional history of the CBCAST
protocol that contains at least one join notification can be reduced to an alternate conforming history
of CBCAST that performs the same computation and where the first join notification is replaced with
a removal notification. This allows us to restrict our analysis to histories that contain no join
notifications.
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We will construct the reduced history explicitly. We will start with the original history, and make
careful changes to it. The construction will revolve around the first joining process G, its parent D,
and the join view of G, which we call the critical view. The idea is to declare that G is an original
group member (member since view zero) and that it has a doppelga¨nger -G that is also a member
of view zero. Then instead of having G join the group, we have -G leave the group. We need to
accomplish this while not violating the CBCAST protocol, and without affecting the user application.
In fact if we have any hope of success, the user application must be completely oblivious to the
change. To create the reduced history we will have to solve two problems. First we will have to
create a whole new history for ±G during the pre-critical interval, namely the interval that precedes
the critical view change. Then we will have to resolve the race conditions that occur as a result
of untimely packets, namely packets that are sent before the critical view change notification and
arrive afterwards.
We will solve the first problem by usingD as the pre-critical template for ±G. This means that every
reactive move by D, like receiving or acknowledging a message, will be copied by ±G verbatim.
However we will not copy proactive moves by D, namely original message broadcasts that are
initiated by the application at D. During the pre-critical period, ±G will be passive participants.
We will ensure that the APP thread does not run there (and therefore does not generate message
queuing requests) by artificially delaying the launch of the APP thread until after the critical moment.
This is possible to arrange because the launch of the APP thread in protStart is asynchronous.
The second problem will be solved with the help of the donation/co-donation protocol. This protocol
is carefully tailored to provide precise compensation for critical boundary race conditions. In the
reduced history the critical donation and co-donation packets will be eliminated. All the simulated
packet processing that occurs during the ReceiveDonation and ReceiveCoDonation procedure calls
will be replaced with the receipt and processing of actual, newly-minted untimely packets.
The new packets and events will have to be added and timed in a very precise manner so that we
neither violate CBCAST nor affect the user application. For example, pre-critical flush packets from
±G will have to arrive slightly earlier than their counterparts from D, in order to prevent them
from causing the receiving process to install a new view. But pre-critical forwarded messages from
±G will have to arrive slightly later than their counterparts from D, in order to guarantee that
they are redundant, and therefore ignored by the receiving process. We do not want ±G to rock
the boat prematurely.
To manage this careful surgery we need quite a bit of control. We will gain this control by creating
a 4-coordinate label for each event. The label will describe which transaction the event belongs to
and whether it is the transaction trigger or a side effect. It will describe whether the event was
moved slightly forward or backward to insure redundancy. For events that occur during a donation
or co-donation transaction, the label will also describe which simulated sub-transaction the event
is related to. The most important fact about the labels is that they all come from a single partially
ordered label space that is common to the original and reduced histories. The use of a single label
space for both histories will allow us to relate the order in both, and ultimately to use induction
over the shared label space to prove that both histories track each other closely and ultimately
converge.
Throughout this part of the paper H is a fixed transactional history that includes a first join view
vcrit. The process that joins at view vcrit is denoted G throughout, and the parent process of G is
denoted by D. We will sometimes refer to H as the original history. We will sometimes refer to
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the synthesized history Hr as the reduced history.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Transactions
A process executing the CBCAST protocol invokes a procedure in reaction to each triggering event.
A view change notification event triggers an invocation of the protStart, protRun, protJoin or
protRemove procedures. A packet processing event causes the invocation of the ReceiveMessage,
ReceiveAck, ReceiveGhost, ReceiveFlush, ReceiveDonation or ReceiveCoDonation procedures. A
message broadcast request event causes an invocation of the protBroadcast procedure. The pro-
cedure call in turn causes zero or more side effects in the form of packet queuing events. This
sequence of events, starting with a trigger and continuing with a finite number (possibly zero) of
side effects is a transaction. Because each process P runs its CBCAST procedures in a critical section,
the events at each transaction occur as a contiguous sequence in EP and therefore transactions can
be read out of the history H directly. Compare this with the model-based definition of the notion
of transaction in Section 2.2.
5.2.2 A clean event order
The partial event order ≺ in H is a bit too weak for our labeling needs. Our analysis in 2.4 shows
that this ordering is compatible with event views: a high-view event cannot precede a low-view
event. But it does not have to succeed it either. Also, given the fact that all the view change
notification events of a single view can be viewed as occurring at the same time, it would be
convenient to collapse them into a single event. This is exactly what we will do now.
Definition 19. The Clean Event Set (E˙, ≺˙) is the partially ordered set obtained from the set E
of events in H by collapsing all the notification events of each view i into a single element ℓi, with
the induced partial order. Formally:
E˙ = {ℓi}0≤i<V+1
⋃  ⋃
0≤i<V +1
(Ki \Gi)


e˙≺˙f˙ ⇐⇒


e˙ = ℓi and f˙ = ℓj and i < j
e˙ = ℓi and f˙ ∈ Kj \Gj and i ≤ j
e˙ ∈ Ki \Gi and f˙ = ℓj and i < j
e˙ ∈ Ki \Gi and f˙ ∈ Kj \Gj and i < j
e˙, f˙ ∈ Ki \Gi and e˙ ≺ f˙
Notice that since notification events are necessarily trigger events, the elements of E˙ can be divided
into trigger events (which include all the ℓi events) and side-effect events.
The transactions that are triggered by the critical donation and co-donation packets have a special
place in our analysis, so we add some specific notation for them.
Definition 20.
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• Let d ∈
−−→
PGH be the critical donation packet sent by P . We denote Crit(P → G) = dPR when
dPR exists.
• Let c ∈
−−→
GPH be the critical co-donation packet sent to P . We denote Crit(G → P ) = cPR
When cPR exists.
5.2.3 Donation and co-donation sub-transactions
The main concern of the ReceiveDonation and ReceiveCoDonation procedures is the execution of a
sequence of ReceiveMessage and ReceiveAck calls. These calls or sub-transactions compensate for
race conditions. When a new process joins, it is not possible to deliver to it an up-to-date consistent
copy of ReplicatedData that will allow it to participate in the distributed computation without any
further correction. The problem is that at the moment where the new process joins, some of the
information required by it is trapped in packets that are in transit, carrying information that will
arrive to the packet’s destination too late to be of help.
What are these missing packets? the answer to this question is not easy. Na¨ıvely, most of these are
packets that were sent to or from the parent of the new process and failed to arrive by the moment
of the view change, but the general picture is a lot more complicated because the parent itself may
have joined the group in a previous view change, and the packet of interest may have been sent
to/from an ancestor of the parent. Luckily, we only have to worry about the critical view change,
which is the first process join in the history. This case, while not trivial, is considerably simpler.
Our event labeling will reflect this fact, by labeling the sub-transactions of critical donations and
co-donation transactions differently from non-critical ones. This way we can avoid an in-depth
analysis of non-critical donations and co-donations, and let their meaning remain entangled in the
magic of induction.
In the proceeding discussion we will use the shorthand notation
‖vect‖ = vect.f + vect.b
For vectors like mpkt out, mpkt in[] and index.
Lemma 16. Let P be an original process (a member of view zero in H) and suppose that G processes
a critical donation packet from P . Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence
between the following two sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveMessage invocations by G at labeled step 1 of the ReceiveDonation
procedure as it processes the donation packet from P .
2. The queuing events of untimely message packets in channel
−−→
PD, ordered by ≺. Formally these
are the events kQU ∈ E that meet the following criteria:
k ∈
−−→
PD
k =p
MSG
〈msg〉
kQU ≺ vvcrit(P )
PR
vvcrit(D)
PR ≺ kPR if kPR exists
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Proof. Let k be a packet that meets all the criteria of (2). Then it is a message packet k = pMSG〈msg〉
that had been sent from P to D prior to the critical view change. When k is queued, P places
a record 〈msg, index, iset〉 in its WaitSet. Since the packet does not make it to D prior to the
critical moment, the message does not stabilize with respect to D and remains in WaitSet with a D
instability at the critical moment. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 9 that at the critical moment
at D, ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ < ‖index‖. Indeed we can say more than that: if k is the ith packet in the
sequence of untimely message packets in the
−−→
PD channel, then ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ + i = ‖index‖.
Process G starts life with the same value of mpkt in[P ], inherited from D. Since the protRun
procedure does not touch this value, and since the critical donation packet from P is the first
packet that G receives from P , this value remains unchanged until G executes the ReceiveDonation
procedure.
At the critical moment P executes the protJoin procedure. It adds G instability to the record,
with iset[G].f = iset[D].f and iset[G].b = 0. P then donates its state to G. When G processes the
donation by invoking the ReceiveDonation procedure, it finds the record with its G-instability and
copies it to the UNTp set. G sorts the records in such a way that the records of untimely message
packets from P are sorted in their broadcast order.
To see why that is true, let k and k′ be untimely message packets in
−−→
PD and suppose that
k′
QU ≻ kQU. Then (iset[D].f)@k′ ≥ (iset[D].f)@k because this value is initialized from mpkt in[D].f
(see the protBroadcast and protRemove procedures) which is monotone increasing. As a result
(iset[G].f)@k′ ≥ (iset[G].f)@k in the donated state from P and so
height1(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) ≥ height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉)
If these heights are equal the sorting proceeds based on height2. This function is derived from
the index component of the record, which is strictly increasing with each message broadcast at P .
Therefore
height2(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) > height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉)
which proves that the records of the untimely message packets are sorted in the order at which
those message packets were queued by P .
Process G examines the records in the sorted UNT set one by one. Every time a record from UNTp
is examined, its ‖index‖ is compared to ‖mpkt in[P ]‖. If ‖index‖ is bigger, the ReceiveMessage
procedure is invoked, causing ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ to be incremented by 1. It follows from Lemma 9 that
if the message is timely then the comparison will fail and the call will not be invoked. So the call
is invoked only for untimely message packets, in the right order, and causes ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ to be
incremented each time. If the call is invoked for all the untimely message packets up to the ith one,
then ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ grows by i− 1 up to that point, which is not enough to prevent the comparison
from succeeding for the ith message packet. Therefore the call is invoked exactly for the records of
untimely message packets, in the correct order, as claimed.
Lemma 17. Let P be an original process (a member of view zero in H) and suppose that G processes
a critical donation packet from P . Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence
between the following two sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveAck invocations by G at labeled step 2 of the ReceiveDonation procedure
as it processes the donation packet from P .
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2. The queuing events of untimely forwarded acknowledgement packets in channel
−−→
PD, ordered
by ≺. Formally these are the events kQU ∈ E that meet the following criteria:
k ∈
−−→
PD
k =pACK〈msg〉
ORIG(msg) 6=D
kQU ≺ vvcrit(P )
PR
vvcrit(D)
PR ≺ kPR if kPR exists
Proof. Let k be a packet that meets all the criteria of (2). Then this packet had been sent from
P to D prior to the critical view change, in reaction to the receipt of a message msg from D. The
message must be forwarded because it did not originate with D. When D sends the message packet
to P , it places a record 〈msg, index, iset〉 in its FwdWaitSet (see labeled step 6 of the protRemove
procedure). Let Fmsg = index.f .
As the critical parent, D is an original process and Lemma 9 applies. Therefore after P executes
the ReceiveMessage procedure, its value of mpkt in[D].f is equal to Fmsg. Let Fcrit be the value of
mpkt in[D].f at P at the critical moment. Since the receipt of the message msg at P takes place
pre-critically, Fcrit ≥ Fmsg. At the critical time P copies mpkt in[D].f to mpkt in[G].f (while zeroing
out the .b component) before sending its donation to G (see the protJoin procedure).
Since the acknowledgement packet for this message does not arrive by the critical moment, the
record remains with P in its instability set (iset) and G starts life with the same record in its own
FwdWaitSet, after inheriting it from D. Right away G zeroes out index.b in the record (see the
protRun procedure). Since the donation packet is the first packet ever received at G from P , the
record must remain in FwdWaitSet at G until that moment, because there is no way until that time
for the P -instability to be resolved.
Following the execution of the ReceiveDonation procedure the record of msg in FwdWaitSet makes
it into the UNTg set. Moreover, the value of the index.f = Fmsg component of the record is no
higher than the critical value of mpkt in[G].f = Fcrit at P , which is exactly the value that arrives
at G together with P ’s donation. The .b field in both values is zero. Therefore the ReceiveAck
procedure gets invoked on behalf of msg.
If k′ is a packet that meets the same criteria and has a later queuing event than k, then k′ =
pACK〈msg’〉 where msg’ is sent from D to P after msg is sent. Therefore the value of ‖index‖ for
msg’ is higher and therefore the related sub-transaction is executed later, so the mapping in this
direction is order preserving.
The inverse correspondence is constructed in a similar way. Let 〈msg, index, iset〉 Be a record in
UNTg that passes the comparison test
‖index‖ ≤ ‖donation.mpkt in[G]‖
From the construction of UNTg it follows that iset[P ] exists. Therefore the message msg got into
WaitSet after a message packet queuing event that included P in its target set. When and where
did this queuing event happen? If it happened at G, then index must be strictly bigger than the
initial value of mpkt out at G. This initial value is equal to zero in its .b component (see the
81
protRun procedure) while its .f component is equal to the critical value of mpkt out.f at D. It
follows from Lemma 9 that Fcrit, the critical value of mpkt in[D].f at P is at most as high as the
critical value of mpkt out.f at D. Therefore index.b+ index.f > Fcrit. But as we have already seen,
Fcrit = donation.mpkt in[G].f and donation.mpkt in[G].b = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore
the queuing event does not happen at G but rather at D, and the WaitSet record in question is
inherited by G when it is created. From this it follows that the message did not originate with D.
If it did, then the record would go to BcastWaitSet in D, and this part of WaitSet is not inherited
by G but instead zeroed out (see the protRun procedure). So ORIG(msg) 6= D.
So the message msg is forwarded from D to P , and is not stabilized with respect to P by the critical
moment. Why is it not stabilized? either it does not arrive at P on time (in which case the message
packet from D to P is untimely), or else it does arrive on time but the acknowledgement packet
from P to D is untimely. If the first case holds then by Lemma 9 Fcrit < index.b+ index.f . As we
saw, this leads to a contradiction. Therefore the acknowledgement packet k = p
ACK
〈msg〉 that was
sent from P to D was untimely. This means that the packet k meets all the criteria listed in the
statement of the lemma.
It is obvious that these two correspondences are inverses of each other and so we are done.
Corollary 6. Let P be an original process and suppose that G processes a critical donation packet
from P . Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence between the following two
sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveMessage and ReceiveAck invocations by G at labeled steps 1 and 2 of
the ReceiveDonation procedure as it processes the donation packet from P .
2. The queuing events of untimely message packets and forwarded acknowledgement packets in
channel
−−→
PD, ordered by ≺.
Proof. Most of the claim follows directly from Lemmas 16 and 17. But we still have to show
that if k, k′ ∈
−−→
PD are an untimely message packet and an untimely acknowledgement packet for a
forwarded message respectively, then kQU ≺ k′QU if and only if the corresponding records in UNTp
and UNTg are processed in the same order.
Let k = p
MSG
〈msg〉 and k′ = p
ACK
〈msg′〉. Let index′ be the value of mpkt out in D when it queues
pMSG〈msg
′〉. This is the value of the index field of the record of msg′ in WaitSet(D).
Suppose first that kQU ≺ k′QU. Then P queues k before it processes pMSG〈msg
′〉. By Lemma 9, at
the time that P queues k, we have mpkt in[D].f ≤ index′.f at P . But in fact the inequality is strict
here because the message msg′ is forwarded by D, not originated. Because of that it is mpkt out.f
that is incremented when p
MSG
〈msg′〉 is queued and mpkt in[D].f that is incremented when the
same packet is processed. Let r, r′ ∈ UNT be the records that correspond to k and k′ respectively.
We have already seen that height1(r) = mpkt in[D].f and index(r
′).f = index′.f . Therefore
height1(r) = mpkt in[D].f < index
′.f ≤ height1(r
′)
which proves one direction of the claim.
To prove the other direction, suppose that kQU ≻ k′QU. Then P queues k after it processes
pMSG〈msg
′〉. By Lemma 9, at the time that P queues k, we have mpkt in[D].f ≥ index′.f and
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following the same logic as before we conclude that height1(r) ≥ height1(r′). In this case however
we cannot guarantee a strict inequality. In case there is equality, however, the order between r and
r′ is determined by height2. Since r
′ ∈ UNTg we have height2(r′) = 0 while r ∈ UNTp and therefore
height2(r) = ‖index(r)‖ ≥ index
′.f > 0 = height2(r
′)
where the rightmost inequality is strict because msg′ is a forwarded message.
Lemma 18. Let P be an original process (a member of view zero in H) that processes a critical
co-donation packet from G. Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence between
the following two sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveMessage invocations by P at labeled step 1 of the ReceiveCoDonation
procedure as it processes the co-donation packet from G.
2. The union of the following two sets of events, ordered by ≺:
(a) The queuing events of untimely forwarded message packets in channel
−−→
DP . Formally
these are the events kQU ∈ E that meet the following criteria:
k ∈
−−→
DP
k =pMSG〈msg〉
ORIG(msg) 6=D
kQU ≺ vvcrit(D)
PR
vvcrit(P )
PR ≺ kPR if kPR exists
(b) The post-critical, pre-P -donation queuing events of message packets in channel
−−→
GG.
Formally these are the events kQU ∈ E that meet the following criteria:
k ∈
−−→
GG
k =pMSG〈msg〉
vvcrit(G)
PR ≺ kQU ≺ Crit(P → G)
Note: The union of these two sets of events is linearly ordered by ≺ because according to the
Parent Axiom vvcrit(D)
PR ≍ Grun = vvcrit(G)
PR.
Proof. Let k be a packet that meets all the criteria of (2a). This packet was sent from D to P
prior to the critical view change, containing a forwarded message msg. When D queued the packet
it placed a record 〈msg, index, iset〉 in its FwdWaitSet. Let Fmsg = index.f . Let Fcrit be the value of
mpkt in[D].f at P at the critical moment. Then the fact that the packet is untimely, together with
Lemma 9 imply that Fmsg > Fcrit. We can say more than that: if k is the i
th packet in the sequence
of untimely forwarded message packets in the
−−→
DP channel, then Fmsg = Fcrit + i. At the critical
moment process P creates mpkt in[G].f = Fcrit. At the critical moment the value of mpkt out.f at
D is equal to Fcrit + u where u is the number of untimely forwarded message packets in the
−−→
DP
channel. As a result G starts life with ‖mpkt out‖ = Fcrit + u (the protRun procedure zeroes out
mpkt out.b).
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Since the packet k is untimely, the record remains in FwdWaitSet, with P in its instability set, until
the critical moment. Therefore G starts life with the same record in its own FwdWaitSet, and the
protRun procedure leaves index.f untouched. Since G does not receive any packet from P until it
receives its donation, the record remains in FwdWaitSet at G until Crit(P → G) and therefore it is
sent to P as part of the co-donation from G. As a result, when P processes the co-donation from
G it finds the record with its P -instability, and places it in UNTg.
P sorts the records in such a way that the records of untimely message packets from D are sorted
in their broadcast order. To see why that is true, let k and k′ be untimely forwarded message
packets in
−−→
DP such that k′
QU ≻ kQU. Then ‖(iset[P ])@k′‖ ≥ ‖(iset[P ])@k‖ at D because this value
is initialized from ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ (see the protRemove procedure) which is monotone increasing. The
value of iset is not changed by the protRun procedure so the same relationship holds in G and so
this is what P sees in the co-donated state that it receives from G. Therefore
height1(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) ≥ height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉)
If these heights are equal the sorting proceeds based on height2. This function is derived from
the index component of the record. The protRun procedure zeroes out index.b but does not touch
index.f . The original value of index.f is derived from the value of mpkt out.f at D. Since k is
a forwarded message packet, the value of mpkt out.f is increased after D queues k, and therefore
index′.f > index.f . Therefore at G, where the .b component is zero for the records of both k and k′
we have ‖index′‖ > ‖index‖ and therefore
height2(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) > height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉)
which proves that the records of the untimely message packets are sorted in the order at which
those message packets were queued by D.
Now let us examine the other subset of packets. Let k be a packet that meets all the criteria of
(2b). When G queues k it does not have P in ContactSet, because ContactSet is initialized in G to
contain only itself (see the protRun procedure), and P is only added to the set when G processes
the critical donation from P . As a result G does not send a message packet to P even though
it does create an iset[P ] entry in the instability set of the message in its WaitSet (to see that,
check the protBroadcast and protRemove procedures to see that message packets are only sent to
contacted processes, while instability is created to each process that has an entry in the mpkt in
vector. According to Lemma 8(3) mpkt in has entries exactly for the live processes.) This makes it
impossible for the record 〈msg, index, iset〉 of the message to stabilize with respect to P by the time
that G processes the donation from P , and as a result the record survives in the co-donated state
that G sends to P , together with its P -instability. As a result P copies the record into UNTg.
The value of index in the record is initialized from the value of mpkt out at G. As we noted before
G starts life with ‖mpkt out‖ = Fcrit + u where u is the number of packets meeting the criteria of
2a. Since mpkt out is incremented by G every time it queues message packets, we can conclude that
the jth packet that meets the criteria of 2b has a record with ‖index‖ = Fcrit +u+ j. In other words
if we take the two sequences 2a and 2b as one, then the record of the ith packet in that sequence
has ‖index‖ = Fcrit + i.
We want to show that these records are also sorted by P according to their ≺-order with respect
to each other and also with respect to the records of the untimely
−−→
DP packets.
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Let k and k′ be two packets in
−−→
GG that meet the 2b criteria, and let k0 be a packet in
−−→
DP that
meets the 2a criteria. k and k′ are post-critical and both have records that retain their P instability.
Moreover, iset[P ] is initialized in both cases from mpkt in[P ] at G, a value that starts out being
equal to the critical value of mpkt in[P ] at D. This value is untouched by the protRun procedure,
and remains unchanged until the moment that G processes the donation from P , because there are
no incoming message packets from P to G until that time. Therefore iset[P ] = iset′[P ]. Similarly,
k0 gets its value of iset[P ] from a pre-critical value of mpkt in[P ] at D. Therefore
height1(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) = height1(〈msg, index, iset[]〉) ≥ height1(〈msg
0, index0, iset0[]〉)
So the height1 function does not resolve the order between the records of k and k
′, and if it resolves
it between k0 and k it does so in the desired way.
Both k and k′ derive their index value from the value of mpkt out at G, which increases with each
message packet queuing event. therefore
height2(〈msg’, index’, iset’[]〉) > height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉)
and we have the desired order relation in this case. The record for packet k0 at D derives its
index value from a pre-critical value of mpkt out at D. G inherits mpkt out from D with the .b
component zeroed out. G inherits the k0 record and similarly zeroes out its index.b value. Post-
critically, mpkt out at G continues to grow from this initial value with each message broadcast.
Therefore
height2(〈msg, index, iset[]〉) > height2(〈msg
0, index0, iset0[]〉)
and we have the desired order in this case as well.
Process P examines the records in the sorted UNT set one by one. Every time a record from UNTg
is examined, its ‖index‖ is compared to ‖mpkt in[G]‖. If ‖index‖ is bigger, the ReceiveMessage
procedure is invoked, causing ‖mpkt in[G]‖ to be incremented by 1.
There are exactly three types of records in UNTg. There are records for message packets that were
queued by G itself, namely post-critical message packets that meet the criteria of 2b. Then there
are records that were inherited from D. These are records of pre-critical message packets. Some of
these packets are untimely and meet the criteria of 2a, while others are timely.
It follows from Lemma 9 that if the message is timely then the comparison will fail and the procedure
will not be invoked. So the procedure is invoked only for untimely and post-critical message packets,
in the right order, and causes ‖mpkt in[G]‖ to be incremented each time. If the procedure is invoked
for all the untimely and post-critical message packets up to the ith one, then ‖mpkt in[G]‖ grows
by i− 1 up to that point, which is not enough to prevent the comparison from succeeding for the
ith message packet. Therefore the procedure is invoked exactly for the records of message packets
that meet one of the two criteria, in the correct order, as claimed.
Lemma 19. Let P be an original process (a member of view zero in H) that processes a critical
co-donation packet from G. Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence between
the following two sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveAck invocations by P at labeled step 2 of the ReceiveCoDonation
procedure as it processes the co-donation packet from G.
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2. The queuing events of untimely acknowledgement packets in channel
−−→
DP , ordered by ≺. For-
mally these are the events kQU ∈ E˙ that meet the following criteria:
k ∈
−−→
DP
k = pACK〈msg〉
kQU ≺ vvcrit(D)
PR
vvcrit(P )
PR ≺ kPR if kPR exists
Proof. Let Icrit be the value of mpkt in[P ] at D at the critical moment. G inherits mpkt in[P ] from
D. This value is not changed by the protRun procedure, and it remains unchanged until the receipt
of a donation packet from P , since this is the first packet of any kind that G receives from P . Upon
receipt of the donation packet from P , G immediately sends a co-donation packet to P . Therefore
when P executes the ReceiveCoDonation procedure, we have:
‖co donation.mpkt in[P ]‖ = ‖Icrit‖
Let k be a packet that meets all the criteria of (2). Then this packet was sent from D to P prior
to the critical view change, in reaction to the receipt of a message msg from P . When P sends the
message packet to D, it places a record 〈msg, index, iset〉 in its WaitSet. Let Imsg = index.
Since the acknowledgement packet for this message does not arrive by the critical moment, the
record remains in WaitSet at P , with D in its instability set until then. At that moment, P adds a
G instability to the record (see labeled step 1 of the protJoin procedure). This additional instability
ensures that the record will remain in WaitSet until the first packet from G arrives. This packet is
the co-donation from G. Therefore when P processes the co-donation packet it discovers the record
in its WaitSet and copies it into UNTp.
As the critical parent, D is an original process and Lemma 9 applies. Therefore after D executes
the ReceiveMessage procedure, its value of mpkt in[P ] is equal to Imsg. Since the receipt of the
message msg at D takes place pre-critically, ‖Icrit‖ ≥ ‖Imsg‖. Therefore:
‖co donation.mpkt in[P ]‖ = ‖Icrit‖ ≥ ‖Imsg‖ = ‖index‖
therefore the record results in the invocation of the ReceiveAck procedure at labeled step 2 of the
ReceiveCoDonation procedure.
If k′ is a packet that meets the same criteria and has a later queuing event than k, then k′ =
p
ACK
〈msg’〉 where msg’ is sent from P to D after msg is sent. Therefore the value of ‖index‖ for
msg’ is higher and therefore the related sub-transaction is executed later, so the mapping in this
direction is order preserving.
The inverse correspondence is constructed in a similar way. Let 〈msg, index, iset〉 Be a record in
UNTp that passes the comparison test
‖index‖ ≤ ‖co donation.mpkt in[P ]‖
From the construction of UNTp it follows that iset[G] exists. Therefore the message msg got into
WaitSet after a message packet queuing event that included a packet being sent to G (post-critically)
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or toD (pre-critically). We must eliminate the post-critical case. If the queuing event is post-critical
then index must be strictly bigger than the critical value of mpkt out at P . Call this critical value
Ocrit. It follows from Lemma 9 that Ocrit ≥ Icrit. Therefore
index > ‖Ocrit‖ ≥ ‖Icrit‖ = ‖co donation.mpkt in[P ]‖
contradicting our assumption. It follows that msg must have been sent pre-critically to D. We
know that D processed the message packet pre-critically because the relation
‖index‖ ≤ ‖co donation.mpkt in[P ]‖ = ‖Icrit‖
implies it according to Lemma 9. It is obvious that these two correspondences are inverses of each
other and so we are done.
Corollary 7. Let P be an original process that processes a critical co-donation packet from G.
Then there is a one-to-one, order preserving correspondence between the following two sequences:
1. The sequence of ReceiveMessage and ReceiveAck invocations by G at labeled steps 1 and 2 of
the ReceiveDonation procedure as it processes the donation packet from P .
2. The queuing events of untimely forwarded message packets in channel
−−→
PD, the queuing events
of untimely acknowledgement packets in channel
−−→
PD and the queuing events of post-critical,
pre-P -donation message packets in channel
−−→
GG, ordered by ≺.
Proof. Most of the claim follows directly from Lemmas 18 and 19. But we still have to show that
if k, k′ ∈
−−→
DP are an untimely forwarded message packet and an untimely acknowledgement packet
respectively, and if k′′ ∈
−−→
GG is a pre-P -donation message packet then
• kQU ≺ k′QU if and only if the corresponding records in UNTg and UNTp are processed in the
same order.
• The record for k′′ in UNTg is processed after the record for k′ in UNTp.
Let k = p
MSG
〈msg〉 and k′ = p
ACK
〈msg′〉. Let index′ be the value of mpkt out in P when it queues
pMSG〈msg
′〉. This is the value of the index field of the record of msg′ the WaitSet(P ).
Suppose first that kQU ≺˙ k′QU. Then D queues k before it processes p
MSG
〈msg′〉. By Lemma 9, at
the time that D queues k, we have ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ < ‖index′‖ at D. Let r, r′ ∈ UNT be the records
that correspond to k and k′ respectively. We have already seen that height1(r) = ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ and
index(r′) = index′. Therefore
height1(r) = ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ < ‖index
′‖ = height1(r
′)
which proves one direction of the claim for k and k′.
To prove the other direction, suppose that kQU ≻ k′QU. Then D queues k after it processes
p
MSG
〈msg′〉. By Lemma 9, at the time that D queues k, we have ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ ≥ ‖index′‖ and
following the same logic as before we conclude that height1(r) ≥ height1(r′). In this case however
we cannot guarantee a strict inequality. In case there is equality, however, the order between r and
r′ is determined by height2. Since r
′ ∈ UNTp we have height2(r′) = 0 while r ∈ UNTg and therefore
height2(r) = ‖index(r)‖ > 0 = height2(r
′)
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We still have to show that the record for k′′ is placed later than the record for k′ in the sorted
order. As we saw before, G inherits the value of mpkt in[P ] without change, and since D pro-
cesses p
MSG
〈msg′〉 pre-critically, the critical value of ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ at D is at least as high as
‖index′‖. Therefore at the moment that G queues k′′ we have ‖mpkt in[P ]‖ ≥ ‖index′‖ and therefore
height1(r
′′) ≥ height1(r
′) where r′′ is the record corresponding to k′′. The rest of the argument is
the same as the similar argument for kQU ≻ k′QU.
Lemma 20. Let P be an original process (a member of view zero in H) that processes a critical
co-donation packet from G, and suppose that the invocation of TryToInstall at labeled step 3 of
the ReceiveCoDonation procedure results in the installation of the pending views at P . Let v =
cur view + v gap be the view height at P at the moment that it processes the critical co-donation.
Then G must have queued a pFLUSH〈v〉 packet prior to dequeuing the donation from P . Moreover,
after queuing that packet and until the donation from P is dequeued, G does not queue any ghost,
flush or message packets.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 15 shows that if TryToInstall actually installs the pending views, then
the value of flush height at G must have been equal to v at the time that G processed the donation
from P . Let v0 = flush heightG@vvcrit (G)PR be the initial flush height at G (see Definition 17). v0 is
equal to ghost heightD@vvcrit (D)PR and therefore v0 < vcrit according to Lemma 8(1 and 8). Lemma
8(1) also implies that v ≥ vcrit because the co-donation is processed at P after the critical view
change. This implies that flush height at G increases between the time G is created and the time
that it processes the donation from P . The only way for that to happen is for G to queue one
or more flush packets. The last one of the flush packets before the receipt of the donation from
P would reflect the value of flush height at the time. Therefore this last flush packet must be
klast = pFLUSH〈v〉. We have to show that G does not queue any additional regular packets between
klast and the processing of the donation from P . We already know that G does not queue any
additional flush packets in that interval. From Lemma 8(8) and the Piggyback Axiom we know
that G also does not queue any ghost packets. It follows from the proof of Lemma 15 that G does
not queue any message packets either.
5.3 The Label Space
We construct an infinite, very well founded, partially ordered set L, that we call the label space. We
use this space as a medium for inducing an ordering on the events in Hr. We do it the following
way. First we assign a label from L to each event in H in a ≺-order preserving manner. Then we
expand the assignment to events in Hr. Then we use the latter labeling to induce an order on the
events in Hr.
Each label is made up of four coordinates: the constellation coordinate, the sub-transaction co-
ordinate, the adjustment coordinate and the side-effect coordinate. Each coordinate comes from
its own very well founded partially ordered set, and the ordering on L as a whole is left-handed
lexicographic, with the constellation coordinate being the major one.
All the events in a single transaction share the same constellation coordinate, but the converse is
not true. It is possible for multiple transactions to share the same constellation coordinate. The
set of all the transactions that share each constellation coordinate is called a constellation. In the
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original history H only notification transactions are grouped into constellations that contain more
than one transaction. In Hr however this is not the case. We will prove by induction that H and
Hr converge. The proof will proceed by induction over constellations (normal induction can be
carried over any very well-founded partially ordered set, not just over natural numbers).
5.3.1 The constellation coordinate set
This set is made up of all the trigger events in E˙ with the ≺˙ partial order (see Definition 19).
Definition 21. We use the symbol Lc to denote the constellation set. For any transaction T the
clean trigger ˙trig(T ) ∈ E˙ is an element of Lc. We denote that element by ℓT . For any event e ∈ E
H
we denote ℓe = ℓtrans(e). If T is a notification transaction for view i then by definition ℓT = ℓi.
5.3.2 The sub-transaction coordinate set
This coordinate is only used for differentiating sub-transactions within donation and co-donation
transactions. For all other events we use a special zero symbol for this coordinate. These sub-
transactions simulate the processing of packets that were supposed to be sent to or from a newly
joining process, but that were not sent due to race conditions. For the purpose of constructing Hr
the labeling of the critical donation and co-donation sub-transactions is crucial. As for the non-
critical donations and co-donations (i.e. those that involve processes other than G that join after the
critical view change), their labeling is a lot less important. It would be nice to use the same labeling
scheme for all donations and co-donation, and this is indeed possible, but very complicated and not
really worth the effort. So reluctantly we use two separate systems of labeling sub-transactions.
One for the critical ones and one for the non-critical ones.
The analysis in 5.2.3 shows that the critical sub-transactions in both donation and co-donation
transactions can be ordered using related events from E˙. These events are all queuing events of
packets, ordered by ≺˙. This is true for non-critical sub-transactions as well but we have not shown
that. So we will simply use positive integers to label those sub-transactions. Together with the
additional special zero element this yields:
Ls = {0ˆ}+
(
E˙
∐
N
)
5.3.3 The adjustment coordinate set
This coordinate is used for slight adjustments of trigger events in Hr, forcing them to happen either
slightly earlier or slightly later than related triggers. The set contains nine elements:
La = {⇓
(-g) < ⇓(+g) < ⇓(-f) < ⇓(+f) < ⇓(-s) < ⇓(+s) < 0ˆ < ⇑(-m) < ⇑(+m)}
Where the elements refer to the time adjustment in processing the following packets:
• ⇓(-g): A ghost packet from -G
• ⇓(+g): A ghost packet from G
• ⇓(-f): A flush packet from -G
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• ⇓(+f): A flush packet from G
• ⇓(-s): An acknowledgement packet from -G
• ⇓(+s): An acknowledgement packet from G
• ⇑(-m): A message packet from -G
• ⇑(+m): A message packet from G
5.3.4 The side-effect coordinate set
This coordinate is used for differentiating events within a transaction (or a sub-transaction, in the
case of a donation or a co-donation that includes multiple sub-transactions). The set contains an
infinite sequence of elements
Lf = {0ˆ < CODONATE < DONATE < ACK < GHOST < FLUSH <
< BCAST1 < BCAST2 < . . . }
Where 0ˆ is indicates a trigger event and the meaning of each of the other symbols is self explanatory.
5.3.5 Labeling the events in H
As we mentioned, each label contains four coordinates, one of each type. Formally
L = Lc ×Ls×La ×Lf
If ℓT ∈ Lc, s ∈ Ls, a ∈ La and f ∈ Lf , we use the notation [ℓT .s.a|f ] to denote the label with
those coordinates. If T is a critical donation or co-donation transaction we use the notations
[Crit(G→ P ).s.a|f ] and [Crit(P → G).s.a|f ].
We want to create a map λ : EH → L that assigns a label to each event in H and preserves order
in the sense that if e ≺ f then λ(e) < λ(f).
Let e be any event in H . We create the label of e = [ℓT .s.a|f ] coordinate by coordinate:
The constellation coordinate:
We simply use the constellation ℓtrans(e).
The sub-transaction coordinate:
• If ℓtrans(e) = Crit(P → G) and e is a side effect of one of the sub-transactions (labeled
steps 1 and 2 of ReceiveDonation) then Corollary 6 implies that there is a corresponding
event f = kQU ∈ E˙ where k ∈
−−→
PD is an untimely packet. We use f as the sub-transaction
coordinate for e.
• If ℓtrans(e) = Crit(G → P ) and e is a side effect of one of the sub-transactions (labeled
steps 1 and 2 of ReceiveCoDonation) then Corollary 7 implies that there is a corre-
sponding event f = kQU ∈ E˙ where either k ∈
−−→
DP is an untimely packet or k ∈
−−→
GG is a
post-critical, pre-P -donation packet. We use f as the sub-transaction coordinate for e.
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• If ℓtrans(e) = Crit(G→ P ) and e is a side effect of the TryToInstall procedure invocation at
labeled step 3 of ReceiveCoDonation then Lemma 20 implies that there is a corresponding
event f = kQU ∈ E˙ where k ∈
−−→
GG is the last pre-P -donation flush packet, and k =
pFLUSH〈v〉 where v is equal to the view height cur view+ v gap at P at the time that it
processes the co-donation. We use f as the sub-transaction coordinate for e.
• If ℓtrans(e) is a non-critical donation or co-donation transaction, and e is a side effect
of one of the sub-transactions then we label e with a serial number, with all the side
effects of the first sub-transaction receiving a value of 1, the side effects of the second
sub-transaction receiving a value of 2, et cetera.
• If e is any other event then we label e with the special value 0ˆ. This includes the cases
where e is
– a trigger event.
– a side effect of a transaction that is neither a donation nor a co-donation.
– the queuing event of the co-donation packet in a donation transaction.
– a side effect of the TryToInstall invocation in a non-critical co-donation transaction.
The adjustment coordinate:
In H this coordinate is always 0ˆ. We only make non-trivial adjustments for events that are
added in Hr.
The side-effect coordinate:
We assign this coordinate according to the side-effect. If e is a trigger event, we use the special
zero value 0ˆ. Otherwise e = kQU for some packet. In that case we look at that side effect that
produced k:
• If k = pCO-DONATE〈co donation〉 then we assign the value CODONATE.
• If k = pDONATE〈donation〉 then we assign the value DONATE.
• If k = pACK〈msg〉 then we assign the value ACK.
• If k = p
GHOST
〈v〉 then we assign the value GHOST.
• If k = pFLUSH〈v〉 then we assign the value FLUSH.
• If k = p
MSG
〈msg〉 then we have to differentiate between several cases:
– If k is an original message packet, in the context of a message broadcast request
transaction, we assign the value BCAST1.
– If k is an original message packet pMSG〈msg〉 in the context of a flush packet pro-
cessing transaction (see Lemma 14), we assign the value BCASTi if msg is the i
th
original message out of LaunchQueue.
– If k is an original message packet pMSG〈msg〉 in the context of a co-donation packet
processing transaction (see Lemma 15), we assign the value BCASTi if msg is the
ith original message out of LaunchQueue.
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– If k is a forwarded message packet pMSG〈msg〉 in the context of a notification transac-
tion (removal of process P ), we assign the value BCASTi if msg is the i
th forwarded
message out of FwdQueue[P ]
5.3.6 Some labeling examples
Suppose that the application at some process P in H decides to broadcast a message. This decision
constitutes a message broadcast request event et that results in the invocation of the protBroadcast
procedure. If v gap = 0 the message gets broadcast, which means that a set of message packets
kP1 , kP2 , . . . , kPn
one packet per contacted process, are queued to their respective channels. All of these packets share
a single queuing event eq:
kP1
QU = kP2
QU = · · · = kPn
QU = eq
If v gap > 0 then there is no queuing event. Therefore we have a transaction
T = transet =
{
{et ≺ eq} if v gap = 0
{et} if v gap > 0
And the labeling yields
λ(et) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ]
λ(eq) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCAST1]
In another example, suppose that the critical joining process G processes a donation from P . The
donated state from P includes a record 〈msg, index, iset〉 in WaitSet. This record was placed in
WaitSet by P when it sent an untimely message packet km = pMSG〈msg〉 to D. Suppose that the
record causes G to invoke the ReceiveMessage procedure. When G executes that call it queues an
acknowledgement packet ks = pACK〈msg〉 to P . The queuing event ks
QU is labeled
λ(ks
QU) = [Crit(P → G).km
QU.0ˆ|ACK]
Theorem 4. The map λ : EH → L is order preserving
Proof. Let e1, e2 ∈ E
H be any events such that e1 ≺ e2. Let λ(e1) = [ℓe1 .se1 .0ˆ|fe1 ] and λ(e2) =
[ℓe2 .se2 .0ˆ|fe2 ]. Let e1 ∈ EP1 and e2 ∈ EP2 .
If P1 6= P2 then by the minimality of ≺ (Minimal Order Axiom) there must be a trigger event et at
P2 such that e1 ≺ et  e2. The events at P2 are completely ordered by ≺ (Process Order Axiom).
It follows from Definition 16 that et  trig(e2). By the same definition trig(e1)  e1. It follows that
trig(e1) ≺ trig(e2) and therefore ℓe1 ≺˙ ℓe2 . Since λ is left lexicographic it follows that λ(e1) < λ(e2)
and we are done in this case.
If P1 = P2 then it follows from Definition 16 that trig(e1)  trig(e2) and ℓe1˙ℓe2 . If the inequality
is strict then we are done. So assume that ℓe1 = ℓe2 . This implies that e1 and e2 belong to the
same transaction T at process P1.
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We will go over each transaction type and verify that the events in the transaction are labeled
with monotonically increasing labels. We rely on the analysis of side effects (see 4.2.1 - 4.2.5). We
will denote by et the trigger of T , and denote by es1 , es2 , . . . esn the side effects of T . Remember
throughout the following analysis that λ(et) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ].
Message broadcast request transaction
According to Lemma 11 an application transaction T has one of the following forms:
• No side effects: T = {et} and there is nothing to prove.
• A message packet multicast: T = {et ≺ es1} where es1 = pMSG〈msg〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCAST1]
Notification transaction
According to Lemma 12 a notification transaction T has one of the following forms:
• No side effects: T = {et} and there is nothing to prove.
• A ghost packet multicast: T = {et ≺ es1} where es1 = pGHOST〈v〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|GHOST]
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast: T = {et ≺ es1 ≺ es2}
where es1 = pGHOST〈v〉
QU and es1 = pFLUSH〈v〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|GHOST] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|FLUSH]
• A sequence of message packet multicasts: T = {et ≺ es1 ≺ · · · ≺ esn} where esi =
pMSG〈msgi〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCAST1] < · · · < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCASTn]
Message packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 13 a message packet processing transaction T has the form T = {et, es1}
where es1 = pACK〈msg〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|ACK]
Acknowledgement packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 13 an acknowledgement packet processing transaction T has one of the
following forms:
• No side effects.
• A ghost packet multicast.
• A flush packet multicast.
• A ghost packet multicast followed by a flush packet multicast.
The monotonicity of the labeling here works just as in the notification transaction case.
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Ghost packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 14 a ghost packet processing transaction T has no side effect so there is
nothing to prove in this case.
Flush packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 14 a flush packet processing transaction T has one of the following forms:
• No side effects: T = {et} and there is nothing to prove.
• A sequence of message packet multicasts: T = {et ≺ es1 ≺ · · · ≺ esn} where esi =
pMSG〈msgi〉
QU
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCAST1] < · · · < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCASTn]
Donation packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 15 a donation packet processing transaction T has the form of a co-
donation queuing event followed by a sequence of zero or more sub-transactions
T = {et, ec, es1,1 , . . . , es1,k1 , es2,1 , . . . , es2,k2 , . . . , esn,1 , . . . , esn,kn}
where ec is the queuing event of the co-donation packet and esi,1 , . . . , esi,ki are the side effects
of the ith sub-transaction.
Within each sub-transaction the sub-transaction coordinate of the label is the same for all
side effects. Let
λ(ei,j) = [ℓT .si.0ˆ|fi,j ]
Then it follows from the previous cases that for each i the labels are monotonic:
[ℓT .si.0ˆ|fi,1] < [ℓT .si.0ˆ|fi,2] < · · · < [ℓT .si.0ˆ|fi,ki ]
where si is the sub-transaction coordinate of the i
th sub-transaction. If the donation is not
critical then si = i, and therefore si < si+1 and the whole sequence of sub-transactions is
monotonically labeled. If the donation is critical then si = ki
QU where ki is the untimely packet
that is related to the ith sub-transaction by Corollary 6. The same corollary guarantees that
if i < j then ki
QU ≺˙ kj
QU. Therefore in this case as well the whole sequence of sub-transactions
is monotonically labeled. In addition
λ(et) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|CODONATE] = λ(ec)
and both packets have a sub-transaction coordinate that is equal to 0ˆ. Therefore the whole
donation transaction is labeled monotonically in all cases.
Co-donation packet processing transaction
According to Lemma 15 a co-donation packet processing transaction T has one of the following
forms:
• A sequence of zero or more sub-transactions
T = {et, es1,1 , . . . , es1,k1 , es2,1 , . . . , es2,k2 , . . . , esn,1 , . . . , esn,kn}
where esi,1 , . . . , esi,ki are the side effects of the i
th sub-transaction. This case is resolved
the same way as a donation transaction, with Corollary 7 guaranteeing that the order of
the sub-transaction coordinates is correct in the critical case.
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• A sequence of one or more message packet multicasts: T = {et ≺ es1 ≺ · · · ≺ esn} where
esi = pMSG〈msgi〉
QU
. If the co-donation is non-critical the labeling looks as follows
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCAST1] < · · · < [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|BCASTn]
If the co-donation is critical then according to Lemma 20 there is a special post-critical
flush packet queuing event f ∈ E˙ and the labeling is
[ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .f.0ˆ|BCAST1] < · · · < [ℓT .f.0ˆ|BCASTn]
5.4 Defining The History Reduction Mapping
5.4.1 Preliminaries
We now show how to construct a history Hr that carries the same computation as H but where
the critical join event of G is replaced by a removal event of a different process -G. The interesting
part is the construction of EH
r
which will rely on the label space that we constructed earlier. We
start with the construction of most of the other components of Hr.
P
Hr = PH ∪{-G}
P
Hr
h = P
H
h ∪{-G}
V
Hr = VH
S
Hr
i =
{
S
H
i if i ≥ vcrit
S
H
i ∪{G, -G} if i < vcrit
A
Hr = AH
The main task is constructing the packets and related events on channels that involve the processes
G and -G. We build up these channels starting with the history H as a base, and then adding and
removing packets as necessary in an attempt to simulate what would have happened if G and -G
were original members of the group and just happened, by some rare chance, to proceed (almost)
exactly as the parent D would up to the point of the critical view change, after which -G is removed
and G remains to evolve as it originally did in the history H .
The rest of this section is dedicated to the construction of the channels that involve G and -G. The
construction involves a detailed description of the packets that are added to these channels, as well
as the few packets that are removed. Together with each packet we add its associated events and
their labels. In addition we describe the requisite changes to and additions of notification events.
This construction amounts to a description of most of the missing ingredients in Hr including all
the channels and all the events. To complete the definition of Hr we just need to add in the partial
order on the events.
We construct the events in Hr with the goal of simulating a reality where the following things
happen:
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• G and -G are group members from the start. However, their upper layer application does
not get started until the critical view change. Therefore G does not originate any message
broadcasts up to the critical point, and -G never originates any message broadcasts at all.
• Other than message origination (and the related flush packets - see below), G and -G proceed
exactly like D up to the critical view change. This happens by luck, as multicasts arrive at G
and -G at about the same time that they arrive at D, and multicasts and responses from G
and -G arrive at other processes at about the same time that similar multicasts and responses
arrive from D.
• Despite their participation in group communications, G and -G, by sheer luck, have no effect
on the state of the group. This happens because acknowledgements from G and -G arrive too
early (just before similar acknowledgements arrive from D) and therefore are never decisive
in stabilizing messages; forwarded messages from G and -G arrive too late (just after similar
forwarded messages arrive from D) and as a result they are discarded as duplicates; and flush
packets from G and -G arrive too early (sometimes long before similar packets arrive from D)
to be the deciding factor in view installation decisions at the receiving processes.
• One area where G and -G are allowed to diverge from D in a controlled fashion is with the
multicasting of flushes. This is unavoidable because G and -G do not originate messages and
therefore their respective wait sets tend to be emptier than the one at D. Therefore G and
-G may be forced by the CBCAST protocol to multicast a flush long before D is ready to do so.
Managing this difference is the whole purpose of the ghost multicasts. These multicasts do
not depend on the instability of original messages and therefore can happen at the same time
at G, -G and D. Flush multicasts out of G and -G, however, do not happen at the same time
that similar multicasts occur at D. Rather they immediately follow each ghost multicast.
5.4.2 Some notation
It should hopefully be intuitive at this point that the simulation is achieved, to a large degree, by
adding clone packets that mimic on ±G-bound channels what the original packets did on similar
D-bound channels. To accommodate the fact that the new flush packets mimic original ghost
packets rather than original flush packets, we also introduce the notion of a zombie packet. A
zombie packet, as the name implies, is a clone of ghost a packet that comes back to life as a flush
packet, but otherwise remains unchanged.
The label space L plays a crucial role in ordering the new packet events that are created along with
the new clone and zombie packets. Instead of ordering these events directly (which can get very
complicated) we label them first. Then we introduce an order on all the events in Hr by inducing
it back from the labels.
The central challenge in building Hr is the seam between the pre-critical period and the post-critical
period. This problem presents itself in the form of packets that are sent pre-critically, but arrive
post-critically (including packets that never arrive). Recall that such packets are called untimely.
We deal with untimely packets using the donation and co-donation transactions. In Hr, the clones
and zombies of untimely packets arrive exactly at the time that the receiving process begins the
sub-transaction that simulates the arrival of the original packets (see labeled steps 1 and 2 of the
ReceiveDonation procedure and labeled steps 1 and 2 of the ReceiveCoDonation procedure at 3.5).
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This makes the dequeuing events of donation and co-donation packets pivotal in the definition of the
reduction mapping, warranting a specific notation that we introduced in Definition 20 to describe
them.
Definition 22. Let msg be a stamped message in H. The reduction of msg is an identical message
msgr, but with a slightly different stamping
ORIG(msgr) = ORIG(msg)
VIEW(msgr) = VIEW(msg)
VT(msgr)[] =
{
VT(msg)[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0} VIEW(msg) < vcrit
VT(msg)[] VIEW(msg) ≥ vcrit
For any data structure A in H, the reduction of A is an identical data structure Ar where all the
messages contained in A or its substructures have been replaced by their reductions.
If A is a data structure in H with reduction Ar and B is a data structure in Hr such that B = Ar,
we say that B is equivalent to A and we denote it by B ∼= A.
Definition 23. 1. A clone of a packet k in H is a new packet in Hr, on a different channel,
whose type is identical to the type of k and whose content is the reduction of the content
cont(k). A clone of an event e in H is a new event in Hr of the same type as e. A clone
event can occur at the same process or at a different one.
2. A zombie of a ghost packet is a clone where, unlike a normal clone, the type of the packet
changes from ghost to flush. A zombie event is a clone of a ghost packet queuing event in H
whose type in Hr a flush packet queuing event.
3. A non-G process is any P 6= ±G.
We now turn to the heart of the construction of Hr, which involves the construction of its channels
and events. The bulk of the work is in constructing the channels and the related packet events, and
then there is a bit of additional work in constructing the notification events. We proceed in multiple
steps. We start with constructing new queuing events and their labels. We continue with channels
where the source is ±G and the target is non-G, then channels where the source is non-G and the
target is ±G, and then the four channels
−−−−−→
±G±G. We construct new trigger events and their labels
in tandem with the channel construction. Then we construct the new notification events and their
labels, and finally we construct the ≺H
r
order out of the labels.
5.4.3 Constructing the new queuing events
Most of the new queuing events are added to ±G. The only new queuing events that are added to
non-G processes are the queuing events of acknowledgement packets that are sent in response to
forwarded messages from ±G. This should not be a surprise because we deliberately construct Hr
in such a way that the additional packets emanating out of ±G are largely ignored and therefore
have no side effects to speak of.
We only create clone and zombie events for pre-critical queuing events in H . We are going to add
post-critical packets to Hr, but their queuing events will all be existing queuing events of existing
multicasts. In fact many, but not all, of the pre-critical cloned packets will become parts of existing
multicasts and will not require a new queuing event.
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If e = kQU is a pre-critical queuing event at D in H labeled λ(e) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|f ] we add the following
new events in Hr:
1. If k is a forwarded message packet, or an acknowledgement packet in response to any message
packet other than a forwarded message from D
(a) A clone queuing event ec ∈ EG with label λ(ec) = λ(e)
(b) A clone queuing event e-c ∈ E-G with label λ(e-c) = λ(e)
2. If k ∈
−−→
DD is an acknowledgement packet in response to a forwarded message packet from D
(a) Two clone queuing events e⇑
(+m)
, e⇑
(-m)
∈ ED with labels
λ(e⇑
(+m)
) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(+m) |ACK]
λ(e⇑
(-m)
) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(-m) |ACK]
(b) Three clone queuing events ec, e
⇑(+m)
c , e
⇑(-m)
c ∈ EG with labels
λ(ec) = λ(e)
λ(e⇑
(+m)
c ) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(+m) |ACK]
λ(e⇑
(-m)
c ) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(-m) |ACK]
(c) Three clone queuing events e-c, e
⇑(+m)
-c , e
⇑(-m)
-c ∈ E-G with labels
λ(e-c) = λ(e)
λ(e⇑
(+m)
-c ) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(+m) |ACK]
λ(e⇑
(-m)
-c ) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑
(-m) |ACK]
3. If k is a ghost packet and λ(e) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|GHOST]
(a) A clone queuing event ec ∈ EG with label λ(ec) = λ(e) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|GHOST]
(b) A clone queuing event e-c ∈ E-G with label λ(e-c) = λ(e) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|GHOST]
(c) A zombie queuing event ez ∈ EG with label λ(ez) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|FLUSH]
(d) A zombie queuing event e-z ∈ E-G with label λ(e-z) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|FLUSH]
4. If k is an original message packet or a flush packet, do not create any clones
If e = kQU is a pre-critical queuing event in H at P 6= D with label λ(e) = [ℓT .0ˆ.0ˆ|ACK] and if
k ∈
−−→
PD is an acknowledgement packet, we add the following new events in Hr:
1. If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to a forwarded message packet
(a) A clone queuing event e⇑
(+m)
∈ EP with label λ(e⇑
(+m)
) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑(+m) |ACK]
(b) A clone queuing event e⇑
(-m)
∈ EP with label λ(e⇑
(-m)
) = [ℓT .0ˆ.⇑(-m) |ACK]
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2. If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to an original message packet, do not create
any clones
5.4.4 Constructing the channels
−−→
PQ for non-G processes P and Q
The original H channels are copied to Hr almost without change. The only change is that each
channel is reduced (see Definition 22). This means that the content cont(k) of each packet k in the
channel is replaced with the reduced content cont(k)r.
5.4.5 Constructing the channels
−−→
PG and
−−−−→
P (-G) for a non-G process P
We start with an empty channel for
−−−−→
P (-G) and with the reduction of the original channel
−−→
PGH for
−−→
PG and remove the critical donation packet and its events, if they exist. Then we add the following
new packets and events:
For any timely packet k ∈
−−→
PD
If k is a ghost, flush or message packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
PG together with cQU = kQU and a new cPR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = λ(kPR)
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
P (-G) together with c′QU = kQU and a new c′PR events labeled
as λ(c′
PR
) = λ(kPR)
If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to a forwarded message
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
PG together with cQU = (kQU)⇑
(+m)
and a new cPR event labeled
as λ(cPR) = λ(kPR)
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
P (-G) together with c′
QU
= (kQU)⇑
(-m)
and a new c′
PR
event
labeled as λ(c′
PR
) = λ(kPR)
If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to an original message do not create any clones.
For any untimely packet k ∈
−−→
PD
If k is a ghost, flush or message packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
PG together with
(a) cQU = kQU
(b) If Crit(P → G) exists, a new cPR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [Crit(P → G).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
P (-G) together with c′
QU
= kQU but no c′
PR
event
If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to a forwarded message
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1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
PG together with
(a) cQU = (kQU)⇑
(+m)
(b) If Crit(P → G) exists, a new cPR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [Crit(P → G).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
P (-G) together with c′QU = (kQU)⇑
(-m)
but no c′PR event
If k is an acknowledgement packet in response to an original message do not create any clones.
5.4.6 Constructing the channels
−−→
GP and
−−−−→
(-G)P for a non-G process P
We start with the empty channel for
−−−−→
(-G)P and with the reduction of the original channel
−−→
GPH for
−−→
GP and remove the critical co-donation packet and its related events. Then we add the following
new packets and events:
For any timely packet k ∈
−−→
DP with e = kQU and λ(kPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ]
If k is a forwarded message packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP together with cQU = ec and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑(+m)|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -cQU = e-c and a new -c
PR event labeled as
λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑(-m)|0ˆ]
If k is a ghost packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP together with cQU = ec and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+g)|0ˆ]
2. A zombie packet z ∈
−−→
GP together with zQU = ez and a new z
PR event labeled as
λ(zPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓
(+f)|0ˆ]
3. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -cQU = e-c and a new -c
PR event labeled as
λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-g)|0ˆ]
4. A zombie packet -z ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -zQU = e-z and a new -z
PR event labeled
as λ(-zPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-f)|0ˆ]
If k is an acknowledgement packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP together with cQU = ec and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓
(+s)|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -cQU = e-c and a new -c
PR event labeled as
λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-s)|0ˆ]
If k is a flush or an original message packet do not create any clones.
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For any untimely packet k ∈
−−→
DP with e = kQU
If k is an acknowledgement packet or a forwarded message packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP together with cQU = ec and if Crit(G→ P ) exists, a new cPR
event labeled as λ(cPR) = [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together a -cQU = e-c and no -c
PR event
If k is a ghost packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP together with cQU = ec and if Crit(G→ P ) exists, a new cPR
event labeled as λ(cPR) = [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.⇓(+g)|0ˆ]
2. A zombie packet z ∈
−−→
GP together with zQU = ez and if Crit(G → P ) exists, a zPR
event labeled as λ(zPR) = [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.⇓(+f)|0ˆ]
3. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -cQU = e-c and no -c
PR event
4. A zombie packet -z ∈
−−−−→
(-G)P together with -zQU = e-z and no -z
PR event
If k is a flush or an original message packet do not create any clones.
For any post-critical packet k ∈
−−→
GG with λ(kQU) = [ℓT .j.0ˆ|f ] where view(T ) < r(P ) and, if
Crit(P → G) exists, ℓT ≺˙Crit(P → G)
If k is a ghost, flush or message packet, a clone packet c ∈
−−→
GP with cQU = kQU and if
Crit(G→ P ) exists, a new cPR event labeled as λ(cPR) = [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ]
If k is an acknowledgement, donation or co-donation packet, do not create any clones.
5.4.7 Constructing the channels
−−−−−−−→
(±G)(±G)
We start with the empty channels for the three channels involving -G and with the reduction of the
original channel
−−→
GGH for
−−→
GG. Then we add the following new packets and events (notice that by
the Self Channel Axiom there are no untimely packets in this case):
For any timely packet k ∈
−−→
DD with e = kQU and λ(kPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ]
If k is a forwarded message packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GG together with cQU = ec and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑(+m)|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
G(-G) together with c′
QU
= ec and a new c
′PR event labeled as
λ(c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑
(+m)|0ˆ]
3. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)G together with -cQU = e-c and a new -c
PR event labeled as
λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑(-m)|0ˆ]
4. A clone packet -c′ ∈
−−−−−−→
(-G)(-G) together with -c′QU = e-c and a new -c
′PR event labeled
as λ(-c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇑(-m)|0ˆ]
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If k is an acknowledgement packet for a forwarded message
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GG together with cQU = e⇑
(+m)
c and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+s)|0ˆ]
2. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
G(-G) together with c′
QU
= e⇑
(-m)
c and a new c
′PR event labeled
as λ(c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+s)|0ˆ]
3. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)G together with -cQU = e⇑
(+m)
-c and a new -c
PR event labeled
as λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓
(-s)|0ˆ]
4. A clone packet -c′ ∈
−−−−−−→
(-G)(-G) together with -c′
QU
= e⇑
(-m)
-c and a new -c
′PR event
labeled as λ(-c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-s)|0ˆ]
If k is a ghost packet
1. A clone packet c ∈
−−→
GG together with cQU = ec and a new c
PR event labeled as
λ(cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+g)|0ˆ]
2. A zombie packet z ∈
−−→
GG together with zQU = ez and a new z
PR event labeled as
λ(zPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+f)|0ˆ]
3. A clone packet c′ ∈
−−−−→
G(-G) together with c′
QU
= ec and a new c
′PR event labeled as
λ(c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+g)|0ˆ]
4. A zombie packet z′ ∈
−−−−→
G(-G) together with z′
QU
= ez and a new z
′PR event labeled
as λ(z′PR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(+f)|0ˆ]
5. A clone packet -c ∈
−−−−→
(-G)G together with -cQU = e-c and a new -c
PR event labeled as
λ(-cPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-g)|0ˆ]
6. A zombie packet -z ∈
−−−−→
(-G)G together with -zQU = e-z and a new -z
PR event labeled
as λ(-zPR) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-f)|0ˆ]
7. A clone packet -c′ ∈
−−−−−−→
(-G)(-G) together with -c′QU = e-c and a new -c
′PR event labeled
as λ(-c′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-g)|0ˆ]
8. A zombie packet -z′ ∈
−−−−−−→
(-G)(-G) together with -z′
QU
= e-z and a new -z
′PR event
labeled as λ(-z′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .0ˆ.⇓(-f)|0ˆ]
5.4.8 Constructing the notification events
The notification events and their labels are mostly left unchanged from H . We start out with
F
Hr = FH and then apply the following additions and substitutions:
We add notifications v0(G) and v0(-G) to F
Hr with
cont(v0(G)) = nSTART〈G〉
cont(v0(-G)) = nSTART〈-G〉
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For any view 0 < i < vcrit we add notifications vi(G) and vi(-G) to F
Hr with
cont(vi(G)) = cont(vi(-G)) = cont(vi(D))
For any non-G process P we replace the contents of the critical notification
cont(vvcrit(P )) = nJOIN〈G,D〉
with
cont(vvcrit(P )) = nREM〈-G〉
We replace the contents of the critical notification
cont(vvcrit(G)) = nSTART〈G〉
with
cont(vvcrit(G)) = nREM〈-G〉
We add a notification vvcrit(-G) to F
Hr with
cont(vvcrit(-G)) = nSTOP
For any view 0 ≤ i < vcrit we add notification events vi(G)PR and vi(-G)PR to EG and E-G
respectively, labeled as λ(vi(G)
PR) = λ(vi(-G)
PR) = [ℓi.0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ]
5.4.9 The partial order ≺H
r
and dropped items
We now construct the order ≺ in Hr. We will occasionally denote it by ≺H
r
. As we mentioned
before, we use the partial order on labels in the construction.
The relation ≺H
r
is defined as the transitive closure of the following primitive order relations:
1. For each k ∈ KH
r
:
kQU ≺H
r
kPR
whenever the dequeuing event exists.
2. For each process X ∈ PH
r
and any two events e1, e2 ∈ E
Hr
X :
e1 ≺
Hr e2
if λ(e1) < λ(e2)
3. For any parent/child pair E/J in H , other than the critical pair D/G:
vj(J)(E)
PR ≍H
r
Jrun
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Please note that this definition produces a well defined relation ≺H
r
, but it will require some work
to show that it is actually a weak partial order. We will pursue that investigation a little later.
We need to define for each new packet whether it is sent and received, and for each new notification
whether it is dropped. We declare that there are no dropped notifications in Hr. As for packets,
the packets for which we added a dequeuing event must be received, and therefore must be sent.
But there are packets for which we did not add a dequeuing event. Since we do not need Hr to be
transactional or even lossless, but only conforming, we simply declare that any clone or zombie for
which there is no dequeuing event is dropped, meaning that it is sent but not received.
5.4.10 Implementing the user application interface
To complete the construction of Hr we have to insulate the user application from any knowledge of
the fact that group history has changed. In order to do that we have to change the implementation
of the user application interface (see 2.3.3), essentially creating a thin wrapper around it that hides
the effects of the history changes. As part of the wrapper we add two new variables, ul view and
ul count, to the ReplicatedData structure, and we make use of three ”magic numbers” that are
defined below. The new variables count how many views were installed and how many messages
were delivered so far, in order to discover the boundary between the pre-critical and post-critical
time that would otherwise be invisible to the user application.
Definition 24. MAGIC VIEW is the value of cur view at D in H at the critical time.
MAGIC MSG is the number of messages that are delivered at D in H by the critical time.
MAGIC SIZE is the number of members of view zero in H.
We define two different implementations of the interface in Hr, one for ±G and one for all other
processes. As usual, we will use P to denote any process which is not ±G. We use the suffixes
”@P” and ”@G” to differentiate between the two implementations. We also use the marker ”r” to
indicate the Hr version of an up-call.
Procedure GroundStater@P
let ul view = −MAGIC SIZE − 2;
let ul count = 0;
GroundState@P(); // call the original H version
Procedure GroundStater@G
let ul view = −MAGIC SIZE − 2;
let ul count = 0;
GroundState@D(); // call the original H version at process D
Procedure ApplyMessager@P(msg, originator)
ApplyMessage@P(msg, originator);
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Procedure ApplyMessager@G(msg, originator)
increment ul count;
if ul count ≤MAGIC MSG then
ApplyMessage@D(msg, originator); // call the original D version
end
else
ApplyMessage@G(msg, originator); // call the original G version
end
Procedure ApplyJoinr@P(pid)
increment ul view ;
if ul view 6= 0 and ul view 6= −1 then
ApplyJoin@P(pid);
end
Procedure ApplyJoinr@G(pid)
increment ul view ;
if ul view > MAGIC VIEW then
ApplyJoin@G(pid);
end
else if ul view 6= 0 and ul view 6= −1 then
ApplyJoin@D(pid);
end
Procedure ApplyRemovalr@P(pid)
increment ul view ;
if ul view = vcrit then
ApplyJoin@G(G); // pid is equal to -G
end
else
ApplyRemoval@P(pid);
end
105
Procedure ApplyRemovalr@G(pid)
increment ul view ;
if ul view ≤ MAGIC VIEW then
ApplyRemoval@D(pid);
end
else if ul view = vcrit then
ApplyJoin@G(G); // pid is equal to -G
end
else
ApplyRemoval@G(pid);
end
5.5 Basic Properties Of Hr
Now that we have defined the reduced history Hr, we establish its basic properties. We show that
Hr is a history according to Definition 1, and indeed a conforming history according to Definition
7. Only after we do that can we show that Hr is the history of a valid CBCAST execution and that
Hr carries the same computation as H .
Definition 25. For any packet k ∈ KH
r
define
origin(k) =
{
k if k is the reduction of an original KH packet
j if k is a clone or zombie of the original packet j
Theorem 5. Hr is a history.
We start with a lemma about the relation ≺H
r
Lemma 21. If e and f are packet events in Hr and e ≺ f then λ(e) < λ(f)
Proof. The relation ≺ on the packet events in Hr is the transitive closure of the three primitive
relations defined in 5.4.9. If we show that each of the primitive relations is compatible with the
label order then we are done.
The second primitive relation is compatible with label order by construction, and the third primitive
relation is compatible because both notification events share the same label [ℓj(J).0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] so the only
difficulty is showing that for every packet k′ ∈ KH
r
for which k′
PR
exists, λ(k′
QU
) < λ(k′
PR
).
If the packet k′ is an original H packet, then this property follows from Theorem 4. We only need
to verify this property for packets k′ that are either clones or zombies of an original packet k.
Looking through the construction of Hr packets, one can easily observe that one of the following
three possibilities must occur:
• k is a timely packet with λ(kQU) = [ℓT .∗.∗|∗] and λ(kPR) = [ℓT ′ .∗.∗|∗] where ℓT ≺˙ ℓT ′ . In that
case for any clone or zombie k′ of k, λ(k′
QU
) = [ℓT .∗.∗|∗] and λ(k′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .∗.∗|∗]. Therefore
λ(k′
QU
) < λ(k′
PR
).
• k is an untimely packet with λ(kQU) = [ℓT .∗.∗|∗] where ℓT ≺˙ ℓvcrit . In that case λ(k
′QU) =
[ℓT .∗.∗|∗] and if k′
PR
exists then λ(k′
PR
) = [ℓT ′ .∗.∗|∗] where ℓT ′ = Crit(P → G) or ℓT ′ =
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Crit(G → P ) for some original process P . In either case ℓT ′ ˙ ℓvcrit and therefore λ(k
′QU) <
λ(k′
PR
).
• k is packet in
−−→
GG with λ(kQU) = [ℓT .∗.∗|∗] where ℓvcrit ≺˙ ℓT ≺˙Crit(P → G) for some original
process P . In that case λ(k′
QU
) = [ℓT .∗.∗|∗] and λ(k′
PR
) = [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ]. If c is the
co-donation packet sent from G to P in the original history H then
λ(k′
QU
) < [Crit(P → G).0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [Crit(P → G).0ˆ.0ˆ|CODONATE] = λ(cQU) <
<λ(cPR) = [Crit(G→ P ).0ˆ.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.0ˆ|0ˆ] = λ(k′
PR
)
This concludes the proof.
Corollary 8. Let e, f ∈ EH
r
P be any two events at a process P in H
r. Then e ≺ f if and only if
λ(e) < λ(f).
Proof. Lemma 21 proves one direction. The other direction follows immediately from the definition
of ≺H
r
in 5.4.9.
Lemma 22. Let e ∈ EH
r
be the queuing event of a message, ghost or flush packet k and let Te be its
target set (refer to the Process Order Axiom for the definition of target set). Let e0 = origin(k)
QU
.
Then
1. if e0 is a pre-critical event that occurred at a process R then
Te = ContactSetR@e0 ∪ {±G}
2. if e0 is a post-critical event that occurred at G then
Te = LiveSetG@e0
3. if e0 is a post-critical event that occurred at R 6= G then
Te = ContactSetR@e0
Proof. First take a quick look at the pseudo code to verify that every multicast of message, ghost
and flush packets has a target set that is equal to ContactSet.
The claims follow from a careful examination of the construction of events in Hr.
Let R ∈ PH and R 6= G. Post-critically we do not add any new clones or zombies to packets
emanating from R so in this case origin(k) = k and Te is the same as the original target set, which
proves the third part.
Pre-critically we do add clones and zombies to message, ghost and flush packets emanating from
R. If R 6= D then all of these clones (there are no zombies) also emanate from R. If R = D then
some of the clones and zombies emanate from ±G.
Every pre-critical multicast set of message, ghost or flush packets in R contains exactly one packet
that is targeted at D. This packet gets cloned with two new targets ±G and added to the same
multicast set. This proves the first part in this case when k emanates from R.
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If R = D then for every forwarded message multicast there is a cloned multicast emanating from
±G that contains the complete original target set with the addition of ±G. Original message and
flush multicasts do not get cloned to ±G. Each ghost multicast is cloned and zombied to two
consecutive multicasts, both of which have the required target set. This takes care of the first part.
As for G, to every post-critical multicast we add packets destined to the uncontacted processes. It
follows from Lemma 8(2) that this makes the target set equal to LiveSet.
The following is a technical lemma that is required for proving that the channels in Hr are FIFO.
Lemma 23. Let X and Y be processes in Hr and let k1, k2 ∈
−−→
XY H
r
be distinct pre-critical packets
such that k1
QU ≺ k2
QU. Then origin(k1)
QU  origin(k2)
QU, with equality occurring exactly when
origin(k1) = origin(k2) is a pre-critical ghost packet and X = ±G.
Proof. If both k1 and k2 are original, there is nothing to prove. The case where one of them is
original and one is a clone or zombie is not possible because all the pre-critical clones and zombies
belong to channels that involve ±G while none of the original pre-critical packets do. Therefore we
can assume that both k1 and k2 are either clones or zombies of their original packets.
Let λ(ki
QU) = [ℓTi .ai.bi|ci]. By Corollary 8 we know that λ(k1
QU) < λ(k2
QU) and therefore trig(T1) 
trig(T2) . By going through the different cases of 5.4.5, 5.4.6 and 5.4.7 it is easy to verify that for
any pre-critical packet k with λ(kQU) = [ℓT .a.b|c], the event origin(k)
QU
has the same constellation
label ℓT . We also know that that for any event e in H the constellation label is ℓtrans(e) (see 5.3.5).
Therefore trig(Ti) = trig(origin(ki)
QU
).
If trig(T1) ≺ trig(T2) then by Definition 16 origin(k1)
QU ≺ origin(k2)
QU
and we are done. Otherwise
T1 = T2 so origin(k1) and origin(k2) are queued in the same transaction. Denote T = T1 = T2. We
also know that origin(k1) and origin(k2) belong to the same channel. This channel is obtained from
−−→
XY by replacing any occurrence of ±G with D.
Going over the complete list of different possibilities of transaction content for T we have:
• T comprises a trigger plus one or more multicasts of original or forwarded message packets.
This happens if T is an message broadcast request transaction, or if T is a notification
transaction that resulted in the forwarding of messages out of FwdQueue[P], or if T is a flush
packet transaction that caused the installation of a new view and the broadcasting of one or
more messages out of LaunchQueue. In these cases origin(ki) are both pre-critical message
packets. Going over the different cases in 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 shows that in this case λ(ki
QU) =
λ(origin(ki)
QU) and the lemma follows.
• T comprises a trigger and the queuing of exactly one acknowledgement packet k. This happens
if T is triggered by the processing of a message packet. In this case it must be that origin(k1) =
origin(k2) = k. But an examination of 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 shows that distinct clones of pre-critical
acknowledgement packets belong to different channels, contrary to the assumption that k1
and k2 belong to the same channel. So this case does not occur.
• T comprises a trigger followed by a single multicast of ghost packets. This happens if T
is triggered by a the processing of an acknowledgement packet that cleared out FwdWaitSet
while BcastWaitSet remained non-empty, or if T is triggered by a nREM〈P 〉 notification event
that occurred when FwdQueue[P] and FwdWaitSet were empty while BcastWaitSet was not
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empty. In this case there is a single packet at each relevant channel, and therefore origin(k1) =
origin(k2). An examination of 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 shows that the clones and zombies of a pre-critical
ghost packet reside on the same channel exactly when the original packet is sent out of the
process D, in which case it generates one clone and one zombie on each relevant channel. In
this case X = ±G and the labeling forces the clone to precede the zombie, and therefore in
this case k1 is the clone and k2 is the zombie of the same original packet.
• T comprises a trigger followed by a single multicast of flush packets. This happens if T is
triggered by the processing of an acknowledgement packet that cleared out BcastWaitSet while
FwdWaitSet was already empty. In this case there is a single packet at each relevant channel
and therefore origin(k1) = origin(k2). An examination of 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 shows that distinct
clones of a pre-critical flush packet reside on different channels, contrary to our assumption
that k1 and k2 reside on the same channel. So this case does not occur.
• T comprises a trigger followed by a single multicast of ghost packets, followed by a single
multicast of flush packets. This happens if T is triggered by the processing of an acknowl-
edgement packet that cleared out FwdWaitSet while BcastWaitSet was already empty, or if
T is triggered by the processing of a nREM〈P 〉 notification that occurred when FwdQueue[P],
FwdWaitSet and BcastWaitSet were all empty. In this case there is in each relevant channel
a single ghost packet followed by a single flush packet. There are two possibilities here. If T
occurs in process D (in which case X = ±G) then the flush packet generates no clones and
the ghost packet is the original of both k1 and k2 which are a clone and zombie, respectively,
of their shared original. If X 6= ±G then the ghost packet and the flush packet each generate
a single clone (but no zombie) on each relevant packet, where the labeling forces the ghost
clone to precede the flush clone. Therefore k1 is the ghost clone and k2 is the flush clone, and
the clones are sent in the same order as their originals.
• T comprises a trigger and no other event. This happens if T is triggered by the processing of a
ghost packet, or if T is triggered by a flush packet that did not cause the installation of a new
view, or if T is triggered by a flush packet that did cause the installation of a new view while
LaunchQueue was empty, or if T was triggered by the processing of an acknowledgement packet
such that FwdWaitSet was not empty when processing started and remained non-empty when
processing concluded, or if T was triggered by an acknowledgement packet for an original
message packet such that FwdWaitSet was empty and BcastWaitSet was not empty when
processing started, and BcastWaitSet remained non-empty when processing concluded, or if
T is triggered by the processing of a nREM〈P 〉 notification that occurred when FwdQueue[P]
was empty while FwdWaitSet was not empty. This case does not occur, of course, since we
know that are least origin(k1) must have been queued to be sent as part of T .
Proof of Theorem 5. Some of the axioms are easy to check. The View Interval Axiom and the
View Change Axiom are trivial. The Channel Axiom and the Packet Event Axiom are true by
construction. The Notification Event Axiom and the Parent Axiom are trivial. The GMS Axiom
follows directly from the construction of notifications in Hr.
The Notification Order Axiom says that view notifications are processed in order. This property
in induced directly from H for all processes other than ±G. In the case of -G the axiom follows
because we explicitly added a processing event for each notification except for the last critical one.
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In the case of G, all the post-critical notification processing events (including the critical one) exist
because H is transactional, while all the pre-critical ones are added explicitly. The processing order
is induced directly from the labels of the events.
The Process Order Axiom has two parts. The first part claims that events within a single process
are linearly ordered. The second part claims that multicast sets are finite. To prove the first part,
notice that at each process P the constellation coordinate is made up of clean events at process
P in H , and this set is linearly ordered since the Process Order Axiom holds in H . Within each
constellation the other coordinates are also taken from linearly ordered sets: this is trivial for the
adjustment and side effect coordinates since the sets La and Lf are linearly ordered. As for the
sub-transaction coordinate, we have the following cases:
• Non-critical donation and co-donation constellations have the same events in Hr as they do
in H , and have the same labels. Since the labels are linearly ordered in H , they are linearly
ordered in Hr.
• In a critical donation constellation, the side-effect events in Hr consist of the sub-transaction
events from H (the co-donation queuing event is removed) and have additional trigger events.
All of these events get their sub-transaction coordinates from the space {kQU ∈ E˙
H
‖ k ∈
−−→
PDH}, where P is the sender of the donation packet. This space is linearly ordered by the
Process Order Axiom in H .
• In a critical co-donation constellation, the side-effect events in Hr consist of all the side-
effect events in H with the addition of new trigger events. All of these events get their
sub-transaction coordinates from one of two sets:
C1 = {k
QU ≺˙ ℓvcrit ∈
˙
E
H ‖ k ∈
−−→
DPH}
C2 = {k
QU ≻˙ ℓvcrit ∈
˙
E
H ‖ k ∈
−−→
GGH}
Each of these sets is linearly ordered by the Process Order Axiom in H . Taken together they
are still linearly ordered because all the elements in C1 precede ℓvcrit and all the elements in
C2 succeed it.
• In a non-donation constellation, all the events have the 0ˆ value for the sub-transaction coor-
dinate.
It follows that the λ function linearly orders EH
r
P at each process P . By Corollary 8 the first part
of the axiom now follows.
The second part of the axiom follows immediately from Lemma 22.
To verify the Process Liveness Axiom and the Piggyback Axiom, notice that they trivially hold
for packets exchanged between non-G processes. As for original packets exchanged between G and
non-G processes, almost nothing changes except that from the point of view of the non-G processes
in Hr, process G had been a member from the start. This does not invalidate either axiom.
The clones and zombies of timely packets are either queued at ±G or dequeued at ±G at essentially
the same time that the original is queued or dequeued at D (any differences in the label of the
original versus the clone or zombie occur at the second or third coordinate). The same is true of
untimely clones and zombies as far as queuing time is concerned. As for processing time, the first
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label coordinate for the processing event of untimely clones or zombies, when such an event exists,
is either Crit(P → G) or Crit(G → P ) for some non-G process P . Since this label corresponds to
the processing transaction of a P -donation at G or a G-codonation at P in the original history,
the axioms follow in this case from the same axioms in the original history as they pertain to the
donation or co-donation packet.
As for clones of a post-critical packet k ∈
−−→
GG, such a clone is created only if the original packet
is queued while P appears alive to G, and its processing event label has Crit(G → P ) as a first
coordinate, which verifies the axiom using the same argument as before.
The Self Channel Axiom holds trivially for original packets k. The only cloned packets on self
channels exist on
−−→
GG and
−−−→
-G -G. If such a cloned packet is pre-critical, then the original Self
Channel Axiom guarantees that it is the clone of a timely packet and the axiom follows easily from
that in that case. Since neither of the two channels contains clones of post-critical packets, we are
done.
The Request Event Axiom is trivially induced from H .
The Order Foundation Axiom follows from Corollary 8 as long as L is itself very well founded. This
in turn follows from the Order Foundation Axiom in H .
The Minimal Order Axiom is true in Hr by definition (see 5.4.9).
The First Halting Axiom would follow if we show that we only add a finite number of new events
in Hr. Indeed, all the timely and untimely packets that we add are clones and zombies of packets
that are queued before the critical view change notification. It follows from the Order Foundation
Axiom and the View Change Axiom (in H) that there is only a finite number of such packets.
The post-critical packets that we add are all clones of post-critical packets in
−−→
GG that are queued
before G processes a donation packet from some original process P ∈ Svcrit or before G receives a
removal notification for P . If G halts then there is a finite number of such packets by the First
Halting Axiom (in H). IfG does not halt but P is removed then G processes the removal notification
of P (because H is transactional) and therefore queues only a finite number of packets before that
event by the Order Foundation Axiom.
If G does not halt and P is not removed then P does not halt (because H is conforming and
not stunted, see Lemma 6). In that case P must dequeue and process to completion the join
notification of G (because H is transactional) and therefore must queue a donation packet d to G.
All the packets queued by P , including d, must be sent (by the Third Halting Axiom) and none of
them are dropped (because there are no dropped packets in a transactional history). Therefore G
receives all of them, and since G does not halt it must dequeue all of them, including d (by the Third
Halting Axiom). Therefore G queues a finite number of packets prior to the dPR = Crit(P → G)
event (by the Order Foundation Axiom) and we are done.
The Second Halting Axiom carries over to Hr for every non-G process. The first part of the axiom
holds for ±G because there are no dropped notifications in Hr. The second part holds for -G
because it halts for for G because it processes all of its notifications.
The Third Halting Axiom has three parts. The first two parts follow from the same axiom in H
and the fact that each clone and zombie k which is not processed is dropped. The third part follows
for the same reason, though not so trivially. Suppose that a packet k meets the criteria of the third
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part of the axiom. Then k is received and therefore is not dropped. If k is a clone or a zombie then
k must be processed because all unprocessed clones and zombies are dropped. If it is original and
all its predecessors are received, then surely its original predecessors are received, and therefore in
H the packet k is processed, and therefore it is processed in Hr as well.
The Fourth Halting Axiom is trivially induced from H .
The main challenge is verifying the last remaining axiom, the Packet Order Axiom, which says that
the channels are FIFO. This is crucial but unfortunately quite tedious. Our basic approach is the
following. We take two packets k1 and k2 that meet the assumptions of the axiom. Namely, they
belong to the same channel
−−→
XY H
r
, with k1
QU ≺ k2
QU, and with k2
PR existing. To verify the axiom
we have to show that k1
PR exists and precedes k2
PR. To do that we look at the original packets
origin(k1) and origin(k2) and use the FIFO property in H to glean information about their events
and labels. From there we derive information about the labeling of the k1 and k2 events, which in
turn determines their order in Hr (see Corollary 8).
We look at different cases according as k1 and k2 are pre-critical or post-critical. The condition
k1
QU ≺ k2
QU implies that if k2 is pre-critical, then so is k1. Also notice that a packet k is pre-critical
if and only if origin(k) is pre-critical.
Case I: k1 and k2 are both pre-critical
In this case we can use Lemma 23 and conclude that origin(k1)
QU  origin(k2)
QU
. According to
the same lemma, if there is an equality then origin(k1) = origin(k2), the common origin is a ghost
packet and X = ±G. In this case a routine inspection of the different cases of 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 shows
that k1
PR exists whenever k2
PR does, and precedes the latter as well. So we can assume that
origin(k1)
QU ≺ origin(k2)
QU and therefore origin(k1) and origin(k2) are distinct.
If origin(k2) is timely then the Packet Order Axiom for H implies that origin(k1)
PR
exists and
moreover origin(k1)
PR ≺ origin(k2)
PR
. This in turn implies that origin(k1) is a timely packet and
therefore k1 is timely as well and therefore k1
PR exists. Let Ti be the transaction triggered by
origin(ki)
PR
. Then trig(T1) ≺ trig(T2) and so ℓT1 ≺˙ ℓT2 .
Going over 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 one can verify that if k is a timely clone or zombie packet then λ(kPR) shares
the same constellation coordinate with λ(origin(k)
PR
). Therefore the constellation coordinate of
ki
PR is ℓTi and it follows from Corollary 8 that k1
PR ≺ k2
PR and we are done.
We are left with the case where origin(k2) is untimely. We know that k2
PR exists. Going over
the untimely cases of 5.4.5 - 5.4.7 one can verify that λ(k2
PR) = [ℓT .origin(k2)
QU
.∗|0ˆ] where ℓT =
Crit(P → G) or ℓT = Crit(G→ P ). In particular we know that T exists. In this case if origin(k1)
is timely then k1
PR exists and is timely and therefore precedes the untimely k2
PR. If origin(k1) is
untimely, it follows from the existence of T that k1
PR also exists and has a label [ℓT .origin(k1)
QU.∗|0ˆ].
This implies that λ(k1
PR) < λ(k2
PR) and therefore k1
PR ≺ k2
PR.
Case II: k1 is pre-critical and k2 is post-critical
The case where k1 is timely is trivial, because for a timely packet k1
PR exists by definition and
again by definition k1
PR ≺ vvcrit(Y )
PR ≺ k2
PR. So we can assume that k1 is untimely.
Since we do not add any new packets to non-G channels, and since any channel involving -G does
not contain any post-critical packets, we can confine our attention to the channels
−−→
GP ,
−−→
PG and
−−→
GG, where P is an non-G process.
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Look at the channel
−−→
PG. We do not add any new packets to this channel that are post-critical.
Therefore k2 must be original. Therefore we can assume that k1 is not original (otherwise there
is nothing to prove). We know that k2
PR exists. Denote by T the transaction that is triggered by
k2
PR.
We know that the first post-critical packet (in H) that P queues to
−−→
PG is the donation packet
d, and since P queues some post-critical packet to G in H (namely k2), it must also queue d.
Moreover, k2 6= d, since k2 survives in Hr and d does not (see 5.4.5). Therefore dQU ≺ k2
QU and the
Packet Order Axiom in H implies that dPR exists and precedes k2
PR in H . Therefore Crit(P → G)
exists and Crit(P → G) ≺˙ ℓT . Since k1 is a clone or a zombie, the existence of Crit(P → G) implies
that k1
PR exists and λ(k1
PR) = [Crit(P → G).∗.∗|0ˆ]. On the other hand λ(k2
PR) = [ℓT .∗.∗|0ˆ] and
Crit(P → G) ≺˙ ℓT . Therefore λ(k1
PR) < λ(k2
PR) and therefore k1
PR ≺ k2
PR and we are done.
Look at the channel
−−→
GP . Since
−−→
GPH does not have pre-critical packets, k1 cannot be original.
We assume first that k2 is original. We proceed just like in the case of
−−→
PG. We know that the
first post-critical packet (in H) that G queues to
−−→
GP is the co-donation packet c, and since G
queues some post-critical packet to
−−→
GP in H (namely, k2), it must also queue c. Moreover, k2 6= c,
since k2 survives in H
r and c does not (see 5.4.6). Therefore cQU ≺ k2
QU and the Packet Order
Axiom in H implies that cPR exists and precedes k2
PR in H . Therefore Crit(G → P ) exists and
Crit(G → P ) ≺˙ ℓT , where T is the transaction triggered by k2
PR. Since k1 is a clone or a zombie,
the existence of Crit(G→ P ) implies that k1
PR exists and λ(k1
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).∗.0ˆ|0ˆ]∗. On the
other hand λ(k2
PR) = [ℓT .∗.∗|0ˆ] and Crit(G→ P ) ≺˙ ℓT . Therefore λ(k1
PR) < λ(k2
PR) and therefore
k1
PR ≺ k2
PR and we are done.
If k2 is not original then origin(k2) ∈
−−→
GG (this is the only channel that produces post-critical
clones). By assumption k2
PR exists, so by 5.4.6 Crit(G→ P ) exists and
λ(k2
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).origin(k2)
QU
.0ˆ|0ˆ]
In particular the co-donation packet c ∈
−−→
GP exists, and is processed, in H .
k1 is an untimely clone or a zombie. The 5.4.6 construction shows that when Crit(G→ P ) exists,
k1
PR exists and λ(k1
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).origin(k1)
QU.0ˆ|0ˆ]. In the clean event order on E˙ we have
origin(k1)
QU ≺˙ ℓvcrit ≺˙ origin(k2)
QU
Therefore λ(k1
PR) < λ(k2
PR) and therefore k1
PR ≺ k1
PR and we are done in this case as well.
We are left with channel
−−→
GG. This channel does not contain untimely packets, so there is nothing
to consider in this case.
Case III: k1 and k2 are both post-critical
If both k1 and k2 are original packets there is nothing to prove. The only post-critical clones
(there are no zombies) occur in
−−→
GP channels where P is an non-G process. So we can assume that
k1, k2 ∈
−−→
GP and at least one of them is not original.
If k2 is not original then it is a clone of a post-critical packet
−−→
GG with λ(origin(k2)
QU
) = [ℓT .∗.0ˆ|∗]. If
Crit(P → G) exists then ℓT ≺˙Crit(P → G). Since k2
PR exists it follows by 5.4.6 that Crit(G→ P )
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must exist and λ(k2
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).origin(k2)
QU
.0ˆ|0ˆ]. This means in particular that the co-
donation packet c from G to P exists, and is processed, in H . It also means, a-fortiori, that
Crit(P → G) exists.
Suppose that k1 is original. Since c is the first packet, in H , that is sent from G to P ; and since
k1 6= c (it survives in Hr and c does not), we have cQU ≺ k1
QU. Therefore
λ(cQU) = [Crit(P → G).0ˆ.0ˆ|CODONATE] < λ(k1
QU)
On the other hand
λ(origin(k2)
QU) = [ℓT .∗.0ˆ|∗] < [Crit(P → G).0ˆ.0ˆ|CODONATE] = λ(c
QU)
By 5.4.6, λ(k2
QU) = λ(origin(k2)
QU
) and so λ(k2
QU) < λ(k1
QU) and therefore k2
QU ≺ k1
QU contrary
to our assumption. So this case is not possible.
So we know that if k2 is a clone then k1 must be a clone as well, and since Crit(G→ P ) exists we
know by 5.4.6 that k1
PR exists and λ(k1
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).origin(k1)
QU
.0ˆ|0ˆ]. Since origin(k1) and
origin(k2) both belong to
−−→
GG and since
λ(origin(k1)
QU
) = λ(k1
QU) < λ(k2
QU) = λ(origin(k2)
QU
)
we have origin(k1)
QU ≺ origin(k2)
QU
and so by 5.3.2 λ(k1
PR) < λ(k2
PR) and so k1
PR ≺ k2
PR and we
are done.
We are left with the case where k2 is original and k1 is not. Using the same argument that we
used with an original k1, we can establish that c
QU ≺ k2
QU, where c is the co-donation packet sent
from G to P in H . We know by assumption that k2
PR exists. So we can conclude from the FIFO
property in H that cPR exists and cPR ≺ k2
PR. In particular Crit(G → P ) exists. Let T be the
transaction triggered by k2
PR. Then Crit(G→ P ) ≺ ℓT .
Since k1 is a clone and Crit(G→ P ) exists, we conclude from 5.4.6 that k1
PR exists and
λ(k1
PR) = [Crit(G→ P ).origin(k1)
QU
.0ˆ|0ˆ] < [ℓT .∗.∗|0ˆ] = λ(k2
PR)
and therefore k1
PR ≺ k2
PR. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 6. Hr is a conforming history.
Proof. We already know that Hr is a history, but we still have to confirm the conforming axioms,
using the fact that H is a conforming history.
The Conforming Channel Axiom.
If either P = (-G) or Q = (-G) we are done because -G halts and is removed in Hr. All the
other channels in Hr are original H channels to which we added clones and zombies and from
which we removed the critical donation and co-donation packets. Since the latter are finite
in number, any original channel that is finite in Hr is also finite in H , and it follows from the
conformity of H that either P is removed in H or Q halts in H . These properties carry over
directly to Hr.
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The Conforming Packet Axiom.
Suppose that this axiom is violated. Then there are processes X and Y and a packet k ∈
−−→
XY
such that
• vi(Y ) = nREM〈X〉 and vi(Y )PR exists.
• kPR exists and vi(Y )PR ≺ kPR
Since we do not change the non-G channels, at least one of X and Y must be equal to ±G.
If k is original then it does not violate the axiom. All the clones and zombies that we add
to the
−−−−−−−→
(±G)(±G) channels are timely, and we add only pre-critical packet processing events
in channels where X = (-G). Therefore k must be a clone or zombie on a
−−→
GP channel or a
−−−−→
P (±G) channel.
In the case of a
−−→
GP channel k must be untimely, and since it is processed the constellation
label of kPR is Crit(G→ P ) and the critical co-donation packet is processed at P . It follows
from the Conforming Packet Axiom in H that Crit(G→ P )≺˙ℓr(G) and we are done.
The case of a
−−−−→
P (±G) channel and an untimely k is similar. If k is timely then the constellation
label of kPR is equal to the clean event origin(k)
PR
. By the Conforming Packet Axiom in H
we know that origin(k)PR≺˙ℓr(P ) and we are done in this case as well.
The Conforming Notification Axiom.
By construction Hr has no dropped notifications, so the axiom is vacuously true.
The Conforming GMS Axiom.
The new process -G has a finite view interval. If P 6= (-G) and P halts then P exists in H
and has a finite view interval there. This property carries over to Hr.
The Conforming Parent Axiom.
The history H is transactional and therefore has no uninitialized processes. This property
carries over to Hr for all the processes with the exception of -G. But -G itself is also initialized
because it processes all of its notifications. Therefore this property holds vacuously at Hr.
The Conforming Halt Axiom.
This property carries over to Hr for all the processes in H . The property holds for -G as well
because it halts.
6 The History Equivalence Theorem
6.1 Introduction
We are now ready to prove the fundamental property of Hr, namely, that it performs the same
calculation as H .
The proof proceeds by induction on the partially ordered constellations of L . We will formulate
an inductive hypothesis that correlates the state of the processes in H and in Hr prior to a given
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constellation. We will show that under the hypothesis, if the processes of Hr process the triggers of
the constellation according to the CBCAST algorithm, each would generate and queue the exact same
packets, and in the same order, that are observed in the Hr transaction for that trigger. Moreover,
the post-processing state of the processes in Hr will continue to relate to the state of the processes
in H according to the inductive hypothesis once the whole constellation is processed.
The most important part of the rather elaborate inductive hypothesis is what it says about the
eventual state of H and Hr, namely that the state becomes identical. This means that the cal-
culation carried out by the two histories is the same calculation. This makes it possible to carry
over desirable properties like coherence and progress from Hr to H . By repeating that step we can
ultimately carry over these properties from relatively simple histories that do not have any process
joins to the more intractable histories that have any finite number of such joins.
Theorem 7 (History Equivalence Theorem). Hr is the history of a CBCAST and APP computation
that performs the same computation that H does. Specifically
• Hr delivers the same messages and view installations in the same order and at the same
constellation as H does at any process P 6= ±G.
• Hr delivers the same messages and view installations in the same order and at the same
constellation as H does at process G after the critical moment.
• Hr delivers the same messages and view installations at processes ±G in the same order and
at the same constellation as H does at process D before the critical moment.
• At some point the states of Hr and H become identical
Where a message delivery is an invocation of the ApplyMessage up-call and a view installation is
an invocation of the ApplyJoin or ApplyRemoval up-calls.
6.2 Proof plan and preliminaries
The claim of the theorem is a little subtle. H is a history that arises naturally from an execution of
CBCAST and APP. But Hr is a synthetic history whose trigger events occur for no underlying reason.
To prove the theorem we have to endow Hr with an execution that gives rise to its arbitrary
behavior. We do that inductively, one constellation at a time.
At the beginning of time we have each original process in Hr initialized by invoking the protStart
call, using
rosterr = roster
⋃
{±G}
as the roster. This causes the processes of Hr to initialize to a specific initial state. We will show
that this state is similar to the initial state of H , where similarity of state is a rather complex
relationship that we will define later. This similarity forms the basis of our inductive process. The
induction is by the partially ordered constellations of Lc (see Definition 21).
Recall from 5.3 that H and Hr constellations were defined as sets of events that share the first
coordinate, called the constellation coordinate, in their labels. Since each constellation coordinate is
a clean H-trigger, there is a very close relationship between Hr-constellations and H-constellations.
In fact in most cases a Hr-constellation is essentially an original H-transaction or a set of clones
of an H-transaction. The exceptions are the critical donation and co-donation transactions of
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H . Each of these gets broken down into a sequence of Hr transactions which correspond to H
sub-transactions and which can be distinguished by their sub-transaction labels.
For each constellation we assume the following about Hr and H :
1. The starting states of Hr and H are similar.
2. The starting states of the APP thread in Hr and H are identical.
3. The next execution interval of the APP thread will occur at exactly the same time in Hr and H
at every process. In particular, since the constellation consists of at most a single transaction
per process in H , the APP thread will not continue running in Hr until the conclusion of the
constellation, despite the fact that it may consist of multiple transactions.
The last assumption reflects a degree of freedom that we have in weaving the APP computation
into Hr. After all, we only have to show that Hr can arise as a history of a CBCAST and APP
computation, not that it must arise.
The only difficulty with the timing of the APP thread occurs at its inception. In H , the APP thread
at G is launched when G installs the critical view. In Hr however the thread is launched at the
beginning of time by the protStart procedure, since G is original in Hr. However the launch is
asynchronous, meaning that the thread is not executed immediately but at some indeterminate
point in the future. Since the lauch is earlier in Hr we can simply assume that the execution is
delayed long enough to coincide with the execution in H . At process -G in Hr the launch also
occurs at the beginning of time but we can assume that the execution is delayed until -G halts and
therefore never occurs.
Under these assumptions we demonstrate the following conclusions:
• Using the CBCAST callbacks to execute the constellation in Hr results in an ending state of
Hr that is similar to the state of H at the end of the same constellation.
• The side effects that are generated by the CBCAST callbacks are identical to the observed side
effects in Hr. In other words the current constellation looks like it has come about as a result
of a CBCAST execution rather than an arbitrary choice of side effects.
• The message deliveries and view installations that are generated by the CBCAST callbacks in
Hr are identical to those generated in H , in the sense that was elaborated in the statement
of the theorem. As a result any information that is visible to APP remains identical at the end
of the constellation.
This looks like it is enough for carrying the induction forward, but it is not quite enough, because
even though we have shown that the side effects of the current constellation are generated by CBCAST
rather than being arbitrary, we have not shown that any subsequent trigger events are non-arbitrary.
So suppose that C is a constellation in Hr, and suppose that every preceding constellation has
been shown to arise from a CBCAST and APP execution. Why should this execution give rise to the
triggers of C? Look at any trigger in C:
If the trigger is a dequeuing of a notification then there is no problem, because GMS is part of Hr
and we are allowed to control its behavior arbitrarily.
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If the trigger is a dequeuing event of a packet, then the packet was queued in a previous constellation
and therefore was a result of a CBCAST and APP execution. The dequeuing of the packet at this point
is the result of the timing (or labeling) that we built into Hr explicitly in order to have packets
dequeue at their destinations at improbable, but incredibly convenient times.
If the trigger is a dequeuing of a message broadcast request then its existence depends on APP
actually having produced the same requests in Hr and in H at the same time. The only way for
this to happen is for the APP thread to be exactly identical in both histories, and this can only be
guaranteed by perfectly masking the differences between Hr and H from APP. For this to happen
we need three conditions:
• The APP thread must have been in an identical state in both histories at all processes at the
end of the previous constellation.
• The APP thread must have seen the exact same information since that time.
• The APP thread execution must have proceeded at the exact same speed at the exact same
intervals in both histories and must not have intermingled with constellation executions.
We have shown that the first two conditions are met, and are at liberty to assume the third, as we
have seen. Therefore we can conclude that APP could have issued the same requests3
With these observations we can conclude that the triggers of C are indeed a result of a CBCAST and
APP execution and that the three inductive hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) above continue to hold.
The definition of state similarity is somewhat complex and varies depending on the period in the
life of the process into which the constellation falls. Each process goes through three periods, the
pre-critical, interim and convergent periods. The pre-critical period includes all the transactions
that occur prior to the critical notification and the convergent period includes all the transactions
that occur after the critical view is installed. The interim period includes all the constellations that
occur while the critical view is pending installation.
Here is the crux of the matter: in the convergent period, similarity becomes equality, and the two
histories converge as claimed.
It turns out that desirable properties like Causal Order and Progress carry over from Hr to H . By
iterating the history reduction process we can ultimately carry over these properties from relatively
simple histories that do not have any process joins to the more intractable histories that have any
finite number of such joins. Later we will show that join-free histories enjoy the Causal Order
Property and the Progress Property. As a result both properties hold for finite-join histories. We
will show that the Causal Order property holds for histories with an infinite number of joins as
well. This is not true for the Progress Property.
6.3 Side Effects in Hr
In our model each side effect is a queuing event. A queuing event is a multicast (in the case of
a message, ghost or flush packet) or a unicast (in the case of an acknowledgement, donation or
3we could have simplified this argument by replacing APP in Hr with a random oracle that by sheer luck broadcasts
the same messages that APP issues. However we thought it was significant that the argument could be carried forward
with the same user application and without resorting to an artificial oracle.
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co-donation packet). In a queuing event a process P queues a set of identical packets to outbound
channels, bound for a target set of processes (see the Packet Event Axiom). Before we can make
inductive arguments, we must relate the observed side effects in Hr to the observed side effects in
H .
As we prove the History Equivalence Theorem, we will repeatedly make the argument that the
execution of CBCAST in Hr produces the observed Hr side effects. Each observed side effect in Hr
has two characteristics: the type and content of the packet that is being queued, and the target
set of the multicast or unicast. In each case we will have to show that the CBCAST code execution
produces the observed type of packet with the observed content. As for the target set, all the
multicasts in CBCAST (step 2 of protBroadcast, step 5 of protRemove, steps 1 and 2 of CheckFlush)
use ContactSet as the target set. We will establish later (see Lemma 24) that in each case, the
observed target set is equal to the value of ContactSet that exists at the process in Hr at the time
of the multicast. Unicasts will not present a similar problem.
6.4 The inductive hypothesis
The inductive hypothesis relates the states of certain processes in H and Hr. The complete set of
variables that make up the state of a process is listed in 3.4.1. The inductive hypothesis is complex
enough to warrant a preliminary discussion.
Thanks to labeling we have a common ”timeline” for H and Hr, namely the common constellation
partial order. We divide this common timeline into three periods: The pre-critical period, the
interim period and the convergence period. The pre-critical period is the interval of time up to the
critical view change constellation ℓvcrit . The interim period ends at a process when that process
installs the critical view. This boundary occurs at a different constellation at each process. Process
-G is removed at the end of the pre-critical period, so it does not have an interim period. The
convergence period starts at the end of the interim period and continues indefinitely. The inductive
hypothesis is divided into separate hypotheses for each time period. The most important of those
is the convergent period, where the hypothesis is that H and Hr are identical.
To summarize, let e ∈ E˙ be a constellation and let P be a process. Then
• the constellation belongs to the pre-critical period at P if e ≺˙ ℓvcrit
• the constellation belongs to the interim period at P if e ˙ ℓvcrit and cur viewP@e < vcrit
• the constellation belongs to the convergent period at P if e ˙ ℓvcrit and cur viewP@e ≥ vcrit
The most complex constellations are the critical donation and co-donation constellations, Crit(P →
G) and Crit(G → P ). Each of these is a single transaction in H , but becomes a sequence of
transactions in Hr - potentially even an empty sequence, in which case the constellation does not
exist in Hr. To prove the inductive hypothesis for one of these constellations, we need to resort
to a second level of induction. For this purpose we will formulate sub-hypotheses that relate the
states of H and Hr at each sub-transaction.
We build on our observations in 6.3 to define the following equivalence between side effects. We
use this equivalence to separate the issue of side effect type and content from the issue target set,
that will be treated separately.
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Definition 26. Let e = kQU and er = krQU be two queuing events in H and Hr, respectively. We
say that e and er produce an equivalent side effect if k and kr have the same packet type and
cont(k) ∼= cont(kr) (see Definition 22).
The inductive hypothesis is actually a set of related hypotheses and sub-hypotheses. The main
hypotheses are:
• The First Pre-Critical Hypothesis, which describes how the state of a process P ∈ PH in H
is related to the state of the same process in Hr at the start of a pre-critical constellation.
Notice that P 6= ±G because -G is not a process in H while G joins post-critically in H .
• The Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis, which describes how the states of D, G and -G in Hr
are related to each other at the start of a pre-critical constellation. Notice that in this case
the comparison is within Hr, not between H and Hr.
• The Interim Non-G Hypothesis, which describes how the state of a process P 6= G in H is
related to the state of the same process in Hr at the start of a post-critical constellation that
occurs before P installs the critical view in H .
• The Interim G Hypothesis, which describes how the state of G in H is related to its state in
Hr at the start of a post-critical constellation that occurs before G installs the critical view
in H .
• The Convergent Hypothesis, which claims that the state of a process P in H is identical to
its state in Hr at any time after P installs the critical view in H .
The sub-hypotheses are:
• The Donation Sub-Hypothesis, which describes how the state of G in H relates to its state in
Hr at the start of each sub-transaction of each donation constellation at G.
• The First Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis, which describes how the state of P 6= G in H re-
lates to its state in Hr at the start of each untimely sub-transaction of each co-donation
constellation in P .
• The Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis, which describes how the state of P 6= G in H
relates to its state in Hr at the start of each post-critical sub-transaction of each co-donation
constellation in P .
Inductive Hypothesis 1 (First Pre-Critical Hypothesis). Let C be any pre-critical constellation
and let P be a process that exists in both H and Hr at the start of C. Then the state of P in H
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and the state of P in Hr are identical at that point, with the following exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
LiveSetr = LiveSet
⋃
{±G}
ContactSetr = ContactSet
⋃
{±G}
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
⋃
{[G] = ∅, [-G] = ∅}
WaitSetr ∼= {〈msg, index, ∂(iset)〉 | 〈msg, index, iset〉 ∈WaitSet}
where ∂(iset) =
{
iset D /∈ iset
iset
⋃
{iset[±G] = {f = iset[D].f, b = 0}} D ∈ iset
mpkt inr[X ].f =
{
mpkt in[X ].f X 6= ±G
mpkt in[D].f X = ±G
mpkt inr[X ].b =
{
mpkt in[X ].b X 6= ±G
0 X = ±G
ghostr[] = ghost[]
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D], [-G] = ghost[D]}
flushr[] = flush[]
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D], [-G] = ghost[D]}
Notice that flushr[±G] is indeed inherited from ghost[D], not flush[D]!
Inductive Hypothesis 2 (Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis). Let C be any pre-critical constellation.
Then the states of ±G in Hr at the start of C are identical to the state of D in Hr at the same
point, with the following exceptions:
selfr(±G) = ±G
BcastWaitSetr(±G) = ∅
FwdWaitSetr(±G) = {〈msg, {f = index.f, b = 0}, iset〉 |
〈msg, index, iset〉 ∈ FwdWaitSetr(D)}
LaunchQueuer(±G) = ∅
flush heightr(±G) = ghost heightr(D)
mpkt outr.b(±G) = 0
Inductive Hypothesis 3 (Interim Non-G Hypothesis). Let C be any post-critical constellation
and let P 6= G be a process that exists at the start of C and has no yet installed the critical view in
H. Then the state of P in H is identical to the state of P in Hr at that point with the following
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exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue with 〈REMOVE, -G〉 replacing 〈JOIN, G〉
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
Inductive Hypothesis 4 (Interim G Hypothesis). Let C be any post-critical constellation and
suppose that G exists at the start of C and has not yet installed the critical view in H. Then the
state of G in H is identical to the state of G in Hr at that point with the following exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue with 〈REMOVE, -G〉 replacing 〈JOIN, G〉
ContactSetr = LiveSet
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
Inductive Hypothesis 5 (Donation Sub-Hypothesis). Let P be any process that sends a critical
donation packet to G in H and let k be any untimely packet in
−−→
PD. If G processes the critical
donation packet from P in H then the state of G in H at the start of the [Crit(P → G).kQU.∗|0ˆ]
sub-transaction is identical to the state of G in Hr at the start of the matching transaction in Hr,
with the following exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue with 〈REMOVE, -G〉 replacing 〈JOIN, G〉
ContactSetr = LiveSet
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
ghost[P ] ≤ ghostr[P ] ≤ ghost heightP@ℓvcrit
flush[P ] ≤ flushr[P ] ≤ flush heightP@ℓvcrit
Inductive Hypothesis 6 (First Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis). Let P 6= G be any process that
receives a critical co-donation packet from G in H and let k be any untimely packet in
−−→
DP . If P pro-
cesses the critical co-donation in H then the state of P in H at the start of the [Crit(G→ P ).kQU.∗|0ˆ]
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sub-transaction in H is identical to the state of P in Hr at the start of the matching transaction
in Hr, with the following exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue with 〈REMOVE, -G〉 replacing 〈JOIN, G〉
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
ghost[G] ≤ ghostr[G] ≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
flush[G] ≤ flushr[G] ≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
Inductive Hypothesis 7 (Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis). Let P 6= G be any process
that receives a critical co-donation packet from G in H and let k be any uncontacted packet in
−−→
GG. If P processes the critical co-donation in H then the state of P in H at the start of the
[Crit(G→ P ).kQU.∗|0ˆ] sub-transaction is identical to the state of P in Hr at the start of the match-
ing transaction in Hr, with the following exceptions:
MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}
PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue with 〈REMOVE, -G〉 replacing 〈JOIN, G〉
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet
FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
ghost[G] ≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit ≤ ghost
r[G] ≤ ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
flush[G] ≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit ≤ flush
r[G] ≤ ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
Inductive Hypothesis 8 (Convergent Hypothesis). For any post-critical constellation C and any
process P that exists at the start of C, if P has already installed the critical view at that point in
H, then the state of P in H is identical to the state of P in Hr at that same point. Moreover, the
state of P does not contain any pre-critical messages.
6.5 Technical lemmas for the History Equivalence Theorem proof
Lemma 24. Let e = kQU be a queuing event of a ghost, flush or message packet at process P in
Hr, and let e0 = origin(k)
QU
be the original queuing event at process R in H. Assume that the
inductive hypothesis holds and that one of the following conditions hold as well:
1. e is pre-critical, and ContactSetrP@e = ContactSetR@e0
⋃
{±G}
2. e is post-critical, P 6= G and ContactSetrP@e = ContactSetR@e0
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3. e is post-critical, P = G and ContactSetrP@e = LiveSetR@e0
Then Te = ContactSet
r
Proof. Most of the cases follow immediately from Lemma 22 and the various inductive hypotheses.
The one non-trivial case is when e is post-critical, P = G and the Convergent Hypothesis holds. In
that case it follows from Lemma 22 and the inductive hypothesis that Te = LiveSet
r. We have to
show that ContactSetr = LiveSetr. It follows from Lemma 8(2) that the equality holds for original
processes. Since G is an original process in Hr we are done.
Lemma 25. Let msg be an unstamped message and let P 6= ±G be a process in H. Suppose that the
states of P in H and Hr satisfy the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis. Suppose as well that D ∈ LiveSet
and ±G /∈ LiveSet at P in H. Then executing the protBroadcast(msg) in both histories will result
in equivalent side effects (see Definition 26) while preserving the Hypothesis.
Proof. We follow the execution of the protBroadcast procedure step by step.
The first step is a decision whether to proceed or to queue msg to LaunchQueue. Both histories take
the same decision here, resulting in identical changes to LaunchQueue. If v gap > 0 we are done.
The next step increments mpkt out.b, keeping it identical.
The next two steps define a temporary vector vt′. Since P 6= ±G, the resulting vector has values
at H and Hr that bear the same relationship to each other as vt does.
The next three steps stamp the message. By Definition 22 this produces equivalent messages.
The next step creates the queuing event. By Definition 26 this event produces equivalent side
effects.
The next step creates the local variable index which has the same value in both histories.
The next step creates the local vector iset[], which is related in H and Hr the same way mpkt in[]
is.
Since D ∈ LiveSet, we know from Lemma 8 that there is a D coordinate in mpkt in[] and therefore
the record that is added to BcastWaitSet in the last step bears the required relation for WaitSet
records. Therefore this step preserves the inductive hypothesis and we are done.
Lemma 26. Let P and Q be two processes that use the same implementation of the ApplyMessage
up-call. Further assume that the states of P and Q have the following relations:
ReplicatedData(P ) = ReplicatedData(Q)
cur view(P ) = cur view(Q) < vcrit
MSet(P ) = MSet(Q)
⋃
{±G}
ReceiveSet(P ) ∼= ReceiveSet(Q)
vt[](P ) = vt[](Q)
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
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Then executing the Scan procedure in both processes will result in the same relations being preserved,
with all other state variables remaining unchanged in both P and Q. Moreover both processes invoke
the ApplyMessage up-call at the same times and with the same messages.
Proof. We follow the execution of the Scan procedure step by step.
The first step sets the value of deliverable messages found to false at both P and Q.
The next step is a loop over members of ReceiveSet. Since ReceiveSet is equivalent at P and Q,
the loop goes over the same messages in the same order in both executions. For each message, we
check whether the message is a current view message and whether we have already delivered all the
previous messages from the same source. This amounts to checking whether VIEW(msg) = cur view
and whether VT(msg)[ORIG(msg)] = vt[ORIG(msg)] + 1.
The first check gives the same result in P and Q because VIEW(msg) is the same (due to equiva-
lence) and cur view is assumed to be the same. Moreover, if the check is successful it means that
VIEW(msg) = cur view < vcrit and therefore ORIG(msg) 6= ±G. This is because G starts life with
cur view+v gap = vcrit so it does not originate any messages before cur view = vcrit and v gap = 0.
-G does not originate any messages at all.
The second check gives the same result because of equivalence and because of our assumption that
ORIG(msg) 6= ±G. Therefore VT(msg)[ORIG(msg)] and vt[ORIG(msg)] are the same at P and Q.
Therefore the conditional block is executed for the same messages, following the steps:
• all dependents delivered is set to true in both P and Q.
• A loop searches MSet for coordinates whose values will prevent delivery. Other than ±G the
setMSet in Q contains the same processes as in P and the test yields the same results in both.
The only way this loop could produce divergent results is if Q decided that the message was
deliverable while P found an impediment that is related to pid = ±G. But the equivalence
condition on ReceiveSet guarantees that VT(msg)[±G] = 0 in P , so this cannot happen and
the loop must exit with the same value of all dependents delivered in both executions.
• The decision to deliver the message is controlled by all dependents delivered so both P and Q
make the same decision. The message delivery takes the following steps:
– The value of deliverable messages found is set to true at both P and Q.
– The vector time is incremented at the ORIG(msg) coordinate. This is the same coordinate
in P and Q due to equivalence, and since it is not ±G, we increment an identical value
in vt, keeping it identical.
– The message is removed from ReceiveSet and stripped of its vector time and view stamps,
leaving it with only its origin stamp. Since the origin stamp is identical for equivalent
messages, this leaves the message identical in P and Q, in addition to leaving ReceiveSet
equivalent.
– The identical message is applied to the identical user data object ReplicatedData in the
same way. This leaves the data object identical.
The last step is a recursive call to Scan, controlled by deliverable messages found. We have shown
that up to this point the assumed relationships have not changed and no variables changed other
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than some of the ones mentioned. Since P and Q take the same decision about making the recursive
call, the lemma is now proven by induction.
Lemma 27. Let P and Q be two processes whose states have the following relations:
FwdWaitSet(P ) = ∅ iff FwdWaitSet(Q) = ∅
BcastWaitSet(P ) = ∅ iff BcastWaitSet(Q) = ∅
cur view(P ) = cur view(Q)
v gap(P ) = v gap(Q)
ghost height(P ) = ghost height(Q)
flush height(P ) = flush height(Q)
Then executing the CheckFlush procedure in both processes has the following two results:
• The same relations are preserved, with all other state variables remaining unchanged in both
P and Q.
• The same side effects occur in P and Q.
Proof. We follow the execution of CheckFlush step by step.
The first step exits if FwdWaitSet is not empty. P andQmake the same decision here by assumption.
The next block compares ghost height to cur view+ v gap. If ghost height is low it updates it and
broadcasts ghost packets of height cur view + v gap. Since ghost height, cur view and v gap are
all the same in P and Q, this block results in the same side effects and preserves the postulated
relations without changing any other variables.
The rest of the procedure is a repeat of the first part with BcastWaitSet and flush height replacing
FwdWaitSet and ghost height, so the same argument holds.
Lemma 28. Let P and Q be two processes whose states have the following relations:
FwdWaitSet(P ) = ∅ iff FwdWaitSet(Q) = ∅
BcastWaitSet(P ) = ∅
cur view(P ) = cur view(Q)
v gap(P ) = v gap(Q)
ghost height(P ) = ghost height(Q)
flush height(P ) = ghost height(Q)
Then executing the CheckFlush procedure in both processes has the following two results:
• The same relations are preserved, with all other state variables remaining unchanged in both
P and Q.
• If Q broadcasts ghost packets of height v then P broadcasts ghost packets of height v followed
by flush packets of height v.
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• If Q does not broadcast ghost packets, then P has no side effects.
Proof. We follow the execution of CheckFlush step by step.
The first step exits if FwdWaitSet is not empty. P andQmake the same decision here by assumption.
If they exit then neither has side effects and we are done.
The next block compares ghost height to cur view+ v gap. If ghost height is low it updates it and
broadcasts ghost packets of height cur view + v gap. Since ghost height, cur view and v gap are
all the same in P and Q, this block results in the same side effects and preserves the postulated
relations without changing any other variables.
The rest of the procedure is a repeat of the first part with BcastWaitSet and flush height replacing
FwdWaitSet and ghost height. If P and Q decided to broadcast ghost packets, then our assumptions
will force P to broadcast flush packets as well, as the lemma claims. Since the P decision to
broadcast flush packets follows Q’s decision to broadcast ghost packets, the value of flush height in
P ends up being equal to the value final value of ghost height in Q, as claimed.
Corollary 9. 1. Let P be a process in H and suppose that the state relationships in one of the
inductive hypotheses or sub-hypotheses, excluding the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis, hold
with respect to states of P in H and Hr. Then executing the CheckFlush procedure at P in
H and Hr preserves the same relations and causes the same side effects.
2. Suppose that the state relationships in the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis hold at D, G and
-G in Hr. Then executing the CheckFlush procedure in all three processes preserves the same
relations and causes side effects that are related as stated in Lemma 28.
Proof.
Lemma 29. Let X be a process in H that is in the middle of the execution of a constellation in
both H and Hr (if X = G then the constellation must be post-critical). Suppose that the First Pre-
Critical, Interim non-G, Interim G or Convergent Hypothesis holds with respect to the state of X in
H and Hr (if X = G then the pre-critical case does not apply). Also assume that ul view = cur viewr
at X in Hr. Then executing the TryToInstall procedure in both histories at X has the following
results:
• If cur view < vcrit in H at the end of the execution then the same inductive hypothesis (First
Pre-Critical or Interim) still holds.
• If cur view ≥ vcrit in H at the end of the execution then the Convergent Hypothesis holds.
• If P = G and the procedure installs the critical view then G launches the APP thread at exactly
the same moment in H and Hr.
• In all cases the side effects in Hr are equivalent to the side effects in H.
Proof. We follow the execution step by step:
The procedure starts with a loop that goes over the live processes, looking for an impediment to
installation of the next view in the form of flush[] values that are too low. In all the situations under
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consideration we have
cur viewr = cur view
v gapr = v gap
LiveSetr ⊃ LiveSet
flushr[Y ] = flush[Y ] whenever Y ∈ LiveSet
Therefore if there is an impediment to installation in H , the same impediment exists in Hr. The
converse is trivially true in all but the pre-critical case, because that is the only case where LiveSetr 6=
LiveSet. However in that case we have, by the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis:
flushr[±G] = ghost[D] ≥ flush[D]
where the inequality on the right follows from Lemma 8(5). Therefore if G or -G form an impediment
in Hr, then so does D in H . Therefore both histories make the same decision on whether to proceed
with installing all the pending views.
The next part of the procedure is a loop that installs all the pending views. It goes through the
following steps:
• The obsolete messages are removed from ReceiveSet. Because ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet, they
have the same messages and each message has the same message view. Therefore the same
messages are discarded in H and Hr and the hypothesis is preserved. In the case where the
view being installed is the critical one, this step leaves ReceiveSet with no messages of pre-
critical view. By the definition of equivalence (Definition 22) this means that ReceiveSetr =
ReceiveSet.
• The obsolete messages are removed from FwdQueue[]. This is very similar to the previous step.
The only complication is that in the pre-critical case there are two queues, FwdQueuer[±G],
that do not exist in H . However these queues are empty according to the First Pre-Critical
Hypothesis, and so this step preserves the inductive hypothesis as well. As in the previous case,
if the view being installed is the critical one, then at this stage FwdQueuer[X ] = FwdQueue[X ]
at every process X .
• The next two steps increment cur view and decrement v gap. This obviously preserves the
inductive hypothesis. Also ul view = cur viewr − 1. This will be fixed soon.
• The next step pops the head of PendViewQueue. In most cases this trivially preserves the
inductive hypothesis, as well as yielding an identical value for notification. However in the case
where the view being installed is the critical one, this step renders PendViewQueue identical
in both histories while yielding different values for notification. In H we have a value that
indicates that G is joining while in Hr we have a value that indicates that -G is leaving.
• The next step updates MSet according to the type of notification, and applies the change to
the replicated application data. We have to consider the following cases:
1. The notification is for a non-critical joining of a process which is not the local process
X . Since the first join in H occurs at the critical view we have
cur view ≥ vcrit > MAGIC VIEW
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Both histories add the new process to MSet, preserving the inductive hypothesis. Then
in H the process X invokes the up-call ApplyJoin@X, which modifies ReplicatedData in
an unspecified user-defined way. In Hr the process X invokes ApplyJoinr@X. According
to 5.4.10, ApplyJoinr@X behaves the same way in this case, regardless of whether X = G
or not. It increments ul view and restores the equality ul view = cur viewr. Since ul view
is positive, the up-call invokes the original ApplyJoin@X. Therefore ReplicatedData is
modified in the same way in Hr and the inductive hypothesis is preserved.
2. The notification is for a non-critical joining of the local process X . This case is just like
the previous one but in addition process X also launches the main APP thread, with the
same identity parameter pid in both histories. We may assume that the thread will start
executing at the exact same time in both histories (because it is possible, not because it
is probable).
3. The notification is for a non-critical removal of a process. In both historiesX removes the
process from MSet, preserving the inductive hypothesis. Then in H it invokes the up-call
ApplyRemoval@X, which modifies ReplicatedData in an unspecified user-defined way. In
Hr it invokes ApplyRemovalr@X. If X 6= G then according to 5.4.10 the up-call simply
increments ul view , restoring the equality ul view = cur viewr, and then calls ApplyRe-
moval@X, thus preserving the inductive hypothesis. If X = G then ApplyRemovalr@G
increments ul view (restoring the equality with cur viewr) and then invokes either Ap-
plyRemoval@G or ApplyRemoval@D, according as ul view > MAGIC VIEW or not. By
Definition 24 ul view > MAGIC VIEW exactly when the constellation is post-critical,
which must be the case here when X = G, therefore ApplyRemoval@G is invoked and
ReplicatedData is modified the same way in both histories.
4. The notification is for the critical view and X 6= G. In this case process X in H
invokes the up-call ApplyJoin@X and in Hr the up-call ApplyRemovalr@X. By 5.4.10
the ApplyRemovalr@X call increments ul view , thus restoring the equality ul view =
cur viewr. The up-call proceeds to invoke ApplyJoin@X. This modifies ReplicatedData
the same way as in H .
5. The notification is for the critical view and X = G. In this case process G in H invokes
the up-call ApplyJoin@G and then launches the APP thread with pid = G. In Hr it in-
vokes ApplyRemoval@G. By 5.4.10 the ApplyRemovalr@G call increments ul view , thus
restoring the equality ul view = cur viewr. The up-call proceeds to invoke ApplyJoin@G
with pid = G exactly as G did in H . This preserves the equality of ReplicatedData.
In Hr the APP thread is not launched. But since G is an original process in Hr the
thread was already launched, with the same paramter, at the beginning of time when
the protStart procedure was invoked. Since both invocations are asynchronous we may
assume that by sheer luck the early invocation of the thread in Hr is delayed so much
that the thread starts execution at the exact same point in time in both histories.
• The vector time is reset. This means that the previous vector time is replaced with a vector
of zeroes, one per process in MSet. This is easily seen to preserve the inductive hypothesis.
At this point we have to take stock of the case where the view installation was the critical
one. This is the boundary between the Interim period, where the Interim Hypotheses are in
force, and the Convergent period. Following the steps we took so far demonstrates that all the
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differences that existed in the state of the process in the two histories have now dissolved. The
±G difference in MSet has been bridged. As a result vt converged as well. PendViewQueue
shed the one record that was different and became equal. ReceiveSet and FwdQueue[] have
gone from being equivalent to being equal, as we have seen.
Since we managed to install the views we know that the self flush height is high namely
flush[X ] = cur view+ v gap
From Lemma 8(8) it follows that flush height = cur view + v gap. Since we start out with
v gap > 0 (otherwise no views are installed) we know by Lemma 8(9) that WaitSet must
be empty at this point in both histories and therefore equal as well. The only remaining
possible difference is in ContactSet, in the case X = G only. But this difference cannot
exist here because Lemma 8(5) implies that if Y ∈ LiveSet \ ContactSet then flush[Y ] <
cur view+ v gap. This would have prevented the views from being installed. As a result the
Convergent Hypothesis holds, and the computations have now converged for X .
• the next step is an invocation of the Scan procedure. By Lemma 26, this step preserves the
inductive hypothesis and creates no side effects
The last step involves broadcasting all the messages out of LaunchQueue.
At this point v gap = 0 and therefore we cannot be in the interim period. Therefore we only
need to consider the First Pre-Critical and the Convergent Hypotheses. Under either hypothesis
LaunchQueuer = LaunchQueue and by Lemma 25 each call to protBroadcast preserves the hypothesis
and generates equivalent side effects in both histories. From Lemma 24 it follows that the target
set of each side effect is equal to ContactSetr in Hr.
Lemma 30. Suppose that G, -G and D are in the middle of the execution of a pre-critical
constellation in Hr. Suppose that the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis holds. Also suppose that
ul view = cur viewr in all three processes. Then executing the TryToInstall procedure in all three
processes preserves the inductive hypothesis and produces no side effects in either G or -G.
Proof. We follow the execution step by step:
The procedure starts with a loop that goes over the live processes, looking for an impediment to
installation of the next view in the form of flush[] values that are too low. In the situation under
consideration we have the same values of cur view , v gap, LiveSet and flush[]. Therefore all three
processes reach the same decision on installation of the pending views. Since PendViewQueue is
also identical among the processes, the same views get installed.
The next part of the procedure is a loop that installs all the pending views. It goes through the
following steps:
• The obsolete messages are removed from ReceiveSet and FwdQueue[]. Because both sets are
identical in all three processes, the same messages are discarded in all three processes and the
hypothesis is preserved.
• The next two steps increment cur view and decrement v gap. This obviously preserves the
inductive hypothesis. It also results in ul view = cur viewr − 1.
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• The next step pops the head of PendViewQueue. This trivially preserves the inductive hy-
pothesis, as well as yielding an identical value for notification.
• The next step updates MSet according to the type of notification, and applies the change
to the replicated application data. Since we are dealing with a pre-critical constellation, the
view change must be a removal of a process, and by Definition 24 cur view ≤ MAGIC VIEW.
Process D executes ApplyRemovalr@D while ±G execute ApplyRemovalr@G. By 5.4.10, this
results in all cases in incrementing ul view , which restores the equality ul view = cur viewr,
and in invoking ApplyRemoval@D, which modifies ReplicatedData in the same way in all three
processes.
• The vector time is reset. This means that the previous vector time is replaced with a vector
of zeroes, one per process in MSet. This is easily seen to preserve the inductive hypothesis.
• the next step is an invocation of the Scan procedure. By Lemma 26, this step preserves the
inductive hypothesis and creates no side effects.
The last step involves broadcasting all the messages out of LaunchQueue. By the Second Pre-
Critical Hypothesis LaunchQueue is empty in ±G, so this step generates no side effects there, while
generating a single original message broadcast per message in D. As far as the inductive hypothesis
is concerned, for every message in LaunchQueue that is broadcast by D the value of mpkt out.b is
incremented and a copy of the stamped message is attached to BcastWaitSet in D together with
an instability vector. In addition LaunchQueue is emptied out in D. These state changes do not
violate the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis, which only requires that BcastWaitSet and LaunchQueue
be empty and mpkt out.b be zero in ±G.
6.6 Proof of the History Equivalence Theorem
We start the proof at the beginning of time. At time zero, each member process is initialized by
the protStart procedure (see 3.2.5). Direct inspection shows that the state differences between H
processes and Hr processes conform to the pre-critical inductive hypotheses. Notice also that after
protStart is executed in Hr
ul view = cur viewr = 0
It is easy to check that the equality between ul view and cur viewr continues to hold as long as
Hr executes CBCAST. This is because the identity is passed from parent to child, and the only
place where either value is changed is in the TryToInstall procedure, where these two values are
incremented in tandem.
Suppose that the inductive hypothesis holds at constellation label L = [ℓt.s.0ˆ|0ˆ]. Both H and Hr
have a set of transactions or sub-transactions which share the constellation label L. But in H these
transactions are generated by the execution of CBCAST procedures as a reaction to triggers, whereas
in Hr the transactions are manufactured artificially. We have to show three things. First we must
show that if Hr executes the CBCAST protocol it will produce transactions that are identical to its
observed ones. Then we have to show that if Hr executes the CBCAST protocol, then once all the
(sub-)transactions in the constellation conclude the inductive hypothesis continues to hold. As a
final step we have to show that the triggers of the next constellation in Hr arise naturally from the
past behavior of Hr. This guarantees that Hr continues to look like an execution of CBCAST and
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APP all the way up to the next constellation, and that the inductive hypothesis continues to hold
until that point.
We divide our analysis at each stage into cases, depending on the type of constellation, and the
type of side effects (See 4.2.1 - 4.2.5) we observe in H within the constellation. In each case we
try to deal with all of the inductive hypotheses together. In some cases only some of the inductive
hypotheses are relevant. For example, join notifications do not occur pre-critically, by definition.
We also make a repeated use of arguments that show that certain variables that start out equivalent
at the start of a constellation end up remaining equivalent at the end. In the Convergent period
these variables are required to be identical and not just equivalent, so proving that they remain
equivalent is not quite enough. But as long as the procedural parameters that are used by CBCAST
to execute each transaction are identical in both histories, the state will remain identical at the end
rather than just equivalent. We will point out the few cases where the procedural parameters are
not equal, and otherwise gloss over this issue.
6.6.1 Notification constellations
• Type of Constellation: A non-critical GMS removal notification of a process R.
H Transactions: One execution of the protRemove procedure at each surviving process.
Observed behavior in Hr: Post-critically, the transactions occurring in Hr are equivalent
to the H transactions occurring at the same processes. Pre-critically, equivalent trans-
actions occur at the non-G processes, and in addition there are two transactions at ±G.
These transactions have the same triggers as the other transactions in the constella-
tion, and their side effects are related to the original transaction at D according to the
following cases (see Lemma 12):
– If the original D transaction in H queues a sequence of message multicasts then the
±G transactions in Hr queue the equivalent message multicasts.
– If the original D transaction in H has no side effects then the ±G transactions in
Hr have no side effects.
– If the original D transaction in H queues a ghost multicast (with or without a
succeeding flush multicast) then the ±G transactions in Hr queue a ghost multicast
followed by a flush multicast, of the same height as the original ghost multicast.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: We follow the execution step by step, dealing with all the in-
ductive hypotheses at once. The first step increments v gap in all the executions. By the
inductive hypothesis v gap is identical at all compared processes. After incrementation,
v gap remains identical since all the involved processes execute the procedure. Therefore
the first step preserves the inductive hypothesis. This step produces no side effects.
The next step adds a record to PendViewQueue. In the pre-critical and convergent
periods PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue and the added record is identical as well, so
the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis and the Convergent Hypothesis are preserved. In the
interim period PendViewQueuer is not identical to PendViewQueue but the difference is
preserved after the addition of the new record, so the Interim Hypotheses are preserved
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as well. Finally, pre-critically PendViewQueuer is identical at D, G and -G so the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis is also preserved.
The next two steps remove R from LiveSet and ContactSet. Pre-critically both LiveSetr
and ContactSetr differ from LiveSet and ContactSet by the addition of ±G, and both sets
are identical atD, G and -G inHr. Since R /∈ {D,G, -G} in the pre-critical case, the First
and Second Pre-Critical Hypotheses are preserved. Post-critically LiveSetr = LiveSet and
this property is preserved. Away from G the same is true for ContactSetr. Therefore the
Interim non-G and Convergent Hypotheses are preserved. At G, ContactSetr = LiveSet,
so the Interim G Hypothesis is preserved as well.
The next step is a loop that stabilizes messages in WaitSet with respect to R. Post-
Critically WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet in all cases. The loop preserves this relationship, which
guarantees the preservation of all the post-critical inductive hypotheses.
Pre-critically, BcastWaitSetr is empty at ±G while FwdWaitSetr is identical at D, G and
-G with the exception of a slightly different index at each record. The loop preserves these
relationships, which guarantees the preservation of the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis.
Pre-critically at each non-G processWaitSetr is very close to being equivalent to WaitSet
with the only differences being larger instability vectors. We know that in the pre-critical
case R /∈ {D,G, -G} and therefore removing R from the instability sets in WaitSetr and
WaitSet does not disturb their hypothesized relationship. Finally this fact also guarantees
that each instability set will empty out in WaitSet if and only if it empties in WaitSetr
so the loop will always make the same decisions on record removal from WaitSet in both
histories. Therefore the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is preserves as well.
The next step discards mpkt in[R]. This preserves all the hypotheses.
The next step forwards all the messages out of the forwarding queue FwdQueue[R].
In all periods and at all participating processes FwdQueuer[R] ∼= FwdQueue[R], while
pre-critically FwdQueuer[R] is identical at D, G and -G. Therefore the loop proceeds
over equivalent or identical messages (depending on which hypothesis we are checking),
executing the following steps at each message:
– Popping the head of FwdQueue[R], yielding a message msg - this preserves all the
hypotheses. msgr ∼= msg at all processes in all periods. Pre-critically at D, G, and
-G the value of msgr is the same.
– Incrementing mpkt out.f - this preserves all the hypotheses.
– Creating index = mpkt out. This yields indexr = index for all processes in all periods.
Pre-critically at D, G and -G this yields:
indexr.f(±G) = indexr.f(D)
indexr.b(±G) = 0
– Creating an instability vector iset = mpkt in[]. This yields isetr = iset for all pro-
cesses in all the post-critical periods. Pre-critically it yields an identical value of
isetr at D, G and -G. Pre-critically this also yields the following relation at each
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non-G process:
isetr[X ].f =
{
iset[X ].f X 6= ±G
iset[D].f X = ±G
isetr[X ].b =
{
iset[X ].b X 6= ±G
0 X = ±G
– Queuing a message multicast containing the messagemsg and targeted at ContactSet.
Since msgr ∼= msg this side effect matches the observed side effect in Hr. Since the
inductive hypothesis holds at this point, Lemma 24 guarantees that the target set
matches the observed target set.
– Adding a record 〈msg, index, iset[]〉 to FwdWaitSet. Post critically FwdWaitSetr =
FwdWaitSet at every process and the new record is equivalent as well, which preserves
the relevant hypothesis.
Pre-critically at D, G and -G in Hr, FwdWaitSetr is almost identical, except for a
zeroed out .b coordinate at each index at ±G. The new record 〈msgr, indexr, isetr[]〉
exhibits exactly this behavior at the three processes so the Second Pre-Critical Hy-
pothesis is preserved.
Pre-critically at any non-G process WaitSetr is nearly equivalent to WaitSet, with
the addition of ±G coordinates to isetr wherever a D coordinate exists in iset. The
value of isetr in the new record in Hr exactly matches the required difference from
the value of iset in the new record in H , while msgr ∼= msg and index = index.
Therefore the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is preserved.
In the next few steps we discard FwdQueue[R], ghost[R] and flush[R], actions which
preserve all the inductive hypotheses. The one thing to notice is that this follows from
the fact that pre-critically R /∈ {D,G, -G}.
In the last step we call CheckFlush which by Corollary 9 preserves the inductive hy-
potheses. Moreover the same corollary guarantees that the side effects produced by
CheckFlush are equal, and therefore equivalent, to the observed side effects. Lemma 24
guarantees that the target set produced by the execution of CheckFlush for each side
effect, namely ContactSetr, is equal to the observed target set.
• Type of Constellation: A non-critical GMS join notification of a process J , with parent
process K. By definition this must be a post-critical constellation with J 6= G.
H Transactions: One execution of the protJoin procedure at each existing process. One
execution of the protRun procedure at J . J and K have identical states at the start of
the transaction.
Observed behavior in Hr: The transactions at all the processes, including J , are equiva-
lent to the H transactions at the same processes.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: J and K start with the same state, and the same calls are
executed in Hr as in H , at the same processes. Since there is no pre-critical case here,
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we only have to verify the preservation of the Interim non-G, Interim G and Convergent
Hypotheses. We follow the execution step by step, starting with protJoin.
The first few steps increment v gap, add a record to PendViewQueue, add J to LiveSet
and ContactSet and create a new and empty entry in FwdQueue For the process J . These
steps can be easily seen to preserve all three Hypotheses where they apply.
The next step goes over WaitSet, and creating an instability coordinate for J whenever
such a coordinate exists for the parent process K. Only the forwarding part of the co-
ordinate is copied. The broadcasting part is zeroed. Post-critically, WaitSetr ∼= WaitSet
so the loop proceeds identically in H and Hr and preserves the applicable inductive
hypotheses.
The next three steps create J coordinates in the ghost[], flush[] and mpkt in[] vectors.
These steps can be easily seen to preserve the applicable hypotheses.
The next two steps create and queue a donation packet to J . Since all the ingredients of
the donation vector donation are equivalent, the resulting side effect in Hr is equivalent
to the corresponding side effect in H , as observed in Hr. The target set of the packet is
equal to {J} in both histories.
In the last step we call CheckFlush which by Corollary 9 preserves the inductive hy-
potheses. Moreover the same corollary guarantees that the side effects produced by
CheckFlush are equal, and therefore equivalent, to the observed side effects. Lemma 24
guarantees that the target set produced by the execution of CheckFlush for each side
effect, namely ContactSetr, is equal to the observed target set.
We now look at the execution steps in protRun. These steps are taken by J in both
H and Hr. Recall from 3.3 that a new process starts out with a state identical to its
parent K. Therefore, prior to the execution of protRun the states of J in H and Hr
conform to the inductive hypothesis for the post-critical state of K, which can vary
according as K = G or K 6= G. However, if one looks at these two cases in the inductive
hypothesis, one sees that they claim the same things, except that in the case K 6= G,
ContactSetr = ContactSet whereas in the case K = G, ContactSetr = LiveSet. This will
make no difference in the end because the protRun procedure recomputes ContactSet in
a way that renders its value identical in both H and Hr as is expected since J 6= G.
The first three steps in protRun increment v gap and update PendViewQueue and LiveSet.
These steps are easily seen to preserve either the Interim Non-G Hypothesis or the Con-
vergent Hypothesis, as the case may be. The Interim G Hypothesis is mostly preserved
except that now ContactSetr 6= LiveSet. This violation is corrected in the next step.
The next step resets ContactSet to include the process identifier of J only. This step
forces ContactSet to be identical in H and Hr. This step preserves the Interim Non-
G and the Convergent Hypotheses. If the Interim G Hypothesis applied at the start
of the constellation, now the non-G Hypothesis would apply, which is the appropriate
hypothesis for J .
All the following steps except the last one rather trivially preserve the appropriate Hy-
pothesis (either the Non-G Hypothesis or the Convergent Hypothesis).
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In the last step we call CheckFlush which by Corollary 9 preserves the inductive hy-
potheses. Moreover the same corollary guarantees that the side effects produced by
CheckFlush are equal, and therefore equivalent, to the observed side effects. Lemma 24
guarantees that the target set produced by the execution of CheckFlush for each side
effect, namely ContactSetr, is equal to the observed target set.
• Type of Constellation: The constellation is the critical GMS notification.
H Transactions: One execution of the protJoin procedure at each existing process. One
execution of the protRun procedure at G. G and D have identical states at the start of
the transaction.
Observed behavior in Hr: The transactions at all the processes, including G, are equiva-
lent to their counterparts in H with the exceptions that in Hr the trigger notification is
a removal notification rather than a join notification, and the donation packet queuing
event at non-G processes in H is missing in Hr.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: The surviving processes, including G, execute the protRemove
procedure.
Not surprisingly, this case is more subtle than the other cases. First, the processes
execute a different call in H and Hr. Second, the critical notification separates the pre-
critical period from the interim period. Therefore, when we argue that the constellation
preserves the inductive hypothesis, we are really saying that if the First and Second Pre-
Critical Hypotheses hold before the execution of the respective calls, then the Interim G
and Interim non-G Hypotheses hold after the execution.
There is one last complication. Every process that participates in the critical constel-
lation executes exactly one of three procedures. In Hr, every process executes the
protRemove procedure. In H , every process except G executes the protJoin procedure
while G executes the protRun procedure.
The fact that protRemove replaces protJoin at non-G processes explains the observed
absence of a queuing of donation packets at those processes in Hr.
Each of these calls ends with a call to CheckFlush, which is known to preserve all the
inductive hypotheses (see Corollary 9). Therefore in the following analysis we are going
to ignore the call to CheckFlush. We will show that the inductive hypothesis is preserved
if each process pauses just before executing this call. Then Corollary 9 together with
Lemma 24 will complete the argument.
Due to the fact that different code is executed in H and Hr we cannot use our usual
method of following the parallel execution step by step. Instead we prove this case one
state variable at a time. For each variable we show that if the pre-critical hypotheses
hold at the start of the execution, then the interim hypotheses (G and non-G) hold for
that variable at the point where CheckFlush is invoked.
cur view
Non-G case: Initially cur viewr = cur view according to the First Pre-Critical Hy-
pothesis. Both the protJoin and the protRemove procedures leave it unchanged, so
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it remains equal at the end of the constellation, as required by the Interim non-G
Hypothesis.
G case: Initially
cur viewr(G) = cur viewr(D)
according to the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis. At the same time
cur viewr(D) = cur view(D)
according to the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis, and
cur view(D) = cur view(G)
because G starts life with a state that is identical to the state of its parent (see 3.3).
Therefore
cur viewr(G) = cur view(G)
at the start of the constellation. Since the current view is not changed by any of the
three procedures, it remains equal at the end of the constellation, as required by the
Interim G Hypothesis.
Since this argument will come up repeatedly, we will refer to it as the sameness
argument.
v gap
Non-G case: Initially v gapr = v gap. Both the protJoin and the protRemove pro-
cedures increment the view gap, so it remains equal as required.
G case: Initially v gapr(G) = v gap(G) by the sameness argument. Both the protRun
and the protRemove procedures increment the view gap, so it remains equal as
required.
MSet
Non-G case: Initially MSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G}. Neither the protJoin procedure nor
the protRemove procedure change this variable, so the same relation continues to
hold at the end of the constellation, as required.
G case: InitiallyMSetr = MSet
⋃
{±G} as can be easily seen by a slight modification
of the sameness argument. Neither the protRun procedure nor the protRemove
procedure change this variable, so the same relation continues to hold at the end of
the constellation, as required.
PendViewQueue
Non-G case: Initially PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue. The protJoin procedure
appends a 〈JOIN, G〉 record to PendViewQueue, while the protRemove procedure
adds a 〈REMOVE, -G〉 record, which is exactly what is required by the Interim
non-G Hypothesis.
G case: Initially PendViewQueuer = PendViewQueue by the sameness argument.
The protRun procedure appends a 〈JOIN, G〉 record to PendViewQueue, while the
protRemove procedure adds a 〈REMOVE, -G〉 record to PendViewQueuer, which is
exactly what is required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
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LiveSet
Non-G case: Initially LiveSetr = LiveSet
⋃
{±G}. The protJoin procedure adds G
to LiveSet, while the protRemove procedure removes -G from LiveSetr, so LiveSetr
becomes equal to LiveSet as required by the Interim Non-G Hypothesis.
G case: Initially LiveSetr = LiveSet
⋃
{±G} as can be easily seen by a slight modi-
fication of the sameness argument. The protRun procedure adds G to LiveSet while
the protRemove procedure removes -G from LiveSetr, LiveSetr becomes equal to
LiveSet as required.
ContactSet
Non-G case: Initially ContactSetr = ContactSet
⋃
{±G}. The protJoin procedure
addsG to ContactSet, while the protRemove procedure removes -G from ContactSetr,
so ContactSetr becomes equal to ContactSet as required.
G case: It follows from Lemma 8(2) that initially ContactSetr = LiveSetr. The
protRemove procedure removes -G from both LiveSetr and ContactSetr, keeping
them equal.
We already know that at the end of the constellation LiveSetr = LiveSet and therefore
we end up with ContactSetr = LiveSet, as required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
vt[]
Non-G case: Initially vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}. Neither the protJoin pro-
cedure nor the protRemove procedure make changes to vt[], so the relation remains
the same, as required.
G case: Initially vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0} as can be easily seen by a slight
modification of the sameness argument. Neither the protRun procedure nor the
protRemove procedure make changes to vt[], so the relation remains the same, as
required.
ReplicatedData
Non-G case: Initially ReplicatedDatar = ReplicatedData. Neither the protJoin pro-
cedure nor the protRemove procedure invoke any of the user up-calls (see 2.3.3), so
the relation remains the same, as required.
G case: Initially ReplicatedDatar = ReplicatedData by the sameness argument. Nei-
ther the protRun procedure nor the protRemove procedure invoke any of the user
up-calls, so the relation remains the same, as required.
ReceiveSet
Non-G case: Initially ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet. Neither the protJoin procedure nor
the protRemove procedure make changes to ReceiveSet, so the relation remains the
same, as required.
G case: Initially ReceiveSetr ∼= ReceiveSet by the sameness argument. Neither the
protRun procedure nor the protRemove procedure make changes to ReceiveSet, so
the relation remains the same, as required.
FwdQueue[]
Non-G case: Initially FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
⋃
{[G] = ∅, [-G] = ∅}. In Hr the
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protRemove procedure forwards all the messages in FwdQueuer[-G] and removes it.
Since this queue is empty, the overall effect is simply the removal of the empty queue
without any side effects. In H the protJoin procedure adds an empty queue for G.
Therefore FwdQueuer becomes equivalent to FwdQueue as required.
G case: Initially FwdQueuer[] ∼= FwdQueue[]
⋃
{[G] = ∅, [-G] = ∅} by the sameness
argument. In Hr the protRemove removes the empty queue for -G without creating
any side effects. In H the protRun procedure adds an empty queue for G. Therefore
in this case as well the Interim G Hypothesis holds and no side effects are created.
WaitSet, which includes BcastWaitSet and FwdWaitSet
Non-G case: By the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis, the wait set contains equivalent
messages in Hr and H , with a slight difference in their instability sets. Namely
that whenever the instability in H has a D coordinate, the instability in Hr has ±G
coordinates in addition. These coordinates have the same f field as theD coordinate,
and a zero b field. In H , the protJoin procedure adds the exact same G instability
wherever a D instability exists, while in Hr the protRemove procedure removes the
-G instability. If a message becomes stable as a result the protRemove procedure
removes the message from WaitSet. This however cannot happen because the First
Pre-Critical Hypothesis guarantees that the -G instability is accompanied by G and
D instabilities. Therefore WaitSetr becomes equivalent to WaitSet as required by
the Interim Non-G Hypothesis.
G case: In this case we have to analyze the two parts of WaitSet separately.
We start with BcastWaitSet. By the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis BcastWaitSetr
starts out empty. The protRemove procedure does not change this fact, and there-
fore BcastWaitSetr ends up empty. On the other hand in H process G executes
the protRun procedure which empties BcastWaitSet. So both BcastWaitSetr and
BcastWaitSet end up empty and therefore equivalent, as required by the Interim G
Hypothesis.
The case of FwdWaitSet is more complicated. First we verify that FwdWaitSetr
and FwdWaitSet contain equivalent messages. Indeed it follows from the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis that at the start of the transaction FwdWaitSetr(G) and
FwdWaitSetr(D) contain the same messages. By the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis
FwdWaitSetr(D) and FwdWaitSet(D) contain equivalent messages. The protRemove
procedure does not remove any messages from FwdWaitSetr(G) because any message
in FwdWaitSetr(G) that has a -G instability also has D and G instabilities. On
the other hand FwdWaitSet(G) is initially equal to FwdWaitSet(D) and therefore
has messages equivalent to the ones in FwdWaitSetr(G). The protRun procedure
does not remove any messages from FwdWaitSet(G). Therefore at the end of the
constellation FwdWaitSetr(G) and FwdWaitSet(G) contain equivalent messages.
Let msg be any message in FwdWaitSet(D) at the critical moment. Suppose that
its record there is 〈msg, index, iset〉. By the Self Channel Axiom iset does not
contain any D instability and therefore it follows from the First Pre-Critical Hy-
pothesis that the record of msg in FwdWaitSetr(D) is equivalent. By the Sec-
ond Pre-Critical Hypothesis, the record of msg at FwdWaitSetr(G) is equivalent
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to 〈msg, {f = index.f, b = 0}, iset〉. The protRemove procedure does not change
this record since it does not contain -G instability and so this remains the record at
FwdWaitSetr(G) at the end of the constellation. The record of msg at FwdWaitSet(G)
starts out equal to the record at FwdWaitSet(D), and then the protRun procedure
zeroes out the index.b component of the record, leaving it equivalent to the final
value of the record at FwdWaitSetr(G), as required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
LaunchQueue
non-G case: Initially LaunchQueuer = LaunchQueue. Neither the protJoin procedure
nor the protRemove procedure make changes to LaunchQueue, so it remains the same,
as required.
G case: Initially inH processG inherits its launch queue fromD, while inHr process
G has an empty launch queue according to the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis.
The protRemove procedure does not change the value of LaunchQueuer while the
protRun procedure empties LaunchQueue. So LaunchQueuer becomes identical to
LaunchQueue as required.
ghost height and flush height
Non-G case: Initially ghost heightr = ghost height and flush heightr = flush height.
Neither the protJoin nor the protRemove procedures make changes to either value
(remember that we ignore the CheckFlush invocation at the end), so both values
remain the same, as required.
G case: Initially G inherits its state from D, so ghost height(G) = ghost height(D)
and flush height(G) = flush height(D). The Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis implies
that ghost heightr(G) = ghost heightr(D) and flush heightr(G) = ghost heightr(D).
Therefore initially ghost heightr(G) = ghost height(G). The protRemove procedure
does not make changes to either variable in Hr while the protRun procedure resets
the value of flush height to be equal to ghost height, therefore at the end of the
constellation:
flush height(G) = ghost height(G) = ghost heightr(G) =
= ghost heightr(D) = flush heightr(G)
as required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
mpkt out
Non-G case: Initially mpkt outr = mpkt out. The protJoin procedure does not
change this value in H , while the protRemove procedure increments mpkt outr.f for
each message in FwdQueue[-G]. Since that queue is empty, the value of mpkt outr
does not change either, and so it remains the same at the end of the constellation,
as required by the Interim Non-G Hypothesis.
G case: Initially mpkt outr.f = mpkt out.f by the sameness argument and it remains
so at the end of the constellation because neither the protRun procedure nor the
protRemove procedure change that value (in the latter case because FwdQueuer[-G]
is empty). Initially mpkt out.b(G) = mpkt out.b(D) while the Second Pre-Critical
Hypothesis implies that initially mpkt outr.b(G) = 0. The protRemove procedure
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does not change that value in Hr while the protRun procedure zeroes it in H .
Therefore mpkt outr.b(G) becomes equal to mpkt out.b(G).
As a result mpkt outr = mpkt out as required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
mpkt in[]
Non-G case: We start with the coordinates that exist in H . By the First Pre-Critical
Hypothesis, these coordinates have identical values in H and Hr. These coordinates
are not touched by either the protRemove procedure or the protJoin procedure, and
so they remain identical at the end of the constellation as required by the Interim
non-G Hypothesis.
The mpkt inr[-G] coordinate is removed by the protRemove procedure, leaving a G
coordinate whose value is
mpkt inr[G] = {f = mpkt inr[D].f ; b = 0}
according to the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis. The protJoin procedure creates a
new G coordinate whose value is
mpkt in[G] = {f = mpkt inr[D].f ; b = 0}
Since we have already seen that mpkt inr[D].f = mpkt in[D].f , the requirement of
the Interim non-G Hypothesis is met.
G case: Initially mpkt inr[](G) = mpkt inr[](D) according to the Second Pre-Critical
Hypothesis. The protRemove procedure removes the -G coordinate in both at G
and D and therefore at the end of the constellation the equality
mpkt inr[](G) = mpkt inr[](D)
remains valid.
On the other hand the initial relation in H is mpkt in[](G) = mpkt in[](D) because
G is created with the same state as D. The protJoin procedure creates a new G
coordinate at D with value
mpkt in[G](D) = {f = mpkt in[D].f(D); b = 0}
The protRun procedure creates a new G coordinate at G with value
mpkt in[G](G) = {f = mpkt out.f(G); b = 0}
The Self Channel Axiom and Lemma 9 guarantee that at the start of the constellation
mpkt in[D](D) = mpkt out(D). Since G starts out with the same state as D we also
have mpkt out.f(G) = mpkt out.f(D). Therefore mpkt in[G](G) = mpkt in[G](D)
and the vector as a whole remains identical at G and D.
From the Non-G case we know that mpkt inr[](D) = mpkt in[](D) at the end of
the constellation. It follows that mpkt inr[](G) = mpkt in[](G) at the end of the
constellation as required by the Interim G Hypothesis.
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ghost[] and flush[]
Non-G case: Initially, the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis implies that
ghostr[] = ghost[]
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D], [-G] = ghost[D]}
flushr[] = flush[]
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D], [-G] = ghost[D]}
The protRemove procedure removes the -G coordinate from both vectors in Hr.
The protJoin procedure creates a G coordinate in both vectors in H and sets both
of them to the value of ghost[D]. As a result ghostr[] and flushr[] become equal to
ghost[] and flush[] as required by the Interim non-G Hypothesis.
G case: Initially ghost[](G) = ghost[](D) and flush[](G) = flush[](D). By the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis ghostr[](G) = ghostr[](D) and flushr[](G) = flushr[](D).
Using the First Inductive Hypothesis relation between the H and Hr vectors in D
we conclude that
ghostr[](G) = ghost[](G)
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D](G), [-G] = ghost[D](G)}
flushr[](G) = flush[](G)
⋃
{[G] = ghost[D](G), [-G] = ghost[D](G)}
The protRemove procedure removes the -G coordinate from both vectors in Hr. In
G, the protRun procedure creates a G coordinate in both vectors and sets both of
them to ghost height(G). Since G starts out with the same state as D, we have
ghost height(G) = ghost height(D). It follows from the Self Channel Axiom and
Lemma 10 that at the start of the constellation ghost height(D) = ghost[D](D).
Therefore at the end of the constellation
ghostr[G](G) = ghost[D](G) = flushr[G](G)
ghost[G](G) = ghost height(G) = flush[G](G)
ghost[D](G) = ghost[D](D) = ghost height(D) = ghost height(G)
and therefore ghostr[](G) = ghost[](G) and flushr[](G) = flush[](G) as required by
the Interim G Hypothesis.
6.6.2 Message broadcast request constellations
• Type of Constellation: A message broadcast request dequeuing event at a process P . We
assume (see 2.3.3) that APP at a process P does not issue such a request before its Main()
function is executed in a separate thread.
H Transactions: An execution of the protBroadcast procedure at P .
Observed behavior in Hr: An equivalent transaction at P .
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: In Hr, process P executes the protBroadcast procedure, just
as it does in H . In the pre-critical case P 6= ±G. Also notice that AH
r
= AH (see 5.4.1)
and therefore ±G do not generate message broadcast requests pre-critically in Hr.
142
Since the message is not yet stamped we have an actual equality msgr = msg and not
just an equivalence.
We start by verifying that in the pre-critical case the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is
preserved when P = D. Processes ±G do not participate in the constellation in the pre-
critical case. It is easy to observe that the protBroadcast call does not change any state
variables other than LaunchQueue, BcastWaitSet and mpkt out.b. All of these variables
are stipulated by the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis to be equal to zero at ±G and so
we are done with this case.
To verify the other inductive hypotheses and verify the side effects, we follow the execu-
tion step by step.
In the first step, we check if v gap is zero. If it is not, we append the message to
LaunchQueue. By the relevant inductive hypothesis (either First Pre-Critical, Interim
non-G, Interim G or Convergent Hypothesis) v gapr = v gap and LaunchQueuer =
LaunchQueue. Since msgr = msg this step is executed identically in H and Hr and
preserves the hypotheses.
The next and final step is executed if v gap = 0. Notice that during the interim pe-
riod v gap > 0 and therefore for this step only the First Pre-Critical and Convergent
Hypotheses are relevant. This step contains the following sub-steps:
– The counter mpkt out.b is incremented. mpkt outr.b = mpkt out.b and therefore the
inductive hypotheses are preserved.
– The next few lines stamp the message. Here the inductive hypotheses requires that
the stamping be equivalent, rather than equal, in H and Hr. Since selfr = self and
cur viewr = cur view under all the hypotheses these parts of the stamp end up being
equal as required.
As for the message vector time, it is computed from the process vector time, and
is adjusted at the self coordinate. The Convergent Hypothesis is in force when
cur view ≥ vcrit (see 6.4) and it stipulates that all the variables in sight are equal in
H and Hr, resulting in vt′r[] = vt′[]. This matches the equivalence requirement (see
Definition 22).
The First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is in force when cur view < vcrit and it stipulates
that
vtr[] = vt[]
⋃
{[G] = 0, [-G] = 0}
The self coordinate of vt′ is adjusted by mpkt out.b−mpkt in[self].b. If P 6= G then
this adjustment is the same in H and Hr and does not affect the G coordinate. But
we already know that in the pre-critical case P 6= G, so the hypothesis is preserved
in this case.
– In the next step we queue the message multicast to all the members of ContactSet.
Therefore we have an equivalent side effect to the one in H as observed and Lemma
24 guarantees that the computed target set ContactSetr is equal to the observed
target set.
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– In the next and last steps, a record for the message is added to BcastWaitSet. In the
pre-critical case, the message is equivalent and
indexr = mpkt outr = mpkt out = index
isetr[X ].f =
{
mpkt inr[X ].f = mpkt in[X ].f = iset[X ].f if X 6= ±G
mpkt inr[±G].f = mpkt in[D].f = iset[D].f if X = ±G
isetr[X ].b =
{
mpkt inr[X ].b = mpkt in[X ].b = iset[X ].b if X 6= ±G
mpkt inr[±G].b = 0 if X = ±G
as required by the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis.
6.6.3 Message and acknowledgment packet constellations
• Type of Constellation: An acknowledgement packet, sent by a process Q in response to
an original broadcast of a message m, is received at the originating process P . Note
that neither G nor -G broadcast original messages during the pre-critical period or the
interim period, therefore we can assume P 6= ±G in these cases.
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveAck procedure at P .
Observed behavior in Hr: Post-critically, or when Q 6= D, there is a single transaction
at P with an equivalent trigger and equivalent side effects (see Definition 26). Pre-
critically when Q = D, there are three transactions at P , triggered, in that order, by
an acknowledgement packet from -G, G and D. The first two have no side effects. The
third one has side effects equivalent to the original transaction in H .
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: We divide the analysis into several cases:
– The constellation is post-critical.
– The constellation is pre-critical, with P,Q 6= D
– The constellation is pre-critical with Q 6= D and P = D
– The constellation is pre-critical, with Q = D and P 6= D
– The constellation is pre-critical with P = Q = D
In the first three cases, where the constellation is post-critical orQ 6= D, theHr execution
is a single invocation of ReceiveAck by P . Only in the third of these cases (when P = D)
is there anything to prove about Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis. We will ignore that
part for the moment and return to it later. We will deal with the remaining two cases
(where Q = D) later as well.
The Convergent case is not entirely trivial here because the trigger is equivalent but
perhaps not equal (pACK〈m
r〉 ∼= pACK〈m〉). In fact the trigger is equal but showing that
requires the History Equivalence Theorem so we will not rely on this fact and use a
weaker argument instead.
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To verify the preservation of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis, Interim non-G Hypothe-
sis, Interim G Hypothesis or Convergent Hypothesis, as the case may be, we go step by
step over the procedure.
It starts with a check for the existence of a record for m in WaitSet. The record is
guaranteed to be there but we have not proved that. However it does follow from the
First Pre-Critical and from the two Interim Hypotheses that the record is there in H if
and only if it is there in Hr.
The Convergent case is the tricky one here. We know that mr ∼= m. If m is pre-critical
then it follows from the Convergent Hypothesis that the record is not found in either H
or Hr. If m is post-critical then m = mr and the record is found in H if and only if it is
found in Hr. Therefore the same decision is made in both histories regardless of which
hypothesis is in force, and in the Convergent case if the record is found then the H and
Hr triggers are equal.
If the record is not found then the procedure call exits and we are done. With the check
successful, the call continues through the following steps:
– The Q entry is removed from the instability set of the message. In the pre-critical
caseQ 6= ±G , and the Q entry exists in bothH andHr as we have shown. Therefore
removing it in both histories preserves the inductive hypothesis.
– If the instability set becomes empty, the record is removed from WaitSet and the
CheckFlush procedure is called. In the post-critical case the instability vector is
identical and therefore either empty in both histories or non-empty in both. In the
pre-critical case, even though the instability sets are different, they are still empty
or non-empty together. Removing the record from WaitSet preserves the inductive
hypothesis and by Corollary 9, so does invoking CheckFlush. Moreover the same
corollary guarantees that the side effects produced by CheckFlush are equal, and
therefore equivalent, to the observed side effects. Lemma 24 guarantees that the
target set produced by the execution of CheckFlush for each side effect, namely
ContactSetr, is equal to the observed target set.
To verify the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis in the third case, notice that since the
message is original, any changes in its record in WaitSet only affect the BcastWaitSet
portion of WaitSet. Since the inductive hypothesis only requires that BcastWaitSet be
empty in ±G, it remains valid until the invocation of CheckFlush. In this case we cannot
rely on Corollary 9 because ±G do not participate in the constellation and therefore do
not execute CheckFlush. Instead we rely on Lemma 8.
If FwdWaitSetr(D) 6= ∅ when D calls CheckFlush, the procedure exists immediately
and we are done. If FwdWaitSetr(D) = ∅ then as we have seen this implies that
the set was empty since the beginning of the transaction. This in turn implies that
ghost heightr(D) = cur viewr(D) + v gapr(D). This follows from Lemma 8(9) in the
case v gapr(D) > 0. If v gapr(D) = 0 then Lemma 8(5) implies that flushr[D](D) =
cur viewr(D) + v gapr(D) and the equation follows from Lemma 8(8).
Since ghost heightr(D) = cur viewr(D) + v gapr(D) the CheckFlush procedure does not
produce a ghost side effect and as a result does not change the value of ghost heightr(D).
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Therefore the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis remains valid.
We are left with the two pre-critical cases where Q = D.
We start by verifying the preservation of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis. The execution
in Hr consists of three executions of ReceiveAck at P , triggered by the receipt of a packet
from -G, G and D respectively.
The first two executions remove the -G and G entries from the instability set, but do not
empty out the set because it still possesses a D entry. Since CheckFlush is not executed
this guarantees that the two executions have no side effects, as expected. However
the state at P is now in violation of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis because m has
instability at D without matching instabilities at ±G. The third execution restores the
hypothesis by removing D from the instability set. The remaining part of the third
execution preserves the inductive hypothesis and produces the expected side effects for
the exact same reasons as the previous cases that we already analyzed.
With regard to the preservation of the Second Pre-critical Hypothesis, it is only relevant
in the fifth case where P = D. Just as in the third case, the changes in WaitSet do
not affect the validity of the inductive hypothesis, and it continues to be valid until
the moment that D calls CheckFlush. Just as before, Lemma 8 guarantees that this
invocation does not produce a ghost broadcast and therefore preserves the Second Pre-
Critical Hypothesis.
• Type of Constellation: An acknowledgement packet, sent by a process Q in response to
the forwarding of a message m, is received at the forwarding process P , in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveAck procedure at P .
Observed behavior in Hr: There are a number of separate cases:
– Post-critically, or when P,Q 6= D, there is a single transaction at P with the same
trigger and side effects.
– Pre-critically when P = D and Q 6= D, there are three transactions at D, G and
-G respectively, all triggered by acknowledgement packets from Q for the same for-
warded message. The observed side effects at D are equal to the original side effects
in H . At ±G the side effects depend on the D side effects in the following way.
If there is a ghost broadcast out of D then there is a same height ghost broadcast
followed by a a same height flush broadcast out of ±G. If there is no ghost broadcast
out of D, then there are no side effects at ±G.
– Pre-critically when P 6= D and Q = D, there are three transactions at P , triggered,
in that order, by an acknowledgement packet from -G, G and D for the same for-
warded message. The first two have no side effects. The third one has the same side
effect as the original transaction in H .
– Pre-critically when P = Q = D, there are nine transactions in total, three each at
D, G and -G, triggered at each process, in that order, by acknowledgement packets
from -G, G and D, all for the same forwarded message. The first two transactions in
each process have no side effects. The third transaction at D has the side effects as
the original transaction at D. The third transaction at each of ±G has side effects
146
that depend on the original side effects at D in the same way as in the second case:
If there is a ghost broadcast out of D then there is a same height ghost broadcast
followed by a a same height flush broadcast out of ±G. If there is no ghost broadcast
out of D, then there are no side effects for the third transaction at ±G.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: As before we divide the analysis into the different cases:
– The constellation is post-critical.
– The constellation is pre-critical, with P,Q 6= D
– The constellation is pre-critical with Q 6= D and P = D
– The constellation is pre-critical, with Q = D and P 6= D
– The constellation is pre-critical with P = Q = D
The analysis of cases one, two and four is identical to the analysis of similar cases in the
case of an acknowledgement for an original message, and we will not repeat it here.
In the third case there are three executions of the ReceiveAck procedure, one execution at
each of D, G and -G. The analysis of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis proceeds exactly
like the analysis of this case for an original message acknowledgement. As for the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis, the record for the message in WaitSet is in the forwarding part
FwdWaitSet, which contains the same messages in ±G as it does in D. Moreover, for each
message it contains the same instability set. As a result the execution of the ReceiveAck
proceeds in the same way in all three of these processes and the Second Pre-Critical
Hypothesis is preserved. By Corollary 9, the invocation of CheckFlush produces side
effects that match the observed side effects and Lemma 24 guarantees that these side
effects have the observed target set.
In the fifth case there are three executions of the ReceiveAck procedure at each process,
triggered by the receipt of an acknowledgement packet from -G, G and D, in this order.
The analysis of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis proceeds exactly like the analysis of
this case for an original message acknowledgement. As for the Second Pre-Critical Hy-
pothesis, the record for the message m in WaitSet is in the forwarding part FwdWaitSet,
which contains the same messages in ±G as it does in D. Moreover, for each message
it contains the same instability set. As a result, all three executions of the ReceiveAck
proceed in the same way in all three of these processes. By Corollary 9, the invocation
of CheckFlush preserves the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis and produces side effects
that match the observed side effects and Lemma 24 guarantees that these side effects
have the observed target set. Therefore overall the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is
preserved and the side effects in ±G match the observed side effects.
• Type of Constellation: An original message packet containing message m is received at
process P in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveMessage procedure
at P .
Observed behavior in Hr: There are two cases
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– Post-critically, or when P 6= D, there is a single transaction at P with the same
trigger and side effect as the original transaction in H .
– Pre-critically, when P = D, there are three transactions, one each at D, G and -G,
with equivalent triggers and side effects as the original transaction in H .
Execution of CBCAST in Hr:
– In the post-critical and P 6= D cases, process P invokes the ReceiveMessage proce-
dure. The execution proceeds through the following steps:
First an acknowledgment is sent back to the sender. This ensures that the side effect
in Hr is the expected one.
The next step determines whether the message is original. Since the value of ORIG(m)
is equal in both histories, the determination resolves the same way in both histories,
and since the message is original in H it is deemed to be original in Hr as well. As
a result mpkt in[ORIG(m)].b is incremented.
In the pre-critical case ORIG(m) 6= ±G and therefore incrementing the counter pre-
serves the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis. In the post-critical case, thempkt in[] vector
is identical at H and Hr, thus preserving all the relevant hypotheses (Interim G,
Interim non-G and Convergent Hypotheses). The Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is
automatically preserved because neither D nor ±G participate in the constellation
in this case.
The next few steps check for duplicates. These checks rely on values, including
cur view , ReceiveSet, the ORIG(m) coordinate in vt and VT(m), that are all guaran-
teed by all the relevant inductive hypotheses to be identical or equivalent at H and
Hr. Therefore, the duplicate check yields the same results in both histories.
At this point a comment is due about the Convergent case. The trigger in this case
is equivalent (pMSG〈m
r〉 ∼= pMSG〈m〉) but not necessarily equal. Unlike the case of an
acknowledgement packet, a non-equal trigger may actually occur in the Convergent
period. For that to happen it must be that VIEW(m) < vcrit (see Definition 22).
Since P is convergent, cur view ≥ vcrit . This means that the message is obsolete.
Since labeled step 2 of the procedure discards obsolete messages and exits, there is
no contamination of the state with non-equal values and the inductive hypothesis
holds.
If the message is not a duplicate, the next and last steps are:
∗ The messagem is added to ReceiveSet. Since both the messagem and ReceiveSet
are equivalent in both histories, this step preserves the equivalence of ReceiveSet
and the inductive hypothesis.
∗ The message m is appended to the tail of the sender’s forwarding queue. In this
case as well FwdQueue[sender] is equivalent in H and Hr, and the step preserves
the equivalence and the relevant inductive hypothesis.
∗ The Scan procedure is invoked. We want to use Lemma 26 to prove that this
call preserves all the inductive hypotheses and has no side effects. But the
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lemma requires that the ApplyMessage up-call be identical at P in H and Hr.
According to 5.4.10 this is the case for P 6= G. This covers the pre-critical
case since P , as an H process, cannot be equal to G. In the post-critical case
the definition of ApplyMessager@G shows that it behaves, post-critically, like
ApplyMessage@G, and we are done.
– In the pre-critical case when P = D, all three processes D, G and -G invoke the
ReceiveMessage procedure. The verification of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis
proceeds in this case exactly as it does in the P 6= D case. As for the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis, we retrace the execution steps:
First an acknowledgment is sent back to the sender. This ensures that the side
effects at G and -G are the expected ones.
The next step determines whether the message is original. Since the value of ORIG(m)
is equal in all three processes, the determination resolves the same way in all three,
and since the message is original at D it is deemed to be original at ±G as well. As
a result mpkt in[ORIG(m)].b is incremented at all three processes.
Since the mpkt in[] vector is identical at all three processes, incrementing the counter
at the sender coordinate preserves the inductive hypothesis.
The next few steps check for duplicates. These checks rely on values, including
cur view , ReceiveSet, vt and VT(m), that are all guaranteed by the Second Pre-
Critical Hypothesis to be identical at all three processes. Therefore, the duplicate
check yields the same results in all three.
If the message is not a duplicate, the next and last steps are:
∗ The messagem is added to ReceiveSet. Since both the messagem and ReceiveSet
are identical in all three processes, this step preserves the Second Pre-Critical
Hypothesis.
∗ The message m is appended to the tail of the sender’s forwarding queue. In this
case as well FwdQueue[] is identical in all three processes and the Hypothesis is
preserved.
∗ The Scan procedure is invoked. The ApplyMessager@G up-call behaves, pre-
critically, like ApplyMessage@D, which in turn behaves like ApplyMessager@D
(see 5.4.10). Therefore ApplyMessage behaves the same way in D and in ±G
during the pre-critical period so it follows from Lemma 26 that this call preserves
all the inductive hypotheses and has no side effects.
• Type of Constellation: A message packet containing a forwarded message m is received at
process P from process Q in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveMessage procedure
at P .
Observed behavior in Hr: There are several cases:
– Post-critically, or when P,Q 6= D, there is a single transaction at P with an equiv-
alent trigger and side effect as the original transaction in H .
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– Pre-critically, when P = D and Q 6= D, there are three transactions, one each at D,
G and -G, with triggers and side effects equivalent to the original transaction in H .
– Pre-critically, when P 6= D and Q = D, there are three transactions at P , triggered
by the receipt of a message packet from D, -G, and G, in that order, each with the
side effect of an acknowledgement packet being sent to the respective sender. Each
transaction is equivalent to the original one in H .
– Pre-critically, when P = Q = D, there are nine transactions, three each at D, G and
-G, triggered by the receipt of a message packet from D, -G and G, in that order,
each with the side effect of an acknowledgement packet being send to the respective
sender. Each transaction is equivalent to the original one in H .
Execution of CBCAST in Hr:
– The first two cases proceed just like the equivalent cases of an original message
packet, except that the message counter is incremented at the .f coordinate rather
than the .b coordinate.
– In the pre-critical case where P 6= D and Q = D, the processes D and ±G do not
participate in the constellation and therefore the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is
automatically preserved. The process P executes the ReceiveMessage three times.
First it executes the call for the message that it receives from D, and then for the
same message being received from -G and G. The first execution proceeds in parallel
with the original execution in historyH . The analysis of this first execution proceeds
in almost the same way as the analysis of the receipt of an original message does.
There is an important difference, however. When mpkt in[D].f is incremented the
First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is violated because mpkt in[±G].f is not incremented
at the same time. This violation does not, however, affect the rest of the analysis,
and remains an isolated violation. This includes the invocation of the Scan procedure
since Lemma 26 does not require this particular part of the inductive hypothesis.
The subsequent two executions proceed through the following steps:
First, an acknowledgement packet is sent to the respective sender, generating the
expected side effect.
The next step increments the forwarded message counter (mpkt in[-G].f in the second
execution and mpkt in[G].f in the third execution). These steps remove the violation
of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis.
The next steps check for duplicates. These steps cause the call to exit in both
executions because the message is obviously a duplicate - it was already placed in
ReceiveSet and possibly even delivered by the first call.
– In the pre-critical case when P = Q = D, each of the processes D, G and -G
execute the ReceiveMessage three times. First for the message that each receives
from D and then for the same message that each receives from -G and then from
G. The analysis of the state at D in H and Hr proceeds exactly as in the previous
case, where P 6= D and Q = D, proving that the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is
preserved in this case. All we have to show is that the three executions at G and
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at -G result in the preservation of the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis. This part of
the analysis is just a recap of previous cases. The analysis of the first execution at
all three processes (where the message is received from D) proceeds exactly like the
same part of the analysis of the case of an original message that is received at D.
The next two executions proceed identically at D and at G and -G, resulting in a
determination that the message is a duplicate.
6.6.4 Ghost and flush packet constellations
• Type of Constellation: A ghost packet of height v is received at a process P from a process
Q in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveGhost procedure at
process P and no side effects.
Observed behavior in Hr: There are several cases:
– Post-critically, or when P,Q 6= D, there is a single transaction at P with the same
trigger and no side effects.
– Pre-critically, when P = D and Q 6= D, there are three transactions, one each at D,
G and -G, each with the same trigger and no side effects.
– Pre-critically, when P 6= D and Q = D, there are five transactions at P , triggered by
the receipt of identical ghost packets of the same height from -G and then G, followed
by flush packets of the same height from -G and then G and finally a ghost packet
of the same height from D. This order is induced from the adjustment coordinate
of the labels of the triggers. None of these transactions have any side effects.
– Pre-critically, when P = Q = D, there are fifteen transactions, five each at D, G
and -G, triggered at each process by the receipt of two ghost packets of the same
height from -G and then G, followed by flush packets of the same height from -G
and then G and finally a ghost packet of the same height from D. None of these
transactions have any side effects.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr:
– In the post-critical case P executes the ReceiveGhost procedure which results in
raising ghost[Q] to v in both H and Hr. This preserves the relevant one among the
Interim non-G, Interim G and Convergent Hypotheses, because all of them stipulate
that the ghost[] vector is equal in H and Hr. The procedure does not generate any
side effects, which matches the observed lack of side effects in Hr.
– In the pre-critical case where P,Q 6= D, process P executes the ReceiveGhost pro-
cedure which results in raising ghost[Q] to v in both H and Hr. This preserves
the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis because P 6= D and so no changes occur to the
states of either D, G or -G. To see that the First Pre-Critical Inductive Hypothesis
is preserved observe that Q 6= ±G because Q exists in H and ±G do not, and since
Q 6= D by assumption, neither ghost[±G] nor ghost[D] is affected. The procedure
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does not generate any side effects, which matches the observed lack of side effects in
Hr.
– In the pre-critical case when P = D and Q 6= D, the three processes D, G and -G
each execute the ReceiveGhost procedure, which raises the ghost[Q] level in each
process to v. In this case the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is preserved because
this hypothesis stipulates that ghost[] is equal in all three processes, and they all
perform the same change. The First Pre-Critical Hypothesis is preserved for the
same reason as in the previous case. The procedure does not generate any side
effects, which matches the observed lack of side effects in Hr.
– In the pre-critical case when P 6= D and Q = D, the process P executes the
ReceiveGhost procedure twice, once for each ghost packet trigger from -G and G,
then the ReceiveFlush procedure twice, once for each flush packet trigger from -G
and G, and finally the ReceiveGhost procedure once more for the ghost packet
trigger from D. Since D and ±G do not participate in the constellation, the Second
Pre-Critical Hypothesis is automatically preserved. At P , the five calls raise the
values of ghost[-G], ghost[G], flush[-G], flush[G] and ghost[D] to v. This conforms
with the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis. In addition, the calls to ReceiveFlush cause
TryToInstall to be invoked.
By the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis the value of v gap is the same at P in H and
Hr at the start of the constellation.
If v gap = 0 at the start of the constellation then by Lemma 8(10) LaunchQueue = ∅
at P . The first block of TryToInstall does nothing, and the execution of the call
skips to the second and last block, where the messages in LaunchQueue are broadcast.
Since LaunchQueue is empty the first execution of TryToInstall has no side effects and
does not change the process state. The second execution of TryToInstall encounters
the same values of v gap and LaunchQueue as the first execution, and therefore it
also does nothing. As a result the whole constellation preserves both pre-inductive
hypotheses and produces the observed lack of side effects in Hr.
The case where v gap > 0 is more subtle. First, it follows from the Piggyback Axiom
in H that v ≤ cur view+ v gap.
By Lemma 10 at the start of the constellation at P in H , ghost[D] < v
Furthermore it follows from Lemma 8(5) that at the start of the constellation we
have at P , in H :
flush[D] ≤ ghost[D] < v ≤ cur view+ v gap
The First Pre-Critical Hypothesis insures that both inequalities true in Hr as well.
The constellation does not change the value of flush[D], because it does not include
the receipt of a flush packet from D. Therefore the test loop at labeled step 1 of
TryToInstall fails and the call exits without changing the process state and without
any side effects. As a result the same happens in the second call to TryToInstall,
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and the constellation as a whole preserves the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis and
conforms with the observed behavior of Hr.
– In the pre-critical case when P = D and Q = D, the process D executes the
ReceiveGhost procedure twice, once for each ghost packet trigger from -G and G,
then the ReceiveFlush procedure twice, once for each flush packet trigger from -G
and G, and finally the ReceiveGhost procedure once more for the ghost packet trigger
from D. The exact same thing happens at G and -G, for a grand total of fifteen
function calls.
The exact same analysis as in the previous case proves that the First Pre-Critical
Hypothesis is preserved with respect to D, and that the resulting side effects in D
conform with the observed behavior in Hr (namely, no side effects).
As for the execution at ±G in Hr, the Second Pre-critical Hypothesis insures that
±G have the same values of ghost[], flush[] and v gap as D. Therefore the execution
of the constellation in ±G proceeds in the exact same way as in D, with the same
changes to the state and the same lack of side effects.
• Type of Constellation: A flush packet of height v is received at a process P from a process
Q in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveFlush procedure at
process P .
Observed behavior in Hr: There are two cases:
– Post-critically, or when P 6= D, there is a single transaction at P with the same
trigger and equivalent side effects.
– Pre-critically, when P = D, there are three transactions at D, G and -G, each
triggered by an identical flush packet from Q, and with the side effects at D being
equivalent to the ones of the original transaction in H , and with the transactions in
G and -G having no side effects.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr:
– Post-critically, or when P 6= D, the process P executes the ReceiveFlush procedure
in Hr.
The first step in this call increments the value of flush[Q]. Post-critically, this step
obviously preserves the InterimG, Interim non-G and Convergent Hypotheses, where
relevant. Pre-critically, the Second Pre-Critical Hypothesis is preserved because
P 6= D and so no changes occur at either D, G or -G. To see why the First Pre-
Critical Hypothesis is preserved, notice first that in the pre-critical case Q 6= ±G
because Q exists in H and ±G do not, which is why the flush[±G] coordinates are
not affected in Hr. Notice also that the value of ghost[D] is not affected in H . Taken
together, these two observations explain why the hypothesis is preserved by the first
step in this case.
The next and last step the procedure invokes the TryToInstall procedure. By Lemma
29 the TryToInstall call preserves the inductive hypothesis in this case and generates
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equivalent side effects. It follows from Lemma 24 that the side effects have the
observed target set.
– In the pre-critical case when P = D, the analysis of the First Pre-Critical Hypothesis
is identical to the analysis of the previous case. For the Second Pre-Critical Hypoth-
esis, there are three transactions in Hr, at D, G and -G, each one executing the
ReceiveFlush procedure. This call increments the value of flush[Q], which preserves
the inductive hypothesis since flush[] is identical in all three processes this case.
In the second and last step the invocation of TryToInstall preserves the inductive
hypothesis and generates the expected side effects according to Lemma 30.
6.6.5 Donation and co-donation packet constellations
• Type of Constellation: A non-critical donation packet is received at a process J from a
process P in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveDonation procedure
at process J .
Observed behavior in Hr: A single Hr transaction at J that is equivalent to the original
H transaction.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: The process J executes the ReceiveDonation procedure in Hr.
Notice that since the donation is not critical then by definition J 6= G. Also by definition,
donation packets are only sent post-critically. Therefore the only two possible operative
inductive hypotheses are the Interim non-G Hypothesis or the Convergent Hypothesis.
The ReceiveDonation call starts with J adding P to ContactSet. According to either the
Interim Non-G Hypothesis or by the Convergent Hypothesis ContactSetr = ContactSet
and so the first step preserves the inductive hypothesis.
In the next two steps, J sends a co-donation to P in both histories. The contents of
co donation are made up of state variables that are equivalent in H and Hr regardless
of whether the Interim non-G or the Convergent Hypothesis is in force. Therefore this
side effect is equivalent in both histories.
The next few steps construct the ordered set UNT. It follows from the two Hypotheses
and from the fact that donationr ∼= donation that UNTr ∼= UNT, since all the ingredients
used in the construction of this set are equivalent in both histories. In addition the same
hypotheses imply that mpkt inr[] = mpkt in[] and therefore the subsequent loop on the
members of UNT invokes the same procedures (either ReceiveMessage or ReceiveAck) in
the same order, and with equivalent parameters.
To see that the ReceiveMessage call preserves the inductive hypotheses and generates
equivalent side effects, simply follow the reasoning earlier in this proof for the case of
a constellation that is triggered by the post-critical receipt of an original message. To
see that the ReceiveAck call preserves the inductive hypotheses and generates equivalent
side effects, follow the reasoning earlier of this proof for case of a constellation that is
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triggered by the post-critical receipt of an acknowledgement in response to an original
message.
The last two steps of the call update ghost[P ] and flush[P ] at J from the donated values
of ghost height and flush height, respectively. The fact that donationr ∼= donation guar-
antees that the latter two values are the same in H and Hr. As a result ghost[P ] and
flush[P ] remain identical in H and Hr as required by both the Interim non-G and the
Convergent Hypotheses.
• Type of Constellation: A non-critical co-donation packet is received at a process P from
a process J in H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveCoDonation proce-
dure at process P .
Observed behavior in Hr: A single Hr transaction at P that is equivalent to the original
H transaction.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: The process P executes the ReceiveCoDonation procedure in
Hr. By definition, co-donation packets are only sent post-critically. However it is possible
that P = G. Therefore the possible operative inductive hypotheses are the Interim non-G
Hypothesis, Interim G Hypothesis or the Convergent Hypothesis.
The ReceiveCoDonation call begins with constructing the ordered set UNT. It follows
from the three Hypotheses and from the fact that co donationr ∼= co donation that
UNTr ∼= UNT, since all the ingredients used in the construction of this set are equivalent
in both histories. In addition the same hypotheses imply that mpkt inr[] = mpkt in[] and
therefore the subsequent loop on the members of UNT invokes the same procedures (ei-
ther ReceiveMessage or ReceiveAck) in the same order, and with equivalent parameters.
To see that the ReceiveMessage call preserves the inductive hypotheses and generates
equivalent side effects, simply follow the reasoning earlier in this proof for the case of
a constellation that is triggered by the post-critical receipt of an original message. To
see that the ReceiveAck call preserves the inductive hypotheses and generates equivalent
side effects, follow the reasoning earlier of this proof for case of a constellation that is
triggered by the post-critical receipt of an acknowledgement in response to an original
message.
The next two steps of the call update ghost[J ] and flush[J ] at P from the co-donated
values of ghost height and flush height, respectively.
The fact that co donationr ∼= co donation guarantees that the latter two values are the
same in H and Hr. As a result ghost[J ] and flush[J ] remain identical in H and Hr as
required by the three Hypotheses.
In the last step the TryToInstall procedure is invoked. By Lemma 29, this call preserves
the inductive hypotheses and generates equivalent side effects. It follows from Lemma
24 that the side effects have the correct target set, namely ContactSetr.
• Type of Constellation: A critical donation packet is received at G from a process P in H .
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H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveDonation procedure
at process G.
Observed behavior in Hr: The original trigger (the receipt of a donation packet) disap-
pears, since we removed that packet in Hr. The queuing of the co-donation packet also
disappears, because the co-donation packet is removed as well. What remains are the
side effects of all the sub-transactions, and in addition there is a new trigger event for
each untimely packet in the
−−→
PD channel, with the exception of the acknowledgement
packets for original messages, since these packets do not get cloned. The new triggers
and the existing side effects line up perfectly. By Corollary 6 there is an order preserving
one-to-one correspondence between the sub-transactions and the untimely message pack-
ets and forwarded acknowledgement packet in the
−−→
PD channel. We carefully labeled the
side effects and the new triggers so that they pair up according to that correspondence
to make complete transactions. In addition, there are untimely ghost and flush packets
in the
−−→
PD channel whose clones give rise to additional triggers for which there are no
corresponding sub-transactions in H . This is not a problem, these naked triggers simply
represent transactions that do not have side effects. Our only burden is to prove that
if Hr executes the CBCAST algorithm, then these ghost and flush triggers will indeed
produce no side effects and preserve the inductive hypotheses.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: The critical donation packet is the first post-critical packet
from P thatG processes inH . We carefully labeled the untimely packets in
−−→
PGH
r
so that
they are all processed within the critical donation constellation. Therefore in Hr process
G does not process any packets from P in the interval between the critical constellation
and the P -donation constellation. As a result at the start of the constellation we have
in Hr, according to Lemma 8(7, 8 and 1)
ghost[P ](G) = ghost[P ]
G@ℓvcrit ≤ ghost heightP@ℓvcrit =
= (cur view+ v gap)P@ℓvcrit
< vcrit
flush[P ](G) = flush[P ]
G@ℓvcrit ≤ flush heightP@ℓvcrit =
= (cur view+ v gap)P@ℓvcrit
< vcrit
Therefore when the P -donation constellation starts, the value of flush[P ] at G is too low
for G to have already installed view vcrit. Therefore G is still in its interim period (see
6.2), and therefore the operating inductive hypothesis is the Interim G Hypothesis.
All processG does inHr is process all the clones of untimely packets in
−−→
PD. InH , process
G executes the ReceiveDonation procedure. This means that it adds P to ContactSet,
then queues a co-donation to P , and only then proceeds to process a similar sequence of
packets, with the ghosts and flushes excluded. The addition of P to ContactSet does not
violate the Interim G Hypothesis. The fact that a co-donation is queued in H but not
in Hr is what we expect since we explicitly removed the critical donation packets from
Hr.
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So before either history processes the first untimely packet the Interim G Hypothesis still
holds and the side effects meet our expectations. We have to show that the Donation
Sub-Hypothesis also holds at this point. We have already shown that the values of
ghost[P ] and flush[P ] at G are no higher than the critical values of ghost height and
flush height, respectively, at P . This proves that the Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds at
that point.
We are going to show, by induction, that up to the ith untimely clone the history Hr
looks like an execution of CBCAST and the Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds. This means
that we assume that in Hr, process G has processed all the clones of untimely packets
in channel
−−→
PD up to, but not including the ith clone. We assume that in H , process
G has executed all the sub-transactions that correspond to the same clones, excluding
the ghost and flush clones which do not have corresponding sub-transactions. We also
assume that at that point the Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds. Let us look now at the
ith clone. What does G do with it in H and Hr? We look at each case separately.
– The clone is a message packet. In this case G invokes the ReceiveMessage
procedure in both histories. The message can be either original or forwarded. We
have already analyzed similar cases earlier in the proof (post-critical message receipt)
and showed that in both cases the Interim G Hypothesis is preserved. Since the
Donation Sub-Hypothesis only differs from the Interim G Hypothesis with respect
to variables that are not used by the ReceiveMessage procedure, the same analysis
holds without change in this case as well.
– The clone is an acknowledgement packet. In this caseG invokes the ReceiveAck
procedure in both histories. The packet has to be in response to a forwarded message.
We have already analyzed a similar case earlier in the proof (post-critical receipt of
a forwarded acknowledgement packet) and showed that the Interim G Hypothesis
is preserved. Since the Donation Sub-Hypothesis only differs from the Interim G
Hypothesis with respect to variables that are not used by the ReceiveAck procedure,
the same analysis holds without change in this case as well.
– The clone is a ghost packet. In this case G invokes the ReceiveGhost procedure
in Hr, but there is no corresponding action in H . The procedure produces no side
effects, which is what we would expect (since G does not do anything at all inH), but
it does increase ghost[P ]. This deviation is allowed by the Donation Sub-Hypothesis,
as long as the value ghost[P ] does not exceed the critical value of ghost height at P .
This is guaranteed by Lemma 10, since the packet being processed is untimely and
therefore queued by P pre-critically.
– The clone is a flush packet. This case is argued similarly to the ghost case as far
as state is concerned. However a flush packet may cause side effects. Since G does
nothing in H , there must not be any side effects in Hr. For there to be any side
effects in Hr the flush value must be high, i.e. it must be equal to cur view+ v gap.
But this is impossible since Lemma 10 guarantees that the flush value is at most the
critical value of flush height at P , and Lemma 8 guarantees that the latter value is
lower than vcrit , while the current value of cur view+ v gap at G is at least vcrit .
We have established that once the process G is done processing all the sub-transactions
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(in H) and all the untimely packets (in Hr), the Donation Sub-Hypothesis still holds.
This is the end of the constellation in Hr. What are the values of ghost[P ] and flush[P ]
at G in this history? Since all the untimely packets are now processed, it follows
from Lemma 10 that these values are equal to the critical values of ghost height and
flush height, respectively, at P .
The donation transaction is not yet over in H , however. As the last step in the
ReceiveDonation procedure, G updates its values for ghost[P ] and flush[P ] from the do-
nated values of ghost height and flush height that it receives as a donation from P . Since
the P donation reflects its critical state, this last step restores the Interim G Hypothesis
and we are done.
• Type of Constellation: A critical co-donation packet is received at a process P from G in
H .
H Transactions: A single transaction, with an execution of the ReceiveCoDonation proce-
dure at process P .
Observed behavior in Hr: Like the case of a critical donation, the observed behavior of a
critical co-donation constellation in Hr is made up of triggers and sub-transaction side
effects that line up perfectly:
– Side effects of the co-donation transaction in H that carry over to Hr.
– Trigger events, made up of the processing events of cloned and zombied packets:
∗ A trigger for each clone and zombie of an untimely packet in the
−−→
DP channel.
Original message packets and flush packets do not get cloned on this channel,
so they have no corresponding triggers. Ghost packets get both cloned and
zombied, so each of these packets have two corresponding triggers.
∗ A trigger for each clone of a post-critical, pre-P -donation packet in the
−−→
GG
channel. Acknowledgement packets on this channel do not get cloned, so they
do not have a corresponding trigger.
According to Lemma 15, if the invocation of the TryToInstall procedure at the end of
the ReceiveCoDonation procedure installs the pending views, then UNT is empty and
there are no sub-transactions. According to Corollary 7, whatever sub-transactions do
exist line up perfectly with the Hr triggers for message and acknowledgement packets.
According to Lemma 20 the side effects of TryToInstall line up with a final, post-critical
cloned flush packet trigger.
Therefore, if TryToInstall does not install pending views, then all the ghost and flush
triggers produce no side effects. If TryToInstall does install the pending views, then
there are no triggers other than ghost and flush triggers, and none of them produces
any side effects except possibly the last one. Our challenge is to prove that the CBCAST
protocol produces exactly those side effects while preserving the inductive hypothesis.
Execution of CBCAST in Hr: When G receives the critical donation packet from P , it adds
P to its ContactSet and queues the critical co-donation packet to P . Prior to receiving
the donation, P is not in G’s ContactSet (see Lemma 8(2)) and therefore it does not
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queue any packets to P . As a result, the co-donation packet is the first packet that P
receives from G in H . Therefore the value of ghost[G] and flush[G] at P remains equal
to the original value that P sets when it executes the critical invocation of protJoin.
ghost[G]P@Crit(G→P ) = flush[G]P@Crit(G→P ) = ghost[D]P@ℓvcrit
≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
Where the last inequality follows from Lemma 8(7). We also know from Lemma 8 that
ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
< vcrit and therefore P does not have a sufficient value of flush[G]
at the start of the constellation to allow for the installation of view vcrit . As a result
the operating inductive hypothesis at the onset of the constellation is the Interim non-G
Hypothesis, and from the inequality above it follows that the First Co-Donation Sub-
Hypothesis holds as well.
To complete the proof for this constellation, we first use induction to show that the First
Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds, and the expected side effects occur, up to the last
untimely clone or zombie. Then we use a second induction to deal with the post-critical
clones and the TryToInstall side effects.
We start by showing that up to the ith untimely clone the history Hr looks like an
execution of CBCAST and the First Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds. This means that
we assume that in Hr, process P has processed all the clones and zombies of untimely
packets in channel
−−→
DP up to, but not including the ith clone or zombie. We assume
that in H , process P has executed all the sub-transactions that correspond to the same
clones and zombies, excluding the ghost clones and flush zombies which do not have
corresponding sub-transactions. Let us look now at the ith clone or zombie. What does
P do with it in H and Hr? We look at each case individually.
– The clone is a message packet. In this case P invokes the ReceiveMessage
procedure in both histories. The packet has to be a forwarded message packet. We
have already analyzed similar cases earlier in the proof (post-critical message receipt)
and showed that in both cases the Interim Non-G Hypothesis is preserved. Since the
First Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis only differs from the Interim Non-G Hypothesis
with respect to variables that are not used by the ReceiveMessage procedure, the
same analysis holds without change in this case as well.
– The clone is an acknowledgement packet. In this case P invokes the ReceiveAck
procedure in both histories. We have already analyzed a similar case earlier in the
proof (post-critical receipt of a forwarded acknowledgement packet) and showed
that the Interim Non-G Hypothesis is preserved. Since the First Co-Donation Sub-
Hypothesis only differs from the Interim Non-G Hypothesis with respect to variables
that are not used by the ReceiveAck procedure, the same analysis holds without
change in this case as well.
– The clone is a ghost packet. In this case P invokes the ReceiveGhost procedure
in Hr, but there is no parallel action in H . The procedure produces no side effects,
which is what we would expect (since P does not do anything at all in H), but it
does increase ghostr[G]. This deviation is allowed by the First Co-Donation Sub-
Hypothesis, as long as the value ghostr[G] does not exceed ghost heightD@ℓvcrit . This
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is guaranteed by Lemmas 10 and 8, since the packet being processed is untimely and
therefore queued by D pre-critically.
– The zombie is a flush packet. This case is argued similarly to the ghost case as
far as state is concerned with the additional fact that
flush heightD@ℓvcrit
≤ ghost heightD@ℓvcrit < vcrit
which follows Lemma 8. The inequality implies that in Hr the value of flush[G]
remains low and as a result there are no side effects. This is what we expect since
P does nothing in H and therefore does not produce side effects there.
We have established that once the process P is done processing all the pre-critical sub-
transactions (in H) and all the untimely packets (in Hr), the First Co-Donation Sub-
Hypothesis still holds and all the side effects are as expected. At this point in Hr the
process P has already processed the last pre-critical ghost and flush packets from G.
Therefore by Lemma 10
ghostr[G] = ghost heightrG@ℓvcrit = ghost height
r
D@ℓvcrit
= ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
flushr[G] = flush heightrG@ℓvcrit = ghost height
r
D@ℓvcrit
= ghost heightD@ℓvcrit
Where the two rightmost equalities in each line follow from the Second Pre-Critical and
First Pre-Critical Hypotheses, respectively. We also know that
ghost heightrG@ℓvcrit
≤ ghost heightrG@Crit(P→G) = ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
To see why the left inequality is true, notice that Crit(P → G) ≺˙Crit(G → P ) (this is
mediated by the critical co-donation packet) and therefore we can assume by induction
that G executes CBCAST up to constellation Crit(P → G). Now the inequality follows
from the fact that ghost height is monotone increasing and ℓvcrit ≺˙Crit(P → G). The
right equality follows from the Interim G Hypothesis.
Taken together these relations prove that the Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis now
holds.
We divide the rest of the analysis into two parts. First, assume that the TryToInstall
invocation at the end of the ReceiveCoDonation procedure fails to install the pending
views.
We will show that up to the ith post-critical clone the history Hr looks like an execution
of CBCAST and the Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds. This means that we
assume that in Hr, process P has processed all the clones of post-critical packets in
channel
−−→
GG up to, but not including the ith clone. We assume that in H , process P
has executed all the sub-transactions that correspond to the same clones, excluding the
ghost and flush which do not have corresponding sub-transactions. Let us look now at
the ith clone. What does P do with it in H and Hr? We look at each case individually.
– The clone is a message packet. In this case P invokes the ReceiveMessage
procedure in both histories. We have already analyzed similar cases earlier in the
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proof (post-critical message receipt) and showed that in both cases the Interim Non-
G Hypothesis is preserved. Since the Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis only
differs from the Interim Non-G Hypothesis with respect to variables that are not
used by the ReceiveMessage procedure, the same analysis holds without change in
this case as well.
– The clone is an acknowledgement packet. This case does not occur since
post-critical acknowledgement packets do not get cloned.
– The clone is a ghost packet. In this case P invokes the ReceiveGhost procedure
in Hr, but there is no parallel action in H . The procedure produces no side effects,
which is what we would expect (since P does not do anything at all in H), but it
does increment ghostr[G]. This deviation is allowed by the Second Co-Donation Sub-
Hypothesis, as long as the value ghostr[G] does not exceed ghost heightG@Crit(P→G).
This is guaranteed by Lemma 10, since the packet being processed is queued by G
before Crit(P → G).
– The clone is a flush packet4. This case is argued similarly to the ghost case as
far as state is concerned with the additional fact that
flush heightG@Crit(P→G) ≤ ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
which follows from Lemma 8(8). However a flush packet may cause side effects.
Since P does nothing in H , there must not be any side effects in Hr.
Suppose that the flush packet does have side effects. For this to happen, the
TryToInstall invocation in ReceiveFlush must install the pending views. To do that
it is required that for every Q ∈ LiveSetr we have flushr[Q] = cur viewr + v gapr.
Since the Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis holds, we know that
LiveSetr = LiveSet
cur viewr = cur view
v gapr = v gap
flushr[Q] = flush[Q] for all Q ∈ LiveSet \ {G}
Therefore in H , for any live Q 6= G we have flush[Q] = cur view+ v gap
Since the flush packet had side effects in Hr we know that the packet was pFLUSH〈v〉
with v = cur view + v gap. Since the original packet was queued by G before it
processed the donation from P it follows that
v ≤ flush heightG@Crit(P→G)
In H , right before calling TryToInstall in ReceiveCoDonation, process P updates its
value of flush[G], setting it to
flush[G](P ) = co donation.flush height = flush heightG@Crit(P→G) ≥
≥ v = cur view+ v gap
4Untimely flushes in
−→
GP are zombies, but post-critical flushes are clones
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It follows that the invocation of TryToInstall in the ReceiveCoDonation procedure
does succeed in installing the pending views in H , contrary to our assumptions.
We have established that once the process P is done processing all the post-critical sub-
transactions (in H) and all the post-critical packets (in Hr), the Second Co-Donation
Sub-Hypothesis still holds and all the side effects are as expected.
At this point in H process P proceeds to update its values of ghost[G] and flush[G]:
ghost[G] = co donation.ghost height = ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
flush[G] = co donation.flush height = flush heightG@Crit(P→G)
In Hr, P has processed all the post-critical clones, including the last of the post-critical
ghost and flush packets from G. It follows from Lemma 10 that at this point
ghostr[G] = ghost heightG@Crit(P→G)
flushr[G] = flush heightG@Crit(P→G)
Therefore ghostr[G] = ghost[G] and flushr[G] = flush[G] and the Interim Non-G Hypoth-
esis is restored. The last step in H is an invocation of the TryToInstall procedure, that
by assumption fails to install the pending views. Therefore it produces no side effects
and does not change any state variables.
We are finally left with the case where TryToInstall does succeed in installing the pending
views. It follows from Lemma 15 that in this case UNT is empty and no sub-transactions
are executed in H . In addition Lemma 20 shows that the last regular packet queued by
G prior to processing the donation from P is klast = pFLUSH〈v〉 with v = cur view+v gap.
It follows that the only post-critical clones in Hr are ghost and flush packets, and their
processing, up to k, causes only allowable state changes and generates no side effects
(this is shown in exactly the same way as in the previous case, where TryToInstall does
not install pending views).
So at last we are at the point where in H process P is about to update its ghost[G]
and flush[G] values and invoke TryToInstall, which is going to succeed in installing the
pending views. In Hr process P is about to process k = pFLUSH〈v〉, the last cloned packet
from G. The Second Co-Donation Sub-Hypothesis still holds.
Since TryToInstall succeeds in installing the pending views, it follows that in H , after P
updates flush[G] we have flush[G] = cur view+ v gap. Therefore
v = cur view+ v gap = co donation.flush height = flush heightG@Crit(P→G)
By Lemma 8 we have
cur view+ v gap ≥ co donation.ghost height = ghost heightG@Crit(P→G) ≥
≥ flush heightG@Crit(P→G) = cur view+ v gap
and therefore P also updates ghost[G] = cur view+ v gap.
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In Hr the first step in ReceiveFlush sets flushr[G] = v = cur view+ v gap and it follows
from Lemma 8(5) that at that point we already have
ghostr[G] = v = cur view+ v gap
Therefore, if we hold bothH andHr at the point where both histories are about to invoke
the TryToInstall procedure (in the ReceiveCoDonation and the ReceiveFlush procedures,
respectively), the Interim Non-G Hypothesis is restored.
It follows from Lemma 29 that the execution of TryToInstall in both histories generates
the expected side effects and causes the interim period to end and the Convergent Hy-
pothesis to hold. Lemma 24 ensures that the side effects have the correct target set.
This concludes the proof of the theorem and shows that H and Hr perform the same
computation.
7 Causality and Progress With The CBCAST Algorithm
7.1 The Goals of the Analysis
To show that the algorithm works as expected, we have to prove two things. One is the preservation
of causality, meaning that a message is only delivered at a process after all the messages on which
it depends have already been delivered. The second one is the guarantee of progress - that is to
say that all messages eventually get delivered. It is well known (see [10]) that progress cannot be
guaranteed in the presence of failures, and it follows from [14] that a similar limitation exists in our
model of dynamic membership, even without failures. Therefore we can only prove somewhat less
than a full guarantee of progress.
7.2 The Causal Order Property and The Progress Property
Definition 27. We say that a message m is familiar to a process P if either
• m is delivered at P .
• There is a sequence of processes
P0, P1, . . . , Pn = P where n > 0
such that
1. For each i < n, the process Pi is the parent of process Pi+1, i.e. ∃vj(Pi+1)(Pi)
PR =
nJOIN〈Pi+1, Pi〉.
2. n is delivered at P0 prior to the vj(P1)(P0)
PR event.
Definition 28. We say that a history H of the CBCAST protocol has the Causal Order Property
if messages in H are delivered in an order that respects their causal relationships. Technically, this
means that if a process P originally broadcasts a message m that is eventually delivered at a process
Q then
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1. every message that was broadcast by P prior to broadcasting m is already familiar to Q at the
delivery of m.
2. every message that is familiar to P at the broadcasting m is already familiar to Q at the
delivery of m.
Definition 29. We say that a history H of the CBCAST protocol has the Progress Property if
every message that is originally broadcast by a non-halting process in H eventually becomes familiar
to every non-halting process in H.
Theorem 8 (Causal Order Theorem). The Causal Order Property holds for every conforming
history of the CBCAST protocol.
Theorem 9 (Restricted Progress Theorem). The Progress Property holds for every finite-join
conforming history of the CBCAST protocol.
7.3 Causal Order And Progress In Reduced Histories
As a first step in proving the two theorems, we show that if any of the two properties holds in the
reduction of a transactional history, then it holds in the original history as well. This allows us to
ignore any finite number of process join notifications that may occur in the course of the history. In
our proofs we make use of the fact that H and Hr have been labeled using a common label space
L . This allows us to compare the timing of events that occur in the two histories. As usual we
denote by G the first joining process in H , with D denoting its parent. We will casually refer to
”time” when we technically mean ”constellation label”. The critical time is the constellation ℓvcrit
in the joint label space, when G joins in H .
Definition 30. We say that a message m is taken up at process P if the process moves the
message m into ReceiveSet (this takes place at labeled step 3 of the ReceiveMessage procedure). We
will see later that the same message can be received by the same process many times, but is only
taken up once.
We need the following basic facts:
• By construction Hr and H have the same message broadcast requests (A r = A ) and those
requests are labeled the same way in both histories. This means that the processes in PH
r
originate the same message broadcasts, at the same time, as they do in H .
• We know from the History Equivalence Theorem (Theorem 7) that every process other than
G delivers the same messages, at the same time, in both histories; that the same is true for
G post-critically; and that pre-critically process G delivers the same messages in Hr that D
delivers in H , at the same time. As a result G is familiar, at any post-critical time, with the
same messages in both histories. For other processes in H this is true without restriction.
• It follows from the proof of the History Equivalence Theorem that every process other than
G takes up the same messages, at the same time, in both histories; that the same is true
for G post-critically; and that pre-critically process G takes up the same messages in Hr
that D takes up in H , at the same time. See in particular the parts of the proof that relate
to receiving message packets, donation packets and co-donation packets. Notice that cloned
message packets always result in the message being discarded rather than being taken up.
Theorem 10. Let H be a transactional history that includes at least one join notification, and let
Hr be its reduction. If The Causal Order Property holds in Hr then it holds in H as well.
164
Proof. Let P and Q be any processes in H and let m be a message that originates at P and is
eventually delivered at Q. Let n be a message is either originated by P prior to originating m or is
familiar to P when it originates m.
If P originates n prior to m in H , then P also originates n prior to m in Hr. If P is familiar with
n when it originates m in H , it is also familiar with it in Hr when it originates m. Since Q delivers
m in H , it also delivers m in Hr. Because the Causal Order Property holds in Hr this implies that
Q is familiar with n at the time that it delivers m in Hr. If that time is post-critical, then Q is
also familiar with n at the same time in H and we are done. If the time is pre-critical, then Q 6= G
(because G does not exist in H pre-critically) and therefore Q is familiar with n at the same time
in H regardless.
Theorem 11. Let H be a transactional history that includes at least one join notification, and let
Hr be its reduction. If The Progress Property holds in Hr then it holds in H as well.
Proof. Let P and Q be two processes in H that never halt, and letm be a message that is originated
by P . Then P and Q, as processes in Hr are also non-halting, and P originates m in Hr as well.
Since the Progress Property holds in Hr, Q eventually becomes familiar with m in Hr. If this
happens post-critically or if Q 6= G then Q also becomes familiar with m in H . If it happens pre-
critically and Q = G then after the critical time G becomes familiar in H with all the messages that
G was familiar with in Hr pre-critically, since it does not halt. Therefore in all cases Q eventually
becomes familiar with m in H .
Transactional histories are artificial and do not arise naturally the way conforming histories do. In
addition, the reduction of a transactional history is rarely transactional. Therefore we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 31. Let H be a conforming history and let tr(H) be its transactional closure (see the Fault
Theorem, Theorem 1). If tr(H) has the Causal Order Property then so does H. If tr(H) has the
Progress Property then so does H.
Proof. We start with the Causal Order Property. Suppose that in H a message m originates at
process P and is delivered at process Q. Suppose that a message n is either originated by P prior
to originating m, or else is familiar to P at the time that it originates m. History tr(H) contains all
the events of H , and by construction an H dequeuing event is processed the same way in tr(H) as
it is in H . Therefore m originates at P and is delivered at Q in tr(H) and n is originated at P or is
familiar to P in tr(H) prior to the origination of m. Since tr(H) has the causal order property, n
must be delivered at Q prior to the delivery of m, in tr(H). By construction tr(H) does not contain
any new events that precede existing H events. Therefore n must be delivered at an original H
event, which means that n is delivered in H as well. Therefore H has the Causal Order Property.
To prove the Progress Property suppose that in H a message m originates at a non-halting process
P and suppose that Q is also a non-halting process, not necessarily distinct from P . Then in tr(H)
both P and Q are non-halting and P originates m. Since tr(H) has the Progress Property m is
delivered at Q in tr(H), as part of the processing of some event e. If e is an original H event then
m is delivered in H and we are done. Otherwise e is a vacuum event that is generated by the
vacuum loop. But the vacuum loop is only applied to halting processes, and Q does not halt. This
concludes the proof.
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7.4 Stunting
A join-free history is a history H where no processes join. In other words all the processes in PH are
members of view zero, and all view changes are removals of existing members. The discussion so far
implies that if only we could prove that all join-free transactional histories enjoy the Causal Order
Property and the Progress Property, then any finite-join conforming history would enjoy these
properties as well. We are going to prove exactly that in the next section. As far as the Restricted
Progress Theorem is concerned, nothing more is claimed. However, the Causal Order Theorem
claims that the Causal Order Property holds for all conforming histories, not only finite-join ones.
We plug this gap by introducing the notion of stunting.
Definition 31. Let H be a transactional history and let 0 < v < VH be any view change in H.
Then the stunting of H at view v, denoted H<v, is the stunted history (see Definition 5) that is
obtained from H by taking only that part of H that precedes the view change constellation ℓv. We
now define the stunting as follows:
P
H<v =
⋃
u<v
S
H
u
P
H<v
h = P
H<v
V
H<v = v
S
H<v
i = S
H
i for all i < v
K
H<v =
{
k ∈ KH | view(kQU) < v
}
−−→
PQH
<v
=
−−→
PQH
⋂
K
H<v for all P,Q ∈ PH
<v
E
H<v =
{
e ∈ EH | view(e) < v
}
≺H
<v
=≺H
⋂ (
E
H<v ×EH
<v
)
F
H<v = {vi(P ) ∈ F |i < v}
A
H<v =
{
r ∈ A |rPR ∈ EH
<v
}
All the packets and notifications have the same faulting characteristics that they inherit from H .
Since H is transactional there are no dropped packets or notifications.
The proof thatH<v is a conforming history is tedious but straightforward and we omit it. Moreover,
if all the processes in H<v start with the same internal state they had in H then H<v becomes a
history of the execution of the CBCAST protocol and at any point in time up to ℓv the internal state
in the processes in H<v is identical to the internal state of the same processes in H .
Theorem 12. Assume that the Causal Order Property holds for all join-free transactional histories.
Then it holds for all conforming histories.
Proof. We have already shown that under the assumption the property holds for all finite-join
conforming histories. Let H be an infinite-join conforming history and let P and Q be processes
in H . Suppose that P originates a message m and that m is delivered at Q. Assume also that a
message n is either originated by P prior to the origination of m or that n is familiar to P at the
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time that it originates m. Since H is an infinite-join history, there is a view v for which the view
change notification event occurs after Q delivers m.
Look at the v stunting of H . Since H<v has the same state as H up to time ℓv and since m is
delivered at Q before time ℓv, m is also delivered at Q at the same time in H
<v. The origination
of m by P occurs before Q delivers m, so it also occurs before ℓv and therefore occurs in H
<v.
For the same reasons message n is either originated by P prior to m or is familiar to P at the
time m is originated, in the stunted history. Since the stunted history is a finite-join conforming
history, the Causal Order Property holds there and therefore Q is familiar with n at the time that
it delivers m. Therefore the same happens in H and we are done.
All we have left to do is prove the Causal Order Theorem (Theorem 8) and the Restricted Progress
Theorem (Theorem 9) in the case of join-free transactional histories. For the rest of the paper we
will consider only such histories. In particular, we will assume without further comment that every
view notification is a removal, and we will not refer to message familiarity (see Definition 27) since
it is now synonymous with message delivery. Any definitions (and most importantly, the notion of
effective route) will only be assumed to make sense for join-free transactional histories.
In a join-free history of CBCAST the values of LiveSet, ContactSet and MSet have the relations
LiveSet = ContactSet
LiveSet ⊂ MSet
Therefore we will assume that all live processes are contacted and are members of the current view.
7.5 The Central Lemma
Both theorems rely heavily on the a lemma which we refer to as the Central Lemma, and which we
will introduce after a few definitions.
Definition 32. The installation gap of view v at process P is the gap between v and the highest
view known to P at the time that v is installed at P . It is the value of v gap when the view v is
installed at process P . More precisely, it is the value of v gap at labeled step 4 of the TryToInstall
procedure when cur view = v. The installation gap of a view v at process P is denoted by gapv(P ).
Lemma 32. Let P and Q be processes and suppose that P installs view v when Q is still alive
(Q ∈ LiveSet). Then P must have received a pFLUSH〈v + gapv(P )〉 from Q prior to installing the
view.
Proof. Looking at the TryToInstall procedure one can verify that flush[Q] = v+gapv(P ) when view
v is installed at P . The claim now follows from Lemma 10 and from the monotonicity of flush[Q]
(Lemma 8(6)).
Definition 33. Due to forwarding, each message can be received and acknowledged multiple times
by a process, but the message is moved into ReceiveSet and FwdQueue[] at most once (See labeled
step 1 of ReceiveMessage). Additionally, since a forwarding queue becomes empty after forwarding
(see labeled step 6 of the protRemove procedure), a sender will only send a message once to any
target. Therefore for any message that is received by a target there is at most one effective sender
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- namely the sender that managed to get its message packet not just acknowledged but also appended
to the forwarding queue of the receiver - and only one effective packet that is sent by the effective
sender. A message gets forwarded only as a result of a notification of the removal of the effective
sender. As a result, for every process that receives a message, there is at most one effective route
of retransmissions of effective packets leading from the message originator to the process.
Lemma 33. Let n be a message and let
ORIG(n) = R0 → R1 → R2 → R3 → · · · → Rk = T where k ≥ 0
Be the effective route of n from its originator R0 to process T . Then for every 0 ≤ i <= k the
process Ri is a member of view VIEW(n) and
r(R0) < r(R1) < · · · < r(Rk−1)
Proof. Messages are only originated or forwarded by members of the message view to members
of the message view (see labeled step 2 of the protBroadcast procedure and labeled step 4 of
the protRemove procedure). That proves the first claim. Forwarding is triggered by the removal
notification of the effective sender, and view change notifications are only queued to members of
that view. That proves the second claim.
Lemma 34. When a message is received by a process for the first time it is moved into ReceiveSet
and FwdQueue[]. Therefore for every message n that is received by a process R there is exactly one
effective route from the originator of n to R.
Proof. Following the flow of ReceiveMessage we see that there are three cases where a message can
be discarded without being moved into ReceiveSet and FwdQueue[]. The second and third cases
occur when the message has already been delivered and when the message is still in ReceiveSet.
Neither of these cases can occur the first time the message is received. The first case occurs when
the message is obsolete. To prove the lemma we have to show that in this case as well the message is
not received for the first time. Suppose therefore that a process S sent a message packet pMSG〈n〉 to
process R, which then discarded the message as obsolete. Either S is the originator of the message
or it forwards n out of its FwdQueue[]. Either way there exists in this case an effective route
G = G0 → G1 → · · · → Gk = S where k ≥ 0 (1)
Where G = ORIG(n) is the originator of n. Notice that k = 0 covers the case where S = G, i.e. the
case where S is the originator of n.
From Lemma 33 we know that r(G0) < r(G1) < · · · < r(Gk−1). In addition r(Gk−1) < r(S)
because S forwards n (when k > 0) as a result of the removal of the effective sender Gk−1. We also
know that VIEW(n) < r(G) because G originates n. So for all i, we know that r(Gi) > VIEW(n) and
therefore Gi ∈ SVIEW(n).
By assumption, message n was obsolete when received by R from S. This means that R had
already installed view VIEW(n) + 1. It follows from Lemma 32 that process R must have received
a pFLUSH〈> VIEW(n)〉 packet from every member of VIEW(n) for which R had not yet received a
removal notification. In other words, before R can install VIEW(n) + 1 it must have received either
a p
FLUSH
〈> VIEW(n)〉 packet or a nREM〈P 〉 notification from/about every member P ∈ VIEW(n).
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This is true in particular for the processes in the effective route above, all of whom are members of
VIEW(n).
We know that R does not receive a nREM〈S〉 notification before installing view VIEW(n) + 1. This
is because it receives the message packet pMSG〈n〉 from S after installing the view, and by the
Conforming Packet Axiom this can only happen if R still considers S to be alive. Let i be the index
of the first process Gi in the effective route for which R does not receive a nREM〈Gi〉 notification
prior to installing view VIEW(n) + 1.
If i = 0, then Gi is the originator of n. Since R does not receive a nREM〈G0〉 notification, it must
receive a pFLUSH〈> VIEW(n)〉 packet from G0. But G0 only sends such a packet when cur view +
v gap > VIEW(n). Being the originator of n, process G0 broadcasts n while cur view = VIEW(n) and
v gap = 0 (messages are not broadcast when v gap > 0). This means that R receives n from G0
before receiving the flush packet and therefore before installing view VIEW(n) + 1, so the obsolete
pMSG〈n〉 packet from S is not the first receipt of n.
If i > 0, then R receives nREM〈Gi−1〉 prior to installing view VIEW(n) + 1. When that happens,
cur view+v gap = r(Gi−1) (See labeled step 2 of protRemove). It also implies that r(R) > r(Gi−1).
Afterwards, R does not proceed to install VIEW(n) + 1 before receiving pFLUSH〈≥ r(Gi−1)〉 from all
the surviving members of VIEW(n).
Now look at process Gi. it forwards its pMSG〈n〉 when it receives nREM〈Gi−1〉. It then places n in
its WaitSet, together with an instability set that includes R (since r(R) > r(Gi−1)). It then waits
for WaitSet to clear before sending its first pFLUSH〈≥ r(Gi−1)〉. We know that this flush packet is
eventually sent by Gi, by definition of i, so n does indeed leave WaitSet. We also know that the
flush packet is sent while Gi still considers R to be alive, according to the Process Liveness Axiom.
Therefore n must leave WaitSet as a result of Gi receiving a pACK〈n〉 packet from R. This means
that R receives n from Gi before installing view VIEW(n) + 1, so the obsolete pMSG〈n〉 packet from
S is not the first receipt of n in this case either.
Lemma 35 (Central Lemma). If process P installs view vm with gapvm(P ) = 0, then any message
n with view(n) < vm that is received by P is also received by all other processes that install view
vm.
We will prove the central lemma a little later on. First, we use it to prove the Causal Order Theorem
and the Restricted Progress Theorem.
Proof of the Causal Order Theorem. We start with a note on message origination and broadcasting.
The act of originating a message requires two separate steps whenever v gap > 0. First, placing the
message on LaunchQueue (see labeled step 1 of the protBroadcast procedure), and then later when
v gap becomes zero, queuing packets containing the message (see labeled step 5 of the TryToInstall
procedure). In the context of this proof, we are talking about the second step whenever we talk
about broadcasting a message. This definition of the term ”broadcast” can create phantom causal
relationships between messages. Specifically, if message n is delivered after message m is placed
on LaunchQueue but before a packet containing m is queued, we consider m to be dependent on
n, though they are obviously independent. This does not invalidate our arguments, of course,
but it does imply that the algorithm serializes message delivery to a greater degree than seems
necessary. This suboptimal behavior is inherent in the protocol, because every view change is a
global synchronization point that generates excess serialization.
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Let P and Q be processes, and let m be a message that is broadcast by P and is delivered at Q.
We have to demonstrate parts 1 and 2 of Definition 28. Remember that message familiarity is now
synonymous with message delivery.
We start by observing that whenever a process P broadcasts a message n, the message is delivered
at P itself before it processes any further notifications from GMS. This follows from the Self Channel
Axiom. This axiom only implies that n is received by P prior to processing any further notifications
from GMS. However, when n is received by P it is immediately deliverable. This is easy to verity
when you notice that P stamps n with its own vector time before broadcasting it. Moreover, the
ReceiveMessage() procedure includes a call to Scan(), resulting in an immediate delivery of n. As
a result, if P broadcasts n before broadcasting m, and if VIEW(n) < VIEW(m), then n is familiar
to P when it broadcasts m, and we can lump this case under part 2 of definition 28. This leaves
the case VIEW(n) = VIEW(m). In this case we have VT(n) < VT(m) because n gets stamped by P
before m does.
When P broadcasts m, it has view
cur view = VIEW(m)
v gap = 0
and therefore gapVIEW(m)(P ) = 0.
Also, since m is delivered at Q we know that Q installs VIEW(m). Therefore P and Q meet the
requirements of the Central Lemma. We divide the messages that are broadcast by P or delivered
at P prior to the broadcast of m into the following subsets:
1. For each 0 < k < VIEW(m), the set
Mk = {n|VIEW(n) = k and n is delivered at P}
2. All the messages n with VIEW(n) = VIEW(m) and VT(n) < VT(m)
Our previous observation shows that these sets cover all the messages n of both part 1 and part 2
of Definition 28. The messages in the second category must be delivered at Q prior to the delivery
of m (see section 5.1 of [6]). For a given 0 < k < VIEW(m), the Central Lemma implies that all the
messages in Mk are received by Q.
Suppose that there is a message in Mk that is not delivered at Q, and let n be such a message with
a minimal vector time. Let n′ be any message, not necessarily in Mk , such that VIEW(n
′) = k and
VT(n′) ≺ VT(n). Because n ∈Mk , n is delivered at P . Therefore n
′ must be delivered at P before
n is delivered (see section 5.1 of [6]), and therefore n′ ∈Mk . By the minimality of n, we know that
n′ is delivered at Q. Look at the latest of the following points in time:
• The point at which n enters ReceiveSet(Q) (at labeled step 3 of ReceiveMessage)
• For each n′ with VIEW(n′) = k and VT(n′) ≺ VT(n), the point at which n′ is delivered at Q
(labeled step 1 of Scan)
• The point at which Q installs view k (labeled step 4 of TryToInstall)
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This latest point in time has the following two properties. First, Scan() is called shortly after that
point, as can be verified by tracing each of the three code locations. Second, the message n is present
in ReceiveSet(Q) at that point. To see that, notice that by definition n must have already entered
ReceiveSet(Q) (because of the first point in time), so we only have to show that n has not yet been
removed. There are two places where n can be removed. The first is labeled step 1 of Scan, which
is where n is delivered. Since all the above points in time must occur before n can be delivered,
this case can be excluded. The second is labeled step 2 of TryToInstall, where n is removed as an
obsolete message. But all the points in time that we listed must occur before Q installs a view
that is higher than k, so this case can be excluded as well. Therefore the message n is present in
ReceiveSet(Q) at the latest point in time. Moreover, n is deliverable at this point because Q has
already installed view k and all the messages of lower vector time have been delivered. Therefore
the imminent call to Scan() will result in the immediate delivery of n to Q (in the case of labeled
step 1 of Scan it may happen even earlier, within the loop). Due to their low view, the messages
in Mk must be delivered at Q before the installation of VIEW(m) which in turn takes place before
the delivery of m.
In order to prove the Restricted Progress Theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 36. Non-halting processes install all the views.
Proof. The proof depends on the finiteness condition in a fundamental way. Let vL be the last
view. By definition, the non-halting processes are exactly the members of that view. Let P be a
non-halting process. At some point in time P dequeues a notification of the last view which by
assumption is a notification nREM〈X〉 of the removal of the last halting process X .
When P processes that notification it forwards all the messages in FwdQueue[X ] in order, and
moves them to its WaitSet. Thereafter, as long as P does not install view vL, P does not add any
new messages to WaitSet. This is because messages are added to WaitSet only after broadcasting
or forwarding a message. But since v gap > 0 during the period at hand, P does not broadcast any
messages, and since no further view change notifications occur, P does not forward any messages
either. All the messages in WaitSet, having been sent by the non-halting process P , are eventually
acknowledged by all the non-halting processes.
Since P has already received notice of the removal of all the halting processes, this implies that all
the messages in WaitSet eventually stabilize and therefore WaitSet empties. Once that happens,
P sends a pFLUSH〈vL〉 packet to all the non-halting processes. This means that every non-halting
process eventually receives a p
FLUSH
〈vL〉 packet from all the non-halting processes. Once that
happens, all the views up to an including vL are installed immediately.
Proof of the Restricted Progress Theorem. Let P and Q be two non-halting processes and suppose
P broadcasts a message m. A join-free history can only have a finite number of view changes so
we have to show that m is eventually delivered at Q.
Let vL be the last view. By Lemma 36, both P and Q install vL, and by necessity they do it with
gapvL(P ) = gapvL(Q) = 0. By the Central Lemma this implies that all messages that were received
by P prior to view vL are also received by Q and vice versa. More generally, all the non-halting
processes receive the same messages prior to installing view vL.
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To see that the same happens with messages that are received after installing view vL, observe that
since view vL is comprised exclusively of non-halting processes, all messages sent in view vL are
broadcast by non-halting processes and therefore must be received by all members of vL. Therefore,
all the non-halting processes receive the same messages.
We will show now that non-halting processes also deliver the same messages. Let n be a minimal
message is delivered at a non-halting process P but not delivered at a non-halting process Q. We
know by the discussion above that n is received by Q, and therefore by Lemma 34 n enters Q’s
ReceiveSet. We know by the Causal Order Theorem all the messages that message n depends on are
delivered at P and by minimality are also delivered at Q. Why would n not be delivered? Looking
at the Scan and TryToInstall procedures, we see that n enters ReceiveSet when cur view ≤ VIEW(n),
and n is not delivered as long as Q does not install VIEW(n). In addition n is removed from
ReceiveSet without being delivered if it has not been delivered by the time Q installs VIEW(n) + 1.
From lemma 36 we know that Q installs view VIEW(n). Look at the latest of the following three
points in time:
1. Q has received the effective packet p
MSG
〈n〉, and has just placed n in ReceiveSet. (Occurs at
the conclusion of labeled step 3 of ReceiveMessage.)
2. Q has just delivered the last message that n depends on. (Occurs at the conclusion of labeled
step 1 of Scan.)
3. Q has just installed VIEW(n). (Occurs at labeled step 4 of TryToInstall.)
When that latest moment occurs, two conditions are met. First, Q has cur view = VIEW(n), because
at least the third moment occurs when cur view = VIEW(n), and none of the other two moments
can happen after a higher view is installed. Second, the message n is in ReceiveSet because it enters
the set at the first moment and neither way out of the set (delivery of n or installation of a higher
view) is available until after all three moments in time have occurred. As a result, the message n
becomes deliverable at that moment. Looking at the relevant code locations, one can see that the
Scan procedure is either invoked or (in the second case) continues to be executed, resulting in the
delivery of n.
We are almost done. We know that all the non-halting processes deliver the same messages, but
we have to show that they deliver all the messages that originate from non-halting processes. To
do that, we will show that every process delivers all the messages that it originates itself. Since all
non-halting processes deliver the same messages, this implies the desired result.
Suppose that the non-halting process P originates a message n. Since P is non-halting it receives
n and by Lemma 34 it must be placed in P ’s ReceiveSet. As we already observed in the proof of
the Causal Order Theorem, when n is placed in ReceiveSet of its own originator it is immediately
deliverable, because its VT(n) is derived from P ’s vector time in exactly the fashion that makes it
deliverable. Since message placement in ReceiveSet is followed by a call to Scan() (labeled steps 3
and 5 of ReceiveMessage), n is delivered at P and we are done.
7.6 Proving the Central Lemma
We start with a technical lemma that we will use repeatedly in the proof of the Central Lemma.
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Lemma 37. Let A, B, D and F be processes (not necessarily distinct), and let n be a message,
meeting the following criteria:
1. Process D sends an effective pMSG〈n〉 packet to process F as it broadcasts or forwards n.
2. Process B is a member of VIEW(n).
3. r(D) < r(F ).
4. Process A receives a p
FLUSH
〈f〉 packet from process F , with r(D) ≤ f < r(B)
Then process B receives n before process F queues a pFLUSH〈f〉 packet to process A and before B
dequeues a notification of view r(F ).
Proof. Original messages are broadcast to all the members of the message view (see labeled step 2
of the protBroadcast procedure. When no processes join, ContactSet = LiveSet and since v gap = 0
here, MSet = LiveSet), and are forwarded to all the surviving members of the message view (see
labeled step 4 of protRemove). By condition 2 process B is a member of VIEW(n) and condition
4 implies that r(D) < r(B), so process D never receives a nREM〈B〉 notification. Therefore, when
D broadcasts or forwards message n, it queues a pMSG〈n〉 packet to process B. By condition 1 we
know that D also queues a p
MSG
〈n〉 packet to F , and that this packet is effective. That means that
when process F receives the packet, it appends n to its forwarding queue, with D as the sender
(see labeled step 4 of ReceiveMessage). Condition 3 implies that F receives a nREM〈D〉 notification.
We divide the rest of the proof into two cases. The easy case is when n is still in the forwarding
queue when the nREM〈D〉 notification is dequeued by F . The harder case is when n has already
been removed from the forwarding queue.
If n is still in the forwarding queue, then F forwards n to all the surviving members of view VIEW(n),
which include B because r(D) < r(B). It then moves n to its wait set, together with an instability
set that includes B (see labeled step 6 of protRemove). The moment that F dequeues the removal
notification of D is also the first point in time at which cur view+ v gap ≥ r(D) in F (see labeled
step 1 of protRemove). Therefore, the flush packet that F sends to A according to condition 4 is
queued later (see labeled step 2 of CheckFlush). Since flush packets are only queued when WaitSet
is empty (see condition in ambient block of same location), the flush packet must be queued after
message n has left the wait set, i.e. message n must have stabilized in the meantime. But process
B was initially in the instability set of message n. Message n can stabilize with respect to process
B either by receipt of a removal notification for process B, or by receipt of an acknowledgment of
message n by B. In the latter case B must send the acknowledgment to F before becoming aware
of view r(F ) and we are done. The former case is impossible because condition 4 implies that the
flush packet was sent before process F dequeued a notification of the removal of process B.
If n is not in the forwarding queue when a nREM〈D〉 notification is received by F , it means that
it has already been removed. The only possible cause of removal is the installation, by F , of view
VIEW(n) + 1 (see labeled step 3 of the TryToInstall procedure). Let
e = VIEW(n) + 1 + gapVIEW(n)+1(F )
F installs view VIEW(n)+1 only after receiving pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 from all the surviving members of view
VIEW(n) (see lemma 32). In the case at hand process D is one of the surviving members, because
by our assumption F receives the nREM〈D〉 notification after installing the new view. This also
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implies that e < r(D) and therefore, by condition 4, e < f , and therefore F sends the pFLUSH〈f〉
packet to A after installing view VIEW(n) + 1.
If we are lucky, then D sends the effective pMSG〈n〉 packet before sending pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 to F . In that
case n enters the wait set of D with process B in its instability set, and it must exit the wait set
before the flush is sent. Since r(D) < r(B), this can only happen if B receives and acknowledges n.
Process B acknowledges the receipt of n before D sends a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 packet to F , which is received
by F before it installs view VIEW(n) + 1, which in turn happens before F sends a pFLUSH〈f〉 packet
to A. Process B acknowledges the receipt of n before becoming aware of r(D) and r(D) < r(F ),
so the acknowledgment is sent before B is aware of the death of F and so we are done in this case.
If we are not lucky, then D sends a p
FLUSH
〈≥ e〉 to F and only later sends an effective packet
pMSG〈n〉 to F . Let
D0 → D1 → · · · → Dk = D → F where k ≥ 0
Be the effective route of the message n from its originator D0 through D to F . Let i be the smallest
integer such that Di sends a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 packet to F before sending an effective pMSG〈n〉 packet
along the effective route. Then i > 0 because the originator D0 broadcasts n while v gap = 0, so it
could not have sent a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 beforehand, since e > VIEW(n). Process Di forwards n along the
effective route after receiving a nREM〈Di−1〉 notification, which arrives, by the definition of i, after
Di already sent a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 packet to F . This implies that r(Di−1) > e, which in turn implies
(by lemma 32) that F does not install view VIEW(n) + 1 before receiving a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 from Di−1.
By definition, Di−1 must send the effective pMSG〈n〉 along the effective route before sending the
pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 packet. In addition, by lemma 33 r(Di−1) < r(D) < r(B) so Di−1 sends message n to
process B and when it moves n to its wait set it includes process B in the instability set of n. As a
result, Di−1 cannot send a pFLUSH〈≥ e〉 packet to F before n stabilizes with respect to process B,
and since r(Di−1) < r(B), this stabilization can only happen as a result of a receipt of a pACK〈n〉
packet from B. So in this case as well B receives and acknowledges message n, and it must happen
before F installs view VIEW(n)+ 1, which in turn happens before F sends a pFLUSH〈f〉 packet to A.
In addition B must send the acknowledgment of receipt of n before becoming aware of the death
of Di−1 and since r(Di−1) < r(D) < r(F ) this means that B sends the acknowledgment before
becoming aware of view r(F ). So we are done in this case as well.
Proof of the Central Lemma. Assume that there is a message n with VIEW(n) < vm that is received
by process P , and let Q be some process that installed view vm. Denote vn = VIEW(n). Let
S = ORIG(n), the process that originally broadcast n. Then there is an effective route (see Definition
33 and Lemma 34) of pMSG〈n〉 packets:
S → R1 → R2 → R3 → · · · → Rk → P where k ≥ 0 (2)
To streamline our arguments, we will occasionally refer to S as R0 and to P as Rk+1. By Lemma
33 all the processes in the effective route must be members of vn and
r(S) < r(R1) < · · · < r(Rk)
By assumption, P installs view(vm), and gapvm(P ) = 0. From Lemma 32 we know that in order
to install view vm process P must first receive a pFLUSH〈vm + gapvm(P )〉 packet from each member
of LiveSet. It is easy to check that LiveSet = MSet whenever v gap = 0. Therefore P must receive
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a pFLUSH〈vm〉 packet from every member of view(vm). We will use that fact several times in the
argument below.
Rk+1 = P is a member of view vm. Let i be the smallest integer such that Ri is a member of vm.
We will divide the proof to two cases: i > 0 and i = 0.
We start with the case i > 0.
Since i > 0 there exists a process Ri−1 that sends an effective packet pMSG〈n〉 to Ri, and Ri−1 is
not a member of view vm. Since both are members of view vn and Ri is a member of view vm,
r(Ri−1) is in the membership interval of Ri and so it must receive a nREM〈Ri−1〉 packet from the
membership service. We know that vn < vm < r(Ri). We look at the following cases:
Case I: r(Q) ≤ r(Ri).
We know that Q installs view vm, and by the assumption of the current case, Q never receives a
removal notification for Ri. It follows from Lemma 32 that Q must receive a pFLUSH〈f〉 packet from
Ri where f ≥ vm before installing view vm. Assigning A = B = Q, D = Ri−1 and F = Ri, we can
check that all the conditions of Lemma 37 are met. The only difficulty is with condition 4. There
we have
r(D) = r(Ri−1) ≤ vm ≤ f
Ri would not send a pFLUSH〈f〉 packet to Q if it were aware of its removal, therefore f < r(Q) =
r(B)
Therefore process Q receives n.
Case II: r(Q) > r(Ri).
Since process Ri is a member of view vm, P must receive a pFLUSH〈f〉 from Ri, where f = vm,
before it installs view vm. Assigning A = P , B = Q, D = Ri−1 and F = Ri, we can check that all
the conditions of Lemma 37 are met. Again the difficulty is with condition 4. There we have
r(D) = r(Ri−1) ≤ vm = f
f < r(Ri) < r(Q) = r(B)
Therefore process Q receives n in this case as well.
We now turn to the case i = 0.
i = 0 means that process S, the originator of message n, is a member of view vm. Therefore S
must send a pFLUSH〈vm〉 packet to P . Since Q is a member of view vm, this flush packet must be
sent while Q is in LiveSet(S).
When S broadcasts n, cur view(S) = vn and v gap(S) = 0, because message broadcasts do not
occur when v gap > 0. As a result the broadcast occurs before S sends the p
FLUSH
〈vm〉 packet to
P , and while Q is in LiveSet(S). This implies that S sends a pMSG〈n〉 packet to Q as part of the
broadcast, and it includes Q in the instability set of n as it adds its record to WaitSet(S). The
message n must stabilize with respect to Q before S sends the p
FLUSH
〈vm〉 packet. This flush packet
is sent before S receives a removal notification for Q. Therefore the stabilization can only occur as
a result of the receipt of a pACK〈n〉 packet from Q. In other words, Q must receive n.
This concludes the proof of the case i = 0 and of the Central Lemma.
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